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spanning the globe. While there is nothing new in universities’ links with
industry, what is recent is their role as territorial actors. It is government
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expected to be at the heart of networked structures contributing to the
growth of productive knowledge-oriented clusters.
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of broader political histories, comparing how countries in Europe and
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Universities are at the heart of our productive capacity and are powerful
drivers of technological change. They are central to local and regional eco-
nomic development and produce people with knowledge and skills. They
are at the hub of business networks and industrial clusters of the know-
ledge economy.
(Lord Sainsbury 2002 announcing the new Faraday Partnerships)
This statement by the UK’s Minister of Science and Technology ideologi-
cally and politically places universities at the centre of economic develop-
ment per se and of contemporary local and regional economies.
Academics researching in this field have made similar statements. For
example, Leifner et al. (2004, 23) state that ‘A society’s economic competi-
tiveness is dependent on the performance of its higher education
institutions’ and Godin and Gingras (2000) argue that, despite a real diver-
sification of the loci of production of knowledge, ‘universities still are at
the heart of the system and all other actors rely on the expertise’. In
answering the question ‘what is the role of universities in knowledge-based
capitalism?’ Florida and Cohen (1999, 590) argue that ‘Science has
emerged as an alternative to engine of economic growth to the classic
triumvirate of land, labour and capital, the traditional sources of wealth’.
This statement raises a number of questions. For example, what kinds
of roles do universities play in economic development? One answer is that
‘The best of the world’s research universities are uniquely the sources of
vitality, understanding and skills in highly developed societies’ (Kodama
and Branscomb 1999, 4). Is this role unique to universities? The European
Commission (EC) (2003a) finds that it is. In setting out its view of the role
and uniqueness of universities, the Report claims, ‘The knowledge society
depends for its growth on the production of new knowledge, its transmis-
sion through education and training, its dissemination through information
and communication technologies and on its use through new industrial
processes or services’. Universities take part in all three processes and are
‘at the heart of the Europe of Knowledge’ (page 4). Thus as Florida and
Cohen (1999, 593) argue, the shift from industrial capitalism to know-
ledge-based capitalism makes the university ever more critical as a
provider of resources such as talent, knowledge and innovation. State
intervention, therefore, is justified because the role for policy makers is to
‘introduce governance systems to make technological interactions and
technological communications possible’ (Antonelli and Quere 2002, 1051)
reducing the interaction deficit within and across national (and regional)
innovation systems (Geuna et al. 2003) thereby improving the distribution
power of the innovation system (David and Foray 1995).
The ‘triple helix’ model of university–industry–government relations
developed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997) encapsulates this notion
of interdependence and institutional change. It denotes ‘a transformation
in the relationship among university, industry and government as well as
within each of these spheres’ (Etzkowitz 2003, 295). It has gained common
currency in both policy and academic discourses because of its articulation
of a convergence in missions and strategies within each of these three
spheres (Georghiou and Metcalfe 2002). It is also ‘a significant shift in the
social contract’ between universities and society (Martin, B. 2003, 25).
Such a convergence in missions at regional and local as well as national
levels amounts to what Charles (2003) describes as an ‘instrumental posi-
tion’. It is based on the underlying assumption that proximity is causal in
improving the efficiency by which the process of innovation occurs –
innovation being defined as ‘the process of transforming an invention into
something commercially useful and valuable’ (Miller and Morris 1999).
Now the key economic actor is increasingly expected to be a cluster of
firms emanating from or at least closely associated with a university or
other knowledge-producing institution (Etzkowitz 2003). The pervasive-
ness of Porter’s (1990, 1998) cluster concept is a major factor in this narrat-
ive, giving as it does a clear policy strategy to local or regional policy
makers by suggesting that local linkages are a key factor in economic com-
petitiveness. This position is increasingly being challenged, however, as
assumptions are questioned about the economic significance of intra-
regional linkages, including those of between universities and local firms,
as evidence casts doubt on the connection, or indeed the existence of
strong patterns of local linkages and indeed whether they are desirable in
an increasingly internationalized economy (Malmberg and Power 2004).
As the book will show, the impacts of universities, many of which will be
at a regional or local scale, will vary considerably over time, over space
between sectors, between firms of different sizes and that both academics
and policy-makers need to be more aware of these variations.
The background to the now normative position that universities are cre-
ators of wealth is the slowdown in productivity growth and associated
decline in competitiveness of firms in high-technology industries in the
later 1970s and early 1980s which has been blamed on the decline in the
rate of technological innovation (see Poyago-Theotoky et al. 2002). These
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authors find that concerns were especially strong in the US at Federal and
state level. This brought about a new wave of thinking in technology
policy in which university–industry partnerships were at the forefront. In
the UK, for example, since the 1980s, three different governmental and
academic discourses have been constructed around enterprise and innova-
tion. The first discourse in the 1980s within the loose framework of
Thatcherite policies was about individuals and entrepreneurship. Second,
in the 1990s, this was joined by the national policy agenda of the valoriza-
tion of public-sector research. Third, the debate has been about enterprise
– valorization and regional development (Lawton Smith 2003a).
As Europe strives to compete with the US (and the US with China),
current initiatives established to integrate European higher education
systems – the European Research Area and European Higher Education
Area – are designed to overcome the European paradox: a strong science
base but poor performance in technological and industrial competitiveness
(EC 1996 and EC 2003b, 413). This Europeanization of member states’
higher education system is designed to increase internal equity and the
EU’s competitive position versus the US through harmonization. There is
to be closer interaction not only between public research/universities and
industry but also between different parts of the public research system in
order to reduce fragmentation and compartmentalization of EU public
research (EC 2003b, 428). France’s dirigiste system is very different from
the UK’s laissez-faire system and from the German decentralized regional
system.
It is a combination of the lack of integration of science and techno-
logical systems across member states, a confusion of institutional arrange-
ments and objectives and weaknesses in particular fields, that has put
Europe behind the US. Riccaboni et al. (2003) find that it is variations in
the organizations in upstream R&D processes between the US and
Europe as a whole that are responsible for differences in performance and
the greater integrative capacity among the diverse kinds of actors and
organizations. It is not just the structure with respect to institutional rules,
but what is done within that structure, for example rules regulating terms
and conditions of employment (Steinmueller 2003). With respect to
technological advance, the US has relative strengths as measured through
scientific or technological output indicators; R&D or economic perform-
ance indicators are in information and computer sciences and mechanical
and electronic engineering, areas where the EU15 is weak (EC 1994).
Thus the US, more so than Europe, is spending more on the very R&D-
intensive competition (for example in sectors such as advanced organic
chemicals and telecommunications equipment) that needs more science
inputs and requires high levels of both government and industry expendi-
ture on R&D (Grupp 1995).
This book came about because of my unease with the uncritical position
of the territorial role as the latest of the multiple roles that universities are
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required to perform. This disquiet sits alongside numerous articles that
have appeared in the UK’s national press about the problematic position
that universities and individual academics have been placed in with regard
to the ownership and control of intellectual property created during the
course of research funded by industry. It seems to me that the techno-
economic prioritization pays insufficient attention to the evidence or the
consequences of the policy of ‘encouraging’ universities to increase the
amount of industrial research they undertake.
What therefore does the book set out to do? It sets out to record para-
digm shifts articulated in policies that are a response to and further rein-
force trends already taking place and in which universities are being
repositioned in society’s expectations in relation to industry. It compares
developments in Europe with those in the US, the world’s largest economy
and the yardstick for measurement for the rest of the world. It explores
the incentives for change, which are being remade in the contemporary
political economy. It also shows how universities are sites of conflict faced
with a number of tensions such as those between the balance of effort of
teaching and research, with regard to ethical issues about what kinds
of scientific research should be undertaken and legal issues over ownership
of intellectual property versus openness within the academic process. It is
generally the case in countries belonging to the Organization for Eco-
nomic Development (OECD) that the share of Government Expenditure
on Research and Development (GERD) funded by governments has
decreased with that share being largely taken over by industry.
Why should the relationship between universities, innovation and eco-
nomic development be examined? What do we mean by economic devel-
opment? What is the justification for the now central importance of
universities’ territorial role? There seems to be two main answers. First,
the topic is of relevance to the formulation and implementation of public
policies when decisions are made on how to boost innovation – which is
now in its various guises as the knowledge economy, the ‘new economy’
and so on. Economic development more generally is ‘actions taken with
the express intention of enhancing economic prosperity, for individuals,
communities and employers’ (MacKinnon 1998, 6).
The book’s primary focus then is the role of universities in enhancing
that prosperity through participation in the innovation process on which
the prospects for economic development lie. Knowledge production, trans-
fer of scientific and engineering technologies, the mechanisms by which
they are transferred including intellectual transfers, the formation of new
firms and the labour markets associated with those technologies collec-
tively form that contribution to technological advance. The book sets the
university’s territorial role into perspective by examining the broader
nature of the relationship and identifying what aspects of that relationship
are significant at regional/local levels in the abstract and in the particular.
Successful universities are often a defining characteristic of successful
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places although, as studies from the 1980s have shown, this is not necessar-
ily causal. Indeed, the focus on universities and clusters has been recent.
Hall (1984, 12) notes that in Britain, ‘with the possible exception of Cam-
bridge, the presence of a major university has not been a major factor in
the development of high-tech industry’. The focus on the territorial role,
however, is not meant to be prioritized above important changes in the
way universities are required to function, such as the impact of the current
funding regime on the kinds of research being undertaken.
The focus is primarily on science and engineering-based industries.
There is little here about services, about banking or insurance, and other
financial industries even though economies cannot be understood without
reference to the global finance industry (Clark 2004). Nor is it in the scope
of this book to discuss the wider contribution of universities to sustainable
development including the effects on the built environment and social and
community development – which are integral to the relationship of a uni-
versity with its locality – nor other aspects of economic relationship arising
from the close relationship with quality of life and intellectual climate of
localities and regions and which are central to universities’ position within
society (see Florida 1999). Glasson (2003) highlights many other potential
effects of a university on its local community – providing further examples
of the extended model of universities, particularly with regard to sustain-
able development issues such as the built environment and social and
community development.
Moreover, while universities’ role is to be of benefit to society through
these various means, the impact is not one-way. Formal and informal rela-
tionships have multiple feedback effects not only on the universities (and
public laboratories) and the individual scientists and engineers and how
they conduct their internal affairs but on the relationship with civil society
and the ‘value’ of universities as well as with industry. In the UK, for
example, as the pressure on universities to engage more fully in the
innovation process increases, it is recognized that the real problem is
investment by industry and typically does not reflect a lack of supply in
scientific knowledge (see HM Treasury 2003; Coombs and Metcalfe 2000;
Polt 2001; Hughes 2003). Therefore, a major concern of innovation policy
is to maximize the economic impact of public investment in research, for
example by providing inputs to as much private R&D as possible
(Arundel and Geuna 2004, 7).
Second, many aspects of the functioning of the university–industry rela-
tionship in market economies in general and the territorial role are not
fully understood. As is the case of the study of industrial organization
(Scherer and Ross 1990), theory, data and methodologies which reveal the
different aspects of that relationship are becoming available. Thus a
number of ways of looking at universities and increasingly formalized
assessments such as recruitment of students and performance targets of
academics are possible. Evaluation is increasingly becoming central to the
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policy-making process (Kuhlmann 2003). We need to know what measures
are used and the limitations of indicators which rank performance of coun-
tries, regions/localities, universities and academics. This is a crucial issue in
this debate. In spite of the current enthusiasm for universities’ central
position in knowledge-based capitalism (Florida and Cohen 1999), the
1998 OECD Report ‘The University in Transition’ concludes that firms do
not rely on universities and other public research organizations (PROs)
for their innovation activities. How clear, then, is the evidence that univer-
sities provide more than a minor input into innovation (Arundel and
Geuna 2004)? Measurement is always going to be inexact. As Patel (2002)
points out, some contributions of academic research to technological prac-
tice will be direct, when such research leads to applicable discoveries,
engineering research techniques (such as computer simulations) and
instrumentation. Others will be indirect, when research training, back-
ground knowledge and professional networks contribute to business firms’
own problem-solving activities – in particular, to the experimental engin-
eering research, design practice, production and operation that will be
mainly located there. Moreover, the relative importance of these contribu-
tions varies across industries and across scientific disciplines. In this book
it will be argued that far too much attention has been paid to the contribu-
tion universities make to economic development such as spin-offs, patents
and licensing as means for technology transfer, and that insufficient atten-
tion has been paid both in Europe and in the US to the contribution of
universities to local and regional labour markets, through graduated
students (undergraduates, post-grads and continuing professional develop-
ment (CPD)).
The variability of the impact of universities is examined. The territorial
role here refers to explicit relationships within the university’s geographi-
cal hinterland, whether each institution sees that to be the locality, city,
region or nation state (see OECD 1998). For example, economists often
describe the regional scale as the nation state (see for example Geuna and
Nesta 2003). For Krugman (1991) the relevant geographical unit of obser-
vation for the link between knowledge inputs and innovative output is the
city. And not only do national innovation systems vary, the uniqueness of
each university necessarily means that in their territorial role each has its
own characteristics. As the case studies show, Stanford is a world away
from the University of Louisville, which in turn is radically different from
Princeton – but they all have significant and different positions in the
university–economy interface.
In organizing these discussions the book draws perspectives from a
range of literatures, primarily geography, economics and business and
management, to examine how political processes work alongside regula-
tory and legal processes and have been embedded in institutional change
over the last 150 years. Most of the evidence is desk-based research with
the exception of the case studies of European universities in Chapter 7 and
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two of the three US universities in Chapter 8 where interviews were con-
ducted with university faculty. It is clear from this brief discussion that
relationships between the universities and economies are multi-paradig-
matic with co-existing paradigms that sometimes complement each other,
sometimes compete and are sometimes contradictory.
The following eight chapters attempt to capture the complexity of the
relationship between universities innovation and economic development.
Chapter 1 briefly reviews the history of university–industry interaction and
sets out a conceptual framework, comprising eight paradigms, which are
used to frame the analysis for the remaining chapters. Chapter 2 sets out
the conceptual explanations for why the university’s territorial role might
be developed and why it is also problematic. It discusses what the expecta-
tions of what the universe of linkages might be and what role proximity
plays in those. A threefold distinction is made between the co-presence of
universities and economic activity, linkages which arise from proximity,
and those which are orchestrated as a result of policy initiatives which
place universities within a system of local governance. Chapter 3 examines
the evidence for the impact of universities on economic development,
defining what indicators are used, the useful and limitations of those tools
and what the results tell us. Chapter 4 is about universities in innovation
systems in Europe and describes the main trends and discusses how,
although the territorial role has become universal, there is considerable
diversity in the form that this takes. Chapter 6 discusses the contribution
of universities to innovation and economic development through the
development and enhancement of labour markets. In Chapter 7, case
studies of the twin towns of Oxford and Grenoble illustrate similarities but
also diversity in relationships between the science base and economic
development arising from historical and current political policy interven-
tions, local dynamics and institutional strategies. Chapter 8 takes the same
approach as Chapter 7 to the US, comparing three universities, Stanford,
Louisville and Princeton. As the chapter demonstrates, there are tensions
within the US system showing that similar questions are being asked to
those in the UK about the expectations placed on universities to deliver
economic development. To conclude, Chapter 9 revisits the eight para-
digms to review the evidence on the relationship between universities,
innovation and economic development per se and to highlight the complex
interdependent factors which shape relationships between universities and
their geographical hinterlands.
Introduction 7
1 New paradigms in the twenty-first
century
Introduction
The long history of close collaboration between the university and indus-
try dates back at least to the eighteenth century in Europe and to the nine-
teenth century in the US. The contemporary policy emphasis on the
territorial role in which universities are encouraged to be entrepreneurial
and spin-out new firms, to engage more closely with firms in their imme-
diate hinterland and to take on social responsibilities, reflects the current
prioritization of regionalism and clusters which is to be found throughout
the world.
In this chapter, the context and drivers of the quality and extent of rela-
tionship between universities and economic development are explored,
beginning with a brief history of the universities’ economic development
role. This shows that although much is new in the form that relationships
take, many of the current practices and modes of interaction were found in
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe and the US – and in some cases
even earlier. From this overview, a number of paradigms are derived
which will be used as the analytical framework for the rest of the book.
A historical perspective
Universities’ involvement in civic and industrial projects in Europe dates
back to at least the eighteenth century. Schwerin (2004) details how in
Scotland the construction of the improved steam engine by Glasgow Uni-
versity’s instrument maker James Watt in 1765 was soon applied to factory
steam engines and later facilitated the construction of steamships. The
demand for skilled workers for machinery for the cotton industry and
steam power prompted the founding of the University of Strathclyde in
1896. Its focus on engineering and technology transfer complemented the
ancient university of Glasgow. A close relationship between Clyde ship-
building industry and the Glasgow universities existed from the 1820s with
a handful of academics taking key positions within the local innovation
system (page 28). In nineteenth-century Britain universities were also
involved in actions to improve public health in growing and insalubrious
towns and cities as well as safety and working conditions in mines and fac-
tories (Pavitt 2003, 91).
In the US, public universities were established expressly with a primary
motive of engaging with industry (Adams 2002, 275). The Morrill Act 1862
granted land for the establishment of one college in a state with its
primary objective the teaching of courses in agriculture and mechanical
arts. By the end of the nineteenth century, industries were able to draw on
the growing number of schools of applied science and technology, such as
the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology as well as government academies such as the US Military
Academy (Charles and Howells 1992). Universities have played a central
role in the US system of innovation. Prior to the establishment of the
modern corporate laboratory, the university was the main source of exper-
tise (Kodama and Branscomb 1999, 5).
The current debate about these relationships has a long history. B.
Martin (2003, 8) traces the development of the contemporary ‘social con-
tract’ between science and the university and the state. He finds that the
Humboldt university model spread from Germany to other parts of
Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (although not to France
and England) and others have suggested that this model was still influ-
ential in the US as late as 1930 (Herbst 2004, 15). Under the Humboldt
social contract, the government assumed primary responsibility for
funding the university, the key characteristic of the model was the unity of
teaching and research – the assumption that both functions had to be con-
ducted within the same institution – and was characterized by a high level
of autonomy for both individuals and institutions, which formed a key
characteristic of the Vannevar Bush agenda, conditions which Powers
(2003) argues are still critical today.
Yet as well as the mission to undertake fundamental research, German
universities also undertook research largely directed by industry, espe-
cially the chemical industry. In both Europe and the US the rapid rise of
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries was associated with successful
collaboration with academic scientists. Moreover, although American
firms and universities worked together, this was not on the same scale
and intensity as in Germany until the interwar period (see the discussion
in Charles and Howells 1992, 11). This is related to the evolution of
science-based industry in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in
particular the rise of the industrial R&D laboratory (Florida and Cohen
1999, 593).
In the twentieth century, in the UK and the US, systemic government
policy and practice, like other major changes in government policy and
expenditure, have taken place during wars as the government has taken on
greater responsibility for functions that would otherwise be uncoordinated
(Yarrow and Lawton Smith 1993). In the UK, for example, in the middle
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of the First World War, in 1916, the Department for Scientific and
Industrial Research established the ‘Application of Scientific Research to
Trade and Industry’ (Philips 1994, 40). In the US, the Naval Consulting
Board brought together industry, government and academics to help
organize US naval research (Charles and Howells 1992). There too major
collaborative initiatives in pharmaceuticals manufacture, petrochemicals
and synthetic rubber were launched during the Second World War, and
the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, founded in 1915 and
absorbed into NASA in 1958, made important contributions to aircraft
design throughout its existence. Likewise university–industry research col-
laboration was well established in the 1920s and 1930s and contributed to
the development of the academic discipline of chemical engineering, trans-
forming the chemical industry (Mowery 1998) as well as being in the van
of the creation of new fields of technological knowledge which then drive
new industries (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994).
History and structure
The close relationship between US universities and industry, particularly
between the Land Grant universities and industry, dates back to the nine-
teenth century. Following the formation of Land Grant universities estab-
lished under the 1862 Morrill Act, that relationship took the form of
practical collaboration and the provision of vocational skills for a wide
range of professions important to local communities (Rosenberg and
Nelson 1994, 324). Even as early as the 1880s, universities such as MIT, a
Land Grant university which was established as a technical university in
1861, were providing trained engineers for growing firms such as General
Electric and Westinghouse, introducing its first courses in 1882 (Saxenian
1994). The tradition of Land Grant universities undertaking generic indus-
trial research has remained. For example, in the early 1980s, 37 universi-
ties were performing research for local and regional forest product
industries (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994). This field, with agriculture,
particularly with the advent of bioengineered seeds and plants, areas in
which Land Grant universities specialize, maintains the link (Powers
2003).
This was unlike centralized systems such as France, as universities
chose their own route to working with industry, an autonomy which has
remained (Etzkowitz 2003; Rosenberg and Nelson 1994). This autonomy
can be traced back to the European, particularly German model, adopted
by many of the early universities. The nineteenth century German model
of a single professor representing a discipline surrounded by permanent
staff of assistants broke down to be replaced with a model in which
departments comprised professors of different grades with relative auto-
nomy, with support staff. Throughout the twentieth century schools of
engineering such as at Stanford provided leadership in engineering and
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applied science research. Rosenberg and Nelson find that universities
played a critical role in the emergence of the discipline of chemical engin-
eering and aeronautical engineering and more recently in computer
science and engineering and biotechnology. They also argue that scholars
did not come to dominate universities – as was the case in European
universities.
US universities underwent two major transformations from the nine-
teenth century (Etzkowitz et al. 2000). The first was the ‘first academic
revolution’ associated with the paucity of research funds in the context of
the new role of research. Until the 1920s this was of the hands-on
problem-solving kind. Therefore the success of universities depended on
responsiveness to the demands of the local communities. The second was
in the post-Second World War period when ‘similar pressures were
brought to bear on universities, so encouraging the need to secure addi-
tional income, the wider, and more fundamental impact of the knowledge-
based economy . . . which ensured this process was of a qualitatively
distinct order to that of the previous century’.
The Vannevar Bush social contract (1945 to the end of the 1980s), pub-
lished in Bush’s 1945 report, ‘Science, the Endless Frontier’, was based on
state support for science and university autonomy – the separation of
scientific communities from the rest of society (Geuna et al. 2003), the
maintenance of defence R&D, public support for medical R&D and for
federal government to assume responsibility for supporting basic research.
R&D to improve existing products and processes became almost exclus-
ively the province of industry in fields where firms had strong R&D cap-
abilities (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994). This research policy which also had
its parallels in Europe was about winning new scientific knowledge (Pavitt
2003, Martin, B. 2003, Edqvist 2003). B. Martin (2003, 9) describes the
characteristics of the Bush social contract as:
• high level of autonomy for science
• decisions on what should be funded should be left to scientists
• basic research was best done in universities.
Martin argues that the Bush social contract was very successful in the post-
Second World War period, especially in the US, contributing to large
increases in funding for science and an expansion of the number of both
trained scientists and research outputs. He suggests that an alternative
view of the period 1921–53 (and ever since) is that it has been mytholo-
gized as the period in which there was a ‘common view’ of a broad-based
consensual commitment on the part of the Federal government to
increased support for basic research and development.
In the 1960s the essential link between high-technology industry
and universities was made in the US by Frederick Terman, renowned
for making Stanford University one of the world’s leading research
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universities. He expressed the view that universities are ‘major influences
in the nation’s industrial life, affecting the location of industry, population
groups and the character of communities’ (cited in Taylor 1985, 141). In
the UK, the famous letter by Prime Minister Harold Wilson of 1966 to all
universities in the country exhorted them to develop their own science
parks and encourage the growth of high-technology concerns. It was as a
direct response to the Wilson letter that the seeds of Trinity College,
Cambridge, and the Heriot-Watt science parks were sown (Taylor 1985,
137).
By the middle of the 1960s, science policy, ‘the designation given to the
purposeful, politically-framed activity of funding research with public
money’ (Edqvist 2003, 208), was constructed in a time of rapid techno-
logical change associated with the beginning of the era of advances in elec-
tronics and software. By the 1970s the US and other countries such as the
UK were pursuing domestic co-operative technology policies designed to
improve technological innovation performance downstream (Stoneman
1987) (see Allen et al. 1978 and Gummett and Gibbons 1978). Thus, Pavitt
(2003) argues, the twentieth- and twenty-first-century phenomenon of an
active role contributing to economic growth and political expectation that
university-based research will be tied to broader social objectives is a
return to the nineteenth-century paradigm of usefulness. More than this,
universities are de facto engaged in global competition for eminence, as
illustrated by the increasing number of world and European rankings of
universities and national assessments of performance, which include a
range of criteria which relate to scientific excellence including scientific
publications and external income and also to their usefulness measured by
external income (Chapter 3).
The late twentieth-century territorial role, which authors such as Wolfe,
D. (2003, 99–100) would see as a natural extension of the observation that
proximity is important ‘in the transfer of knowledge from the institutions
that generate it to those that adopt and apply it’, can be seen as an exten-
sion of a system in which cumulatively-superimposed layers date back to
the 1940s. This progression is illustrated in Box 1.1 following Edqvist
(2003) who in turn built on Ruivo (1994).
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Box 1.1 Policy progression from the 1940s to the present day.
Science as a source of strategic opportunity – 1940s
Science as a problem solver – 1960s
Science as a motor of progress – 1990s
And now
Science as a driver of regional economic development – late 1990s/2000s
Sources: Adapted from Edqvist 2003
For Edqvist (page 210) the issue is not how new ideas will replace the
old, but how they compete with, absorb and transform their predeces-
sors, and he concludes that there is ‘a conflict between the different
layers, with different understandings of the purpose and the role of
science’. So we see at the beginning of the twenty-first century internal
and external debates about universities’ contribution to economic devel-
opment taking place within the context of a growing internationalization
of markets for students, increasing dependence of technology on science
and especially basic research (EC 2003b, 413) and multiple accountabili-
ties. Universities are very much part of the ‘new economy’, the hallmarks
of which are networks, innovation and knowledge and collaboration
(Martin et al. 2003).
In sum, eight interconnected paradigms can be observed which collec-
tively describe the current expectations on universities as to their contribu-
tion to innovation and economic development. First, the innovation
process is increasingly integrative as firms seek inputs from a range of
organizations including other firms, universities and national laboratories.
Second, although there is a common agenda of university and industry
interaction across Europe and the US – as there is indeed in other parts of
the world – the form that it takes is extremely diverse at the national,
regional/local and institutional level. Third, universities’ ‘quest for emi-
nence’ (Florida and Cohen 1999) has a number of utilitarian functions
relating to funding and political reward. A fourth trend is a growing
questioning of the role of universities and the consequences for higher
education from within academia and from other analysts regarding new
sets of accountability in relation to the economic development role per se
as well as the territorial role. This is accompanied by a far greater public
awareness of the ethics of research in areas such as stem cell research
(particularly in the US) and genetically modified foods (particularly
in Europe) which have profound effects on the location of scientific
research and the commercialization of that research. Fifth, the life-
sciences–biotechnology–pharma nexus has assumed significant importance
in national innovation systems and has strong parallels with the univer-
sity–defence nexus of the Cold War period. Sixth, there is a growing acad-
emic and policy-maker recognition of expanding and improving the
human capital base as the key to successful technology transfer. Seventh,
the entrepreneurial university has become the model for the twenty-first
century. Last, related to the previous trend, increasing resources are alloc-
ated to universities and local/regional organizations for fostering the local-
ization effects of technology transfer and translating that into economic
development. This amounts to a formalization and integration of universi-
ties into local/regional systems of governance to achieve that end. These
paradigms form the analytical framework for this book. Following sections
expand on these and succeeding chapters review the conceptual and
empirical underpinnings.
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Paradigms
Within the following paradigms are implicit, normative and positive
assumptions from a number of stakeholders about the position of universi-
ties in relation to innovation and economic development. These include,
for example, industry; the universities and individual academics;
organizations that represent both the institutions and the individuals
nationally and internationally such as the Worldwide Universities
Network (www.wun.ac.uk/); supra-national policy-making institutions such
as the European Commission and the European Patent Agency; and
national, regional and local policy-making bodies.
Paradigm 1 Innovation as a distributed and integrated process
Central to the argument that society will gain from the greater integration
of university and industry research and development is the observation
that the innovation process has been evolving from being less compart-
mentalized to being more fluid. In this paradigm, increasingly all stages
and sub-processes of innovation are less likely to be conceived and imple-
mented within one distinct enterprise and instead are likely to be ‘distrib-
uted’ across several enterprises or other institutions (Coombs and
Metcalfe 2000, 50), so becoming a much more integrated and social
process (Oinas and Malecki 2002) (see also Edquist 1997). Not only does
industry now draw on a wide range of external resources, but university
science and engineering are becoming cross-disciplinary (Llerena and
Meyer-Krahmer 2003) and academics engage in joint scientific projects
with colleagues in both academia and industry on an increasingly global
scale (Archibugi and Iammarino 2002, 101). Much of this has been driven
by financial incentives, for example in the European Union under its own
R&D programmes such as ESPRIT (information technology) and RACE
(advanced communications technology) (see Charles and Howells 1992 for
a discussion). At the same time, basic research is global in application and
does not necessarily relate to the region in which it takes place (Godden
2003, 23).
The blurring of boundaries is captured in Gibbons et al.’s (1994) distinc-
tion between Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge. Mode 1 knowledge is homo-
geneous, disciplinary and hierarchical and reflects the way that knowledge
has traditionally been produced in autonomous and distinct academic dis-
ciplines. Mode 2 knowledge, in contrast, is heterarchical, transient, trans-
disciplinary, socially accountable and reflexive and undertaken in a
context of application. The recent emergence of transdisciplinary research
centres within HEIs, which engage with external research partners and
increasingly rely on third-stream funding sources (developing their capa-
bility and responsiveness to the needs of business and other organizations
in the wider community – www.hefce.ac.uk/reachout/news/3stream.htm),
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can be situated within this new mode of knowledge production (OECD
1999, 81). Pavitt (2003, 90), however, is somewhat sceptical of this divide
and argues that the modes co-exist and that Mode 2 existed before Mode 1
and they are complementary. Mode 2 is seen by some as the normative
model for university–industry interaction. For example, Rutten et al.
(2003, 247) argue that universities must adopt the Mode 2 model in order
to be part of the knowledge-producing sector as this is ‘the only way in
which HEIs can make a substantial contribution to (regional) economic
development’.
The distinction between basic and applied science, and hence the nature
of the relationship between these and each other and to commercial
potential through transfer of technology, misrepresents the pattern of
research activities (see Stokes 1997 in Hughes 2003). Stokes, amongst
others, has argued that a substantial proportion of university and publicly
funded research has always combined considerations both of use and of
the pursuit of fundamental understanding. Stokes’s diagram of Pasteur’s
Quadrant (Figure 1.1) illustrates the misleading dichotomous approach in
the linear model. The diagram draws a distinction between research that is
solely concerned with use, typified by the work of Edison; research that is
solely concerned with fundamental understanding, typified by the work of
Bohr; and research that involves both, typified by Pasteur, which Stokes
demonstrates has a long and distinguished role in the research structure of
natural sciences.
The problem for technology policy, therefore, according to Hughes, has
three dimensions. The first is how to encourage the importance of
Pasteur’s Quadrant in scientific and policy discourse. The second is how to
promote or support activity in Pasteur’s Quadrant by enabling scientific
recognition of society’s concerns with particular areas of use as a stimulus
for the pursuit of fundamental understanding in relevant areas. The third
is to how to encourage communication and interaction between the
quadrant communities. On this interpretation the success of the US in


















Figure 1.1 Pasteur’s Quadrant (sources: Stokes 1997; Hughes 2003).
industrializing knowledge is to be understood less in terms of specific
policy initiatives to transform basic into applied research than in the
ability of its university system to populate all three boxes and enable inter-
action across them. This, Hughes argues, has been the result of the decen-
tralized, competitive and regional structure of the system and its close
coupling of research and graduate education, plus diverse streams of
funding and a close relationship of universities with state and regional
research needs.
Evidence for the increasingly distributed innovation processes, particu-
larly from the 1980s, is found in numerous studies which have documented
the growth in the use of external research and technical resources by firms
including collaborating or contracting out their R&D, design and engin-
eering needs partly in response to the rising costs of conducting R&D
(Wolfe, D. 2003, 93; see also Charles and Howells 1992; Katz and Martin
1997; Lawton Smith 2000). Estimates of the rate of return to publicly
funded research range between 20 per cent and 60 per cent (Salter and
Martin 2001). Returns are dependent on firms acquiring knowledge and
information produced by public research organizations (PROs) (universi-
ties, public research institutes and government laboratories) and success-
fully applying this information to their innovative activities (Arundel and
Geuna 2001, 3). The gains to universities are that inputs from industry
provide scientists with information that provides a better understanding of
the nature of the task, which aids in designing research programmes and
conducting experiments (Stephan 2001, Poyago-Theotoky et al. 2002).
The many forms through which interaction takes place between univer-
sities and industry are summarized below (adapted from Lawton Smith
1990). These include commercial and non-commercial activities, the inci-
dence of which does not vary only by institution or by country. For
example, general endowment plays a much greater role in the funding of
research in the US than in the UK, while academic entrepreneurship is
much less common in France and Germany than in the US and UK.
1 Transfer of non-commercial knowledge and expertise
• graduated students
• academic publications
• informal networks of contacts
• part-time secondment by academics to industry
• part-time secondment of industrialists to academia
• joint professorships in industry and academia
• industrial liaison services.
2 General research support
• speculative research paid for by industry in a university department
• general endowment
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• gifts of money provided for specific purposes
• gifts of equipment (sometimes latest technology, but often out of
date).
3 Co-operative research
• interaction requiring some degree of co-operative planning e.g.
national joint research programmes and joint consortia
• UK KTP scheme
• collaboration in specially supported programmes
• collaborators in international programmes
• appointment of industrial fellows
• joint industry/university studentships e.g. UK CASE, France
CIFRE schemes.
4 Commercial ventures by universities
• short-term contract research on a specific problem
• industrial centres and units operating on a commercial basis
• testing services e.g. carbon dating, equipment testing
• licensing of inventions
• joint industry/university ventures
• companies set up by universities/departments to exploit intellec-
tual property
• university/colleges directly investing in local companies
• universities/colleges establishing science parks
• establishment of holding and administrative companies for uni-
versity owned companies
• companies set up by universities to market university intellectual
property.
5 Commercial activities by academics, technicians and students
• consultancy
• academics on boards of companies
• companies set up by academics and technicians to exploit intellec-
tual property or to develop equipment needed by departments.
The potential benefits from R&D collaboration to industry and universities
are summarized in Table 1.1. Although these have been characterized as
one or the other, they are also common goods where society benefits from
the gains from this process through the creation of new jobs, better products
and services and raising the pool of resource income through wealth cre-
ation that can be used to benefit society as a whole. Many of these can be
measured, although the process of measurement and what is actually meas-
ured are subject to much debate, not least because most long-run effects are
indirect and difficult to quantify (Candell and Jaffe 1999) (Chapter 3).
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At the same time, this is not a universal pattern. Studies have
demonstrated that some industries develop without extensive engagement
with universities, while others show that industrial innovation has a life
cycle through which universities are important at some stage, usually the
early stage (Faulkner and Senker 1995; Lawton Smith 2000; Charles and
Howells 1992; Nelson 1988; Tushman et al. 1997; Nooteboom 1999, 2000;
Glasmeier 2000).
Paradigm 2 Diversity versus uniformity and systems of
governance
Common to much of the recent literature on innovation is a focus on sys-
temic features rather than on isolated events associated with heroic scien-
tists or engineers (Bunnell and Coe 2001; Shapira 2004a). Interest in
national innovation systems lies in the systemic character of innovation
and the key role given to the state as co-ordinator and last-resort decision-
maker (Noisi 2003). Policies at the national and supra-national level have
been based on the assumption that there is an interaction deficit within
innovation systems and across national innovation systems (Geuna et al.
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Table 1.1 Gains to university–industry interaction
Gains to industry Gains to university
Productivity gains and business Better able to conduct research and 
innovation experiments with input from industry 
science
Enabling firms to capture knowledge Facilitating and accelerating the 
spillovers transfer of research results from 
universities or public laboratories to 
industry
Reducing duplication of firms’ R&D Increased financial resources for 
investments research or teaching
Supporting the exploitation of scale Increased contract funding for further 
economies in R&D developments into a final product
Support access of industrial firms to Increasing funding for research enables
R&D capabilities in labs larger-scale research projects
Supporting the creation of a common Funding for research that is relevant to 
technological ‘vision’ within industry industry and provides up-to-date 
that can guide R&D and related teaching material
investments by public and private 
entities
Creation and development of human Funding for students, research 
capital, increased performance assistants and post-doctoral students
Sources: Goldstein and Renault 2004; Mowery 1998; Geuna and Nesta 2003.
2003). Hence, the interplay at the national level of education, science and
technology as well as industry and other policies constructs the rules of the
game by which the commercialization function is prioritized over other
activities, which in turn is how the client group(s) is/are defined at particu-
lar moments in time. This prioritization within a NIS determines the incen-
tives (often involving funding) for the commercialization of research, for
the accessibility of knowledge to industry and to wider communities, and
how outcomes are evaluated.
The national innovation systems (NIS) concept, which had its roots in
early work by Freeman (1987), is based on two related assumptions
(David and Foray 1995). These are, first, that technical capabilities lie at
the core of a country’s international competitiveness and, second, that the
development of such capabilities is influenced by issues of national local-
ization and can be managed by way of proper government action. The
position of universities in this framework is that the purpose of knowledge
institutions is to increase take-up of technology. What makes countries
differ is not only the strength of national scientific resources (Grupp 1995)
but also on the distribution power of their innovation systems (David and
Foray 1995; Foray 1997). This is defined as nations’ capacity to ensure
timely access by innovators to stocks of knowledge held in its institutions
and firms. OECD (2002a, 8) reinforces the notion that it is the national
system of innovation that has primacy while arguing that individual institu-
tions are the best place to determine the practice of industry–science rela-
tions, and that it is governments which have responsibility for setting the
basic rules and institutional frameworks that reflect the public interest but
provide the right incentives to firms, public researchers and organisations
alike.
While each country has its own specific institutional structures and
national innovation systems agenda, there are two main models
(OECD/IHME 1999, 28):
• the centralized model in which the national government is the main
source of funding e.g. Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, New
Zealand and the UK
• the decentralized model where regional authorities are the main
source of funds – Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain and the US.
Recent studies have emphasized that innovation systems are constantly
being reconfigured because the roles of knowledge institutions tend to
change over time (Edquist 1997; Gregerson and Johnson 1999; Lundvall
and Maskell 2000). In the 1980s and 1990s, Italy, France, the UK and the
US among many countries introduced major legislation which changed the
basis on which universities interact with industry. For example in 1999
France introduced reforms which were designed to encourage academic
entrepreneurship. Llerena et al. (2003), however, are sceptical about
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whether the reforms have in fact delivered the necessary university auto-
nomy – the essential condition.
Other research has challenged the primacy of the national system of
innovation. This is because firms and researchers are entwined in thick
networks of international relationships that cut across national barriers
(Brusoni and Geuna forthcoming). While some of these networks are
associated with the activities of transnational corporations who collaborate
directly with universities in non-home countries and through consortia
such as EU and international programmes, in other cases small firms are
engaged in similar kinds of collaborative activity (see for example Lawton
Smith 2000). Moreover, missing in the NIS analysis is the relationship
between supra-national agencies – such as the European Union – and
international regulatory regimes. Indeed comparisons between Europe
and the US have often under estimated the importance of high levels of
public funding for basic research in conjunction with the multiplicity of
entrepreneurial funding agencies that target new lines of enquiry, and over
estimated the ability to commercialize technology (Geuna and Martin
2003). Yet another way of assessing the economic impact is to look at the
contribution to exports. For example, in Australia, the HE system is the
largest national export industry, exceeding strong sectors such as agricul-
ture (see OECD 1999, 39).
Paradigm 3 Eminence
Lundvall (1988, 364–5) described the academic mode of behaviour in a
more innocent age: that science is produced in universities as a result of
non-pecuniary incentives and that the ‘search for excellency’ is a strong
motive power. Citing David (1984) he believed that ‘the output of science
will be widely dispersed because the world-wide diffusion of research
results is a precondition of excellency’. He also perhaps ahead of his time
recognized the dangers of subordinating academic activities to industry:
‘that the academic mode might lose one of its principal merits – the tradi-
tion for world-wide diffusion of knowledge’. Now academic eminence not
only implies distinction in scientific endeavour, it can be ranked and has a
utilitarian value.
Herbst’s (2004, 17) assertion that a substantial performance gradient
separates US research universities from the rest of the world is supported
by a world ranking of universities published in 2004. (Institute of Higher
Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University ed.sjtu.edu.cn/ranking.htm.
Universities were ranked by several indicators of academic or research
performance, including alumni and staff winning Nobel Prizes and Fields
Medals, highly cited researchers, articles published in Nature and Science,
articles in Science Citation Index-expanded and Social Science Citation
Index, and academic performance with respect to the size of an institu-
tion.) This shows that the US has the most eminent universities: eight of
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the top ten are US universities and all but 15 of the top 50 universities are
American. Two UK universities are in the top ten: Cambridge (fifth) and
Oxford (ninth). The top non-UK EU university is the Netherlands’ Uni-
versity of Utrecht (39th) with Paris 6 41st. A more recent ranking of the
world’s top 200 universities produced by the UK’s Times Higher Educa-
tion Supplement (2004), using a different set of indicators, finds the US still
dominating the top places in the list, with seven in the top ten, with Oxford
and Cambridge fifth and sixth. ETH Zurich is tenth, but the top non-UK
European university was the Ecole Polytechnique in France (27th). An
elite grouping of these leading research universities – the ‘global elite 8’ –
including Yale and University of California, Berkeley (UCB) in the US,
ETH Zurich and Tokyo University have formed a consortium designed to
‘increase opportunities for global research, teaching and learning through
faculty collaboration and exchange, research training cooperation, under-
graduate and post-graduate student exchange, joint/double degree pro-
grammes, exchange of best practices and protocols and benchmarking’
(Jobbins 2005, 6).
The European Commission (2003b) ranked top national institutions at
member state level using the indicators of number of publications, number
of citations, and citation impact. The last indicates whether or not a uni-
versity’s scientific publications in leading academic journals are cited more
often (or not) than publications in those journals on average. The leading
universities of each country were then ranked against each other on
performance in more than 20 disciplines, ranging from clinical medicine to
electrical engineering. London University came top in both the number of
publications and citations, by some considerable distance. Paris 6 and
Milan University were ranked second and third respectively. Cambridge
University had the highest overall university impact scores. When Euro-
pean universities were ranked according to citation impact against the
world average, 22 EU universities scored above the world average. The
top two were Cambridge and Oxford, followed by Eindhoven University
of Technology and Technical University of Munich. Eight countries were
represented in the 22 with seven universities from the Netherlands, five
from Germany and four from the UK included. The Commission Report
also finds that Europe’s performance is around average in 11 broad fields
of science, and therefore inferior to that in the US.
In Europe, particularly in the UK, a political debate is taking place on
how far the elite model should be replicated. The question is whether gov-
ernments should promote a greater concentration of resources in a limited
number of research centres or should make efforts to raise the qualitative
level at the national level (Cesaroni and Piccaluga 2003, 2). In the UK aca-
demics and politicians have expressed serious misgivings about the
‘government’s drive to further concentrate research in top rated depart-
ments and universities’ (Thomson and Goddard 2003). Haines (2003) asks,
‘would the University of Westminster (which was given a 3b in the RAE
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1996) who designed the modem for Nokia and Ericksson mobile phones
have been able to do their research if their funding settlement has been
dismissive of work of “attainable national excellence”?’
Eminence is also an aspect of the conditions under which universities
engage in economic development and is considered to be instrumental in
overcoming market failure particularly in context of markets for know-
ledge (Sine et al. 2003). These authors demonstrate that institutional pres-
tige increases a university’s licensing rate over and above the rate that is
explained by the university’s past licensing performance. Because licensing
success positively impacts future invention production, they argue that
institutional prestige leads to stratification in the creation and distribution
of university-generated knowledge. Prestigious universities have a dispro-
portionate influence on the evolution of technology not because they are
necessarily superior creators of technology but because their prestige facil-
itates technology transfer. Moreover, if more prestigious institutions are
better able to diffuse knowledge than less prestigious institutions, then
inventors from high-prestige institutions will have a disproportionate
effect on technological change in society. Another take on this is that the
more eminent scientists are better able to maintain research output and
quality. Zucker and Darby (1996), Louis et al. (2001) and Siegel et al.
(1999) all found that faculty members involved in commercialization pro-
jects typically re-invest their profits in laboratory equipment and addi-
tional post-doc researchers, reinforcing their research capacity and
maintaining their positions. On the other hand, Geiger (2003, 6) finds that
firms seeking research assistance with product development or applied
research will sacrifice prestige in research partners – which makes local
partners more attractive. ‘Local partners have the additional advantage of
promoting closer interaction with company researchers and greater ease of
hiring students’.
Paradigm 4 Defence and biotechnology
From the Second World War onwards, defence expenditure dominated
national R&D expenditure and underpinned large sections of the
economy. In the third quarter of the twentieth century, the biotech sector
became the ‘new defence industry’. A massive explosion in research
funding in universities and other research institutions in the public and
private sectors and their close ties with industrial customers (big-pharma,
agbio companies, biotech companies) mimic patterns in the defence indus-
try. On the other hand, while defence spending was a hidden regional
policy (Boddy 1988) and the origins of successful high-tech clusters based
on defence technologies tended to be suppressed for ideological reasons
(Eisinger 1988 in Etzkowitz 2003), the biotech sector is identified as a key
driver of economic development at national and regional levels. More-
over, unlike defence, where public concerns have been expressed about
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weaponry rather than the research process, controversies about the ethics
of research and applications of bio-technologies are in the forefront of
public debate.
The importance of university research to drug development is illus-
trated by the case of the three biggest pharmaceutical companies in the
UK donating £4 million to medical research at universities (including
Oxford) that involves animals. Animal testing is one of a number of
factors which drug companies, which are major funders of university
research, take into account in locating their research. For the UK, safety
fears are speculated to drive research abroad, especially to the US. Other
factors include prices paid for medicines by health care services and the
quality of the science base – which is where the UK competes strongly
(Firn 2004, 3). In the US a study of developments in medical treatments in
cardiovascular-pulmonary medicine found that nearly half of the concep-
tual steps in the ten most important treatments came from basic
researchers (NIGMS/NIH 1997).
Paradigm 5 Accountability and responsibility
Throughout the long engagement with industry, debates about ethics,
problems relating to the freedom of publication and other barriers to flows
of information have taken place (see Charles and Howells 1992). This is
one aspect of the increasingly complex issue of to whom or what and why
universities are accountable and what their responsibilities are in relation
to innovation and economic development. The number of stakeholders
interested in universities’ performance has increased over time and now
include: policy makers at national and regional levels, government and
non-commercial funders of university research, the universities and their
individual academics whose careers are assessed on particular criteria, stu-
dents whose education may be affected by these changes, industry and
society at large. Transformations in HEI systems have raised questions
about accountability.
Five questions are open to debate. The first is, what is the function of
universities in relation to the generation and diffusion of knowledge? The
second is, how should the ownership of that knowledge be managed and
how does that affect their performance? Third, how should universities’
performance on both criteria be evaluated? Fourth, how can universities’
greater involvement in economic development be of political benefit?
Fifth, what are the consequences of changes to the first three?
For the first, in the opinion of Paul David and his colleagues (David et
al. 1994, 19), the primary and unique function of universities is to be the
‘node in the open knowledge-generating network’. Second, related to this
is the question of the rights of universities to their intellectual property
and the terms of trade with which they engage with industry. David and
Foray (1995) identify three dimensions of knowledge affecting generation,
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acquisition and distribution processes: (1) degree of codification, (2) com-
pleteness of disclosure, and (3) ownership status. These are used to define
a space in which various types of economically relevant science and
technology can be located. They make the distinction between ‘open
science’ which may be associated with academic research, including
government-sponsored and even business-sponsored research conducted
under ‘university-like’ organizational norms affecting the autonomy of
individual researchers. In the world of ‘proprietary science’ research is
undertaken with the intention and quasi-contractual pre-commitment of
the researchers to the organizational goal of extracting economic rents
from the knowledge gained, either by keeping it a secret and using it in
directly productive activities that end in the sale of conventional commodi-
ties, or by converting some or all of the knowledge into assets that, as
legally protected property, can be readily owned and alienated for valu-
able consideration. For David et al. (1994) the issue is not whether such
involvements are mutually beneficial to the participants or the public at
large. Rather they take the issue to be the terms on which such involve-
ment can be established, and whether they allow the university’s ability to
function as an open knowledge-network node to be perpetuated. For
Geuna and Nesta (2003, 4) the paradigm shift has gone so far that, rather
than the dominant norm being that universities are mainly engaged in
managing research agreements in firms, now the primary task of techno-
logy transfer is to ‘assess and protect IP and make it available to industry’.
They argue that positive impacts will occur only if the costs of the techno-
logy transfer operation are counterbalanced by income. Evidence from the
US and Europe is that most universities do not make a profit through the
technology transfer offices and/or through IPRs.
Third, the recognition of the commercial potential of university
research is being matched by an increase in measures designed to evaluate
the outputs of universities, public laboratories and programmes designed
to improve flows of knowledge between these bodies and industry. The
performance of countries, regions, institutions, departments and indi-
viduals and programmes are increasingly benchmarked (see for example
OECD 2002a: Benchmarking industry–science relationships (IRS),
Boekholt 2003 and Morgan and Nauwelaers 1999). The range of interested
parties in industry–science relationships (ISR) is indicated by OECD
(2002a, 7) which states that
To benchmark ISR is to compare their relative efficiency in meeting
and reconciling the needs of the main stakeholders (government,
industry, public research organizations, civil society), and to relate dif-
ferences in performance to observable characteristics of industry-
science linkages, which are amenable to public policy. To this end,
industry and science linkages should be evaluated along three dimen-
sions: nature and relative importance of channels of interactions; their
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incentive structures; and their institutional arrangements. Which leave
a big hole where aspects are not amenable to public policy.
Shapira and Kuhlmann’s (2003) edited book tackles the issues of the
evaluation of public policy structures and initiatives designed to advance
research innovation and technology. As they point out from discussion of
the US case – which is generally applicable – ‘science and technology
evaluation is clearly influenced by broader political and societal change’
(page 8 and see Cozzens same volume). Cozzens (2003, 59) argues that a
sea change occurred after the Second World War in research and innova-
tion policy which involved the claim by university-based researchers for
relative autonomy within the larger political system. Since then ‘US
science policy has been characterized by a tension between autonomy and
accountability’. Those adopting the former position want to justify Federal
investments in research on the basis of general claims about the contribu-
tions of science and technology to prosperity while those who espouse the
latter perspective want those benefits to be demonstrated concretely. The
merits of the latter approach is implied by Kuhlmann (2003), who argues
that a more deliberate effort to better integrate evaluation and science and
technology assessment techniques into innovation systems, with a view to
improving understanding and inform future policies through the use of
‘strategic intelligence’, should be adopted. He also suggests that the key
concept of the new wider understanding of evaluation is ‘negotiation’
among participating actors, whereby decisions are made as a continuous
process and evaluation results are one piece of information amongst many,
and the process is participative – although not easily achieved in practice.
Fourth, the politics of why universities might see it to be in their own
best interests to engage overtly in the process of economic development
lie in three possible avenues to political reward (Bozeman 2000). The most
common is for the laboratory to be rewarded for the appearance of active
and aggressive pursuit of technology transfer and commercial success – but
this might make the form of the activity being its own reward and publicity
for activities being part of the game. Other less common avenues are the
laboratory being rewarded with increased funding for demonstrating
technology transfer and the recipient of technology transfer communicat-
ing to the policy makers the value of its interaction. Bozeman also notes
there is a close connection in the US between the growth of research on
technology transfer and that of policies and government activities relating
to technology transfer. Kenney (1986) earlier argued that universities
legitimate ideology, thus being both responsive to and for the entrepre-
neurial agenda.
Fifth, as well as the gains to interaction, one of the negative con-
sequences of the closer integration is the lack of universities’ ability to
function as an ‘open node’. Noble’s (1977) corporate manipulation thesis
essentially argues that corporations interfere with the normal pursuit of
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academic science and seek to control relevant university research for their
own ends. An early version of this is reported by Florida and Cohen (1999,
593) who cited Chemistry and Engineering departments in the US at the
start of the twentieth century which were host to a deep struggle between
faculty who wanted to pursue applied, industry-oriented research and
other faculty who wanted to study anything so long as it was basic
research. This was particularly deep at MIT (Servos in Florida and Cohen
1999, 594) where departments that became dependent on industry lost
eminence as prestigious faculty members moved away. One goal of
postwar government funding was to counteract this negative impact of
industrial support.
Others such as Paul David (see for example 2005) are sceptical about
the current focus on commercialization. Van Reenan (2002, 18) for
example, argues that there are risks to the public policy of encouraging
universities to commercialize more of their research. There is a genuine
concern that protecting of IP in universities could undermine open science
that gives moral incentives for academics to do pioneering research. As
long ago as 1986, Kenney highlighted the conflicts of interest in the US
biotech industry ‘which stem from the fact that nearly all of the biotech-
nology researchers have university appointments and yet work for and
sometimes own substantial interests in companies that are commercialising
biotechnological research’ (page 113). In the UK a report published in
2003 by the Royal Society, ‘Keeping Science Open’, highlighted a ‘most
unhealthy “gold rush” mentality’ originating in biotech but infecting other
fields. The Royal Society (2003, v) expressed a belief ‘that public funding
of the UK science base should be based on quality, since high quality
research is the gateway to both advances in knowledge and to wealth cre-
ation based on science’.
Coombs and Metcalfe (2000) argue that the challenge for both the uni-
versities and the policy makers is to ensure that the quality of research in
the universities is not lost in the drive to align the interests of universities
and business. In the US, similar problems of open science versus control
and access to research findings and the loss of commitment to teaching,
shifting attention away from fundamental research questions, have been
found (Stephan 2001) and distrust created between adviser and students.
Conflicts have been reported in Chicago, Columbia and Cornell universi-
ties (Marshall 1999 in Poyago-Theotoky et al. 2002).
The controversy over the potential to patent human genes is a further
dimension to the issue of accountability and has a direct impact on what
can be undertaken in the lab. For example, animals are patentable in the
US and Japan but not in the EU. Patenting may slow down the research to
innovation process. Moreover, researchers working with pharmaceutical
companies realize that there is a choice of where to undertake clinical
trials, but have their own moral stance and personally imposed standards
on what is acceptable. Salter and Frewer (2002, 14) observe:
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As one moves from pure research knowledge through its develop-
ment, so there is an engagement between scientific and industrial
interest in the process of standard setting. In the health arena, the
state apparatus of medicines control, the CSM and the MCA, medi-
ates that process. In this context it is interesting to note Abraham’s
observation that ‘because the science base is so malleable, social and
political factors may enter into medicines regulation under the guise of
problem solving with relative ease, and when they do so it is of crucial
importance to understand how they relate to the competing interests
involved.
(Abraham 1997, 160, his stress)
Finally, it is worth considering the sources of criticism of whether univer-
sity research is relevant to the needs of industry. In Europe, the debate
about universities and their relevance is debated more strongly in some
countries than others. Pavitt (2003) finds that while it remains the case that
technologically aware companies continue to value academic researchers,
critics of lack of relevance are much more vocal in the UK than in the US,
Switzerland and Scandinavia. In the UK, ‘Most of the criticism comes
from government officials and politicians . . . often based on simplistic
notions of accountability’. He ascribes this to the relative weight of these
officials compared to that of technologically dynamic businesses in the
political system.
Paradigm 6 Massification of higher education
The teaching role of universities and contribution to the skills that are
needed by industry has undergone considerable transformation since the
1960s, and is continually being revaluated in the light of the debate about
universities’ contribution to economic development. In line with Mason et
al. (2004) and Bozeman (2000) it is argued that scientific and human
capital is often neglected in assessments of technology transfer effective-
ness, and that internal and inter-country differences in the workings of
scientific and engineering labour markets are neglected. This reflects the
lack of attention paid to the sub-system related to human resource devel-
opment, including formal education and training and the organization of
knowledge creation (Lundvall 2002, quoted in Mason et al. 2004). The
bottom line is that promoting university commercialization is misplaced
because universities are identified as a source of technology not talent
(Florida 1999).
In both Europe and the US, there is, however, an increasing recognition
of the importance of upgrading skills in the drive to improving economic
performance. Across Europe, in the expansion of university systems in the
last two decades, participation rates have risen sharply and with them
there has been an emphasis on improving the performance of institutions.
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The Europeanization of university teaching is part of the process of maxi-
mizing efficiency (see Chapter 4). In the US, provision of training pro-
grammes has risen in the national and regional political agenda. For
example, as Walshok et al. (2002, 29) point out, while the research base is
important for industry in San Diego, part of that story is the continual
access to recent graduates and continuing education offered by research
universities. Yet whether universities’ prime task is to prepare students for
the world of work is contentious (see Wolf, A. 2002).
Paradigm 7 The entrepreneurial university
The entrepreneurial university encompasses a third mission of economic
development in addition to teaching and research (Etzkowitz et al. 2000,
314). This role dates back only as far as the late twentieth century. For
Etzkowitz (2003, 300) ‘the organizing principle of the Triple Helix is the
expectation that the university will play a greater role in society as an
entrepreneur’. Following Schumpeter (1949), he makes a key distinction
between the entrepreneur as an individual and the individual as part of a
collective system, and ‘the entrepreneurial function need not be embodied
in a physical person and in particular a single physical person’. He records
that Schumpeter had identified the role of the US Department of Agricul-
ture in creating an agriculture innovation system. Governments in every
EU member state have implemented policy reforms to encourage innova-
tion and entrepreneurship.
Drawing on Etzkowitz (2003), entrepreneurship is defined broadly here
as those activities designed to encourage the commercial application or
spin-off of university scientific and engineering research. The entrepre-
neurial role is defined as that activity where the intention is to put into the
public-industrial domain that technology which has a commercial value.
This includes patents, licences, spin-off firms and science parks. Academic
entrepreneurs, as has already been suggested, are not a recent phenome-
non (see for example Etzkowitz 1983, Geiger 1986 and Slaughter and
Leslie 1999). Kenney (1986) records the development of professors as
entrepreneurs in US universities focusing on cultural and institutional
change and the associated ethical issues in the biotech sector and institu-
tional responses. What appears to be happening is that the rate of spin-offs
has been increasing since the later 1980s although the majority are formed
from within the most prestigious universities such as Stanford and MIT in
the US (see Shane 2004).
Indeed, not all universities are entrepreneurial or have the capacity to
be so. This depends on their position with the HE hierarchy and also the
models they chose to adopt for themselves. Vorley (2004) identifies three
classifications of universities which are instrumental in the way IP is
managed and further research identified: (1) Active Commercialization,
(2) Research Internalization and (3) Science/Technology Innovators
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(Capitalist and Collaborative). It is these strategies which have come to
define universities, or their respective departments. The first are institu-
tions pursuing an active commercialization management strategy and are
generally those institutions which are able to generate, and are in receipt
of, higher research incomes. The strategy of the second type is not imme-
diately concerned with commercialization or with directly increasing fiscal
capacity, as is the case with institutions pursuing strategies of Active Com-
mercialization. The emphasis of Research Internalization is instead on the
capacity of the university to internalize the development of science to the
point of becoming commercially viable. Inevitably this means that com-
mercial exposure to competitive market conditions comes at a much later
stage and the motivations of research and development necessarily consti-
tute part of a longer-term project. The third type of research management
strategy pursued by universities may be identified as a variation of the pre-
vious two. Institutions pursuing this strategy largely focus on the earlier
stages of scientific innovation and the embryonic development of tech-
nologies. This is in contrast to either spinning out the technology or pursu-
ing development to achieve the consolidation of technology.
Science parks are included here under the entrepreneurial role rather
than the territorial role because their origins lie in the entrepreneurial
activities of universities rather than specifically with economic develop-
ment in mind. Science parks originated in the US in the 1950s, spread to
Europe in the 1960s and 1970s and have now become a worldwide phe-
nomenon (Lindholm Dahlstrand and Lawton Smith 2003).
A Science Park is an organisation managed by specialised profession-
als, whose main aim is to increase the wealth of its community by pro-
moting the culture of innovation and the competitiveness of its
associated businesses and knowledge-based institutions. To enable
these goals to be met, a Science Park stimulates and manages the flow
of knowledge and technology amongst universities, R&D institutions,
companies and markets; it facilitates the creation and growth of
innovation-based companies through incubation and spin-off
processes; and provides other value-added services together with high
quality space and facilities.
(www.iaspworld.org/ IASP International Board, 6 February 2002)
Economic development is claimed to be an objective of the International
Association of Science Parks and indeed is a popular instrument of
regional development and/or technology policy, for example in France and
Malaysia. Evidence suggests that, while parks have a role to play in the
transfer of research-based ideas into new business ventures, many firms on
parks, particularly in the UK, have little contact with the university result-
ing from a park location (see Massey et al. 1992 and Lindholm Dahlstrand
and Lawton Smith 2003 for a review).
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Paradigm 8 The territorial role
The last paradigm is the territorial role and the universality of engage-
ment in local systems of governance. Here that role is defined as that
which is intended and orchestrated rather than that which happens as a
consequence of multiplier effects of being located within an economy
such as employers, purchasers of goods and services, as ad hoc collabor-
ators and providers of services and engaged in a variety of civic functions.
The missions of universities, will of course, vary depending on size of uni-
versity and of its catchment area, and the local and regional context
(Glasson 2003). But for Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997) the gover-
nance role is well established in the US and Europe, and they conclude
that various systems which were previously considered functionally
differentiated have become integrated at various levels of structure as
national and regional policy have become interconnected. The extent
to which system integration occurs in both continents is examined in
Chapters 4 and 5 (universities in innovation systems in Europe and the
US respectively).
Along with the governance role is an additional set of de facto and de
jure accountabilities. These may take the form of direct reckoning where
funding has been allocated for research or for outreach activities. They
may be ‘political’ whereby the university itself – or organizations
charged with bringing universities into closer contact with the customer
(industry or networking organizations) – claim that the university’s
actions demonstrate that there has been a response to the call for greater
engagement.
Conclusions
This chapter has set out to show that, although universities and territorial
development are currently high on the political and academic agenda,
there is a long history of engagement and parallels can be found with pre-
vious periods of history. The purpose of the eight paradigms that emerge
from the brief historical overview is to provide the analytical framework
for identifying how universities are positioned within economic develop-
ment processes per se and within local or regional economic development
in particular. Collectively they indicate that there have been changes in the
organization of the innovation process, which place universities more cen-
trally; that the degree to which this happens depends on the construction
of particular systems of governance (supra-national, national and sub-
national); that academic eminence has a utilitarian function; that biotech-
nology is the ‘new defence industry’; universities are subject to multiple
accountabilities; that the primary contribution of universities to economic
development is through human capital development rather than techno-
logy transfer; that universities are increasingly entrepreneurial and that
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incentives from national and sub-national organizations to work with local
industry and organizations amounts to participation in systems of gover-
nance. Above all they demonstrate a particular kind of rhetoric – that of
stakeholders and agenda-setting in discourses reflecting current debates
about value for money across public sector provision.
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2 The regional economy and the
university
Introduction
From the mid-1980s onwards, studies of geographies of innovation have
established that high-tech firms cluster around universities in a way that
older industries such as cars and steel did not. Now a university’s presence
is identified as being a key factor without which high-tech activity would
have been unlikely to develop in a location and even less likely to grow:
the large research university is a catalyst, whether or not it is proactively
involved in that development (Doutriaux 2003 on research in Canada).
This association was not always so. It was military and other public
research establishments that were identified as having a significant impact
on the growth of high-tech industry in some regions (see for example
Breheny and McQuaid 1987 on Berkshire in the UK and Markusen et al.
1986 in the US). This chapter then is about why the university–territory
interface has now assumed such a politically important role in regional and
local economic development. It sets out the arguments that are supported
or challenged by evidence in later chapters.
Distributed and integrated innovation systems and their
geography
One of the driving forces behind the territorialization agenda is based on
the paradigm that processes of innovation are increasingly distributed
between different organizations. Theoretical approaches which address
the importance of proximity to the innovation process to varying degrees
highlight technological, social and economic processes. For example,
Oinas and Malecki (2002) articulate the geographical and temporality of
innovation processes in their concept of spatial innovation systems (SIS).
The authors define SIS as consisting of ‘overlapping and interlinked
national, regional and sectoral innovation systems which are all manifested
in different configurations through space’. Central to their approach are
(1) the external relations of actors and (2) the variability of weights of dif-
ferent places or regions as centre points of particular technological paths
in time. It is not just places that vary in importance as centres of innova-
tion over time, the roles played by universities and national laboratories
vary over time. This approach has the merit of drawing attention to the co-
existence of interdependent factors operating at a particular time shaping
geographies of innovation.
Technological explanations
The argument that the innovation process is more effective if it is localized
is based on speed and efficiency of technology transfer in industries char-
acterized by rapid technological change. Technical fields vary in the
degree of innovative opportunities and appropriability conditions (see
Carlsson 1997; Malerba and Orsenigo 1997). In general the pattern is that
research is relevant primarily at the early stages of the innovation life cycle
with the emergence of new technological paradigms. Therefore firms will
be located close to universities only in order to gain access to the latest
research findings more easily (EC 2001b) (see Swann et al. 1998 on the
declining impact of the science base on the computing and biotech indus-
tries in the UK and the US as an illustration of this point). Moreover, the
extent of the impact of proximity will be stronger where there is a close
match between the scientific level of the firms’ R&D personnel and scien-
tists and engineers in universities. The better the match, the easier are
processes of engagement between the two groups, particularly between
personnel with doctorates (see Hicks 1995 in Mason et al. 2004). Hence
larger firms are also more likely to have links than smaller firms (Arundel
and Geuna 2001) because of their greater capacity to absorb the findings
of university research, a finding supported by Veugelers and Cassiman
(2003) in their study of Belgian manufacturing firms. The most obvious
manifestation of the advantages of proximity determining corporate activ-
ity is the location of the research laboratories of multinational companies
(MNC) near to major research universities. For example, in Cambridge,
UK, Microsoft arrived in 1997 preceded by Xerox, Hitachi, Toshiba,
Olivetti and Oracle, among other firms locating research facilities in Cam-
bridge in close collaboration with university departments (Garnsey and
Lawton Smith 1998).
The apparent close relationship in newer sectors is only one small part
of the story of industry’s engagement with universities. Numerous studies
have found that older industries also have extensive links with universities
although the mechanisms may different and include more short-term
interaction. For example Cohen et al. (2002) studied several low techno-
logy sectors such as food, paper, glass and concrete. Lawton Smith (2000)
compared university and industry links in a traditional industry (the flow
measurement industry) with those in a high-tech industry (electronics
components). Both of these studies found similar results to those found by
Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch’s (1998) analysis of university–industry
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interaction in five fields. Their research showed that while collaborative
research and informal contact overall were the most important, mechan-
isms differed within the different fields. In mechanical engineering the
main mechanism used was contract research to solve specific technical
problems, whereas in chemistry the provision of personnel and education
are the most important means of technology transfer.
Social explanations
The most common explanation given why innovation works better if local-
ized is that it is a social process. As some of the knowledge needed by
firms to innovate is tacit, for knowledge transfer to occur effectively,
direct, personal contact between scientists and engineers in different
organizations is required. Such contact provides the basis for establishing
norms and standards which form the basis of practice of interaction
(Lundvall 1988). Pavitt (1998a, 797) encapsulates the thrust of the argu-
ment for geographically proximate networked relationships made by a
number of others (see, for example, Antonelli 2000). Pavitt suggests that,
the main practical benefits of academic research are not easily trans-
missible information, ideas and discoveries available on equal terms to
anyone in the world. Instead they are various elements of problem-
solving capacity, involving the transmission of often tacit (i.e. non-
codifiable) knowledge through personal mobility and face-to-face
contacts. The benefits therefore tend to be geographically and linguis-
tically localized.
Thus networks, which have many different qualities and strengths, which
link university research and industrial practice are embedded within
particular locations linking people who are expert in different aspects of
the innovation process. Granovetter’s 1973 essay on the ‘strength of weak
ties’ argued that weak ties are indispensable to individuals’ opportunities,
are more flexible than strong formal ties and distant contacts are particu-
larly useful because they provide access to new flows of information. They
are channels of the type described by Owen-Smith and Powell (2004, 5–6)
as social connections that ‘diffusely and imperfectly direct transfers
between nodes, facilitating information spillovers’ or as ‘closed conduits,
characterized by legal arrangements’. The context in which these networks
operate is important as it matters whether ‘the nodes that anchor a network
pursue public or private goals’ (page 17). Here the transfers of knowledge
can be through informal contacts between individual academics and indus-
trialists (weak ties), or more formally encompassing teams of people in aca-
demic departments, technology transfer organizations, venture capitalists
and so on (strong ties) but where the nature of interactions are governed by
the terms of trade set out in contractual arrangements.
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Networks therefore can be seen as political systems that contain many
competing and overlapping rationalities (Tracey and Clark 2003). Thus, in
this context, pressures on academics to associate and network with people
in industry, especially within the local level, may be misguided either
where they overstate the importance of proximity in innovation or because
individuals may be already engaged in extensive networks and the pres-
sure to develop new ones may compete with personal professional object-
ives. Malmberg and Power (2004) also have their doubts about the
overarching importance of local interaction. They argue that the challenge
for firms is to link up with global flows of knowledge, and it is most crucial
for firms to try to link up with the best universities and research institutes,
whether or not they are local. Many firms and researchers are participants
in thick networks of international relationships that cut across national
barriers (see also Brusoni and Geuna forthcoming; Oinas and Malecki
2002).
While the importance of networks is assumed, it is difficult to prove.
Arundel and Geuna (2001) point out that many available studies lack
direct evidence of the knowledge flow from the producer of knowledge to
the user, and that none of the research that they looked at investigated
why proximity might matter. While the tacitness theme is strongly
represented in the literature on universities and proximity, Arundel and
Geuna (2001, 12) find that it has its limitations for explaining why innova-
tion is more effective if it is localized, and there are two criticisms of the
tacit knowledge explanation for proximity effects. First, Breschi and
Lissoni (2001) comment that other factors such as the economics of know-
ledge codification, labour markets and appropriation strategies (for
example Saviotti’s 1998 model of the extent of the codification of know-
ledge) could explain the phenomenon of localization. They find that this
argument is compelling given the paucity of direct evidence for the effect
of proximity on knowledge flows. The second criticism comes from Cowan
et al.’s (2000) theoretical evaluation of ‘tacit’ versus codified knowledge.
They suggest that very little knowledge is intrinsically tacit in the sense
that it is impossible to codify. Instead much of what is believed to be tacit
could be codified if economically worthwhile, while other knowledge
appears to be tacit only to the uninitiated. They argue, however, that this
criticism, although raising doubts about the role of tacit knowledge per se,
does not counter a need for personal contact in order to transfer know-
ledge effectively.
Economic explanations
Economic explanations why research-intensive firms cluster around uni-
versities fall into two main camps. The first is based on cost-reduction
arising from local concentrations of industrial activity, the second is cost
reduction through increasing returns to scale through urbanization
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economies. Of the first, Scott’s (1988) transaction-costs approach assumes
that the concentration of innovative firms results in the availability of
agglomeration economies – that is the costs to each firm engaging with
universities will be lowered by the co-presence of others undertaking the
same kind of activity thus sharing the costs. The increased costs associated
with increased external (as against internal) transactions will create a
‘spatial pull’ whereby firms will tend to agglomerate to shorten the length,
and hence the cost, of external linkage. The spillover argument is that
beneficial externalities accrue to organizations and individuals from co-
location. Geographical spillovers are defined as flows of ideas between
agents at less than original cost (Griliches 1992, in Adams 2002) and are
the central theme in endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, 1990; Gross-
man and Helpman 1991). In this logic, knowledge spillovers are an exter-
nality that is at least temporarily bound by geography and, as a result,
confers disproportionate benefits on nearby firms. This is not a general
pattern as not all types of industrial structures can promote knowledge
spillovers equally; they are not constant over time, and affect mature and
young industries differently, being more important at the early stages of an
industry’s life (Acs and Armington 2004). Antonelli and Quere (2002,
1058) favour the positive effects of the reduction transaction and commu-
nication costs of geographical proximity in explaining how innovation
systems work. For them, ‘geographical space acts as the basic governance
mechanism’ in reducing such costs and makes interaction easier. A differ-
ent kind of economic explanation is that dense concentrations of firms in
metropolitan or urban environments benefit from economies of urbaniza-
tion i.e. production costs of firms fall because of the total increase in activ-
ity in an area – increases that contribute to innovation (Simmie and
Sennett 1999). Acs and Armington (2004) also find that city-based eco-
nomic areas are more suitable as units of analysis than states or nations
because they are more homogeneous.
Evidence of R&D spillover networks (spillovers) associated with uni-
versity research has been found by Jaffe (1989) to cause a large gap
between social and private rates of return (a difference amounting to
between 50 and 100 per cent). A high social rate of return is, however, not
sufficient to justify a state’s or a region’s investment in research or a
Federal agency’s decision to fund R&D in a specific region. The reason for
this is that these benefits may be only temporary. Fogarty and Sinha (1999,
474) argue that, ‘At best, geographic proximity confers only a temporary
advantage to a region and its industries. Capturing spillover benefits
hinges on speedy diffusion of knowledge within local R&D networks’.
They argue that a region’s performance of R&D by itself is not sufficient
for producing stronger economic performance in the long run. If university
research is to raise a particular region’s productivity growth via techno-
logy, it must connect with local industry performance. Eventually local
gain requires new technology to be commercialized and take the form of
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investment in local facilities – start-ups, attraction of new industry – or
raising the region’s educational level. Therefore geographic limits create
the possibility of policy intervention as growth depends on aspects of
region building that exceed the decision-making abilities of individual
firms and industries (Adams 2002).
Yet the evidence suggests that the proximity effect of inducing or
catalysing economic development is not universal even in high-tech
sectors. Studies which have contrasted ‘old’ with ‘new’ economies have
highlighted general transformations in economies with high-tech or ‘know-
ledge-based’ sectors of growing importance in the economy, especially in
knowledge-intensive services (KIS) (see for example Martin et al. 2003).
Laafia (2002) in examining Eurostat data shows that over the period
1995–2000 while employment in high-tech and medium-tech was stable,
accounting for 7.6 per cent of employment in the EU15, employment in
KIS was rising and accounted for a third (32.3 per cent) of all jobs. Both
national and regional differences are highlighted. For example, whereas
Sweden is the most specialized in KIS, German regions specialized most in
high-tech and medium-tech manufacturing, which represented ten out of
the 15 leading regions, with the Italian Piedmont and Lombardy regions,
Alsace in France, Antwerp in Belgium and the West Midlands in the UK
making up the rest. These are largely not the ten ‘islands of innovation’
identified by the EC (1994) which contain 80 per cent of the research labo-
ratories and enterprises that participate in transnational R&D and have a
strong presence of university research and industrial research (South East
England; Paris/Ile de France; Frankfurt; Stuttgart; Munich; Turin; Milan;
Lyon/Grenoble; Rotterdam/Amsterdam; Rhein-Ruhr (EC 1994, 203)).
A rather different picture emerges in the services sector, where the
more densely populated regions had the highest percentages of service
sector employment. Inner London had the highest percentage, followed by
Stockholm, outer London, Noord-Holland, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire
and Oxfordshire and Ile de France. In the US, areas with the highest high-
tech locational quotients are on the west and east coasts for example in
San Francisco Washington–Baltimore, Boston, Raleigh Durham, in the
South at Austin–San Marcos, in the Mid-West in Denver–Boulder and in
the North in Minneapolis–St Paul (Baxter and Tyler 2004). These patterns
suggest further support for the argument that it is urbanization rather than
localization economies that are important in fostering innovative behavi-
our, although the two are not mutually exclusive.
Diversity versus uniformity, systems of governance and
localized interaction
An extensive literature on national innovation systems dating back to the
1980s has illustrated national differences in the relative research strengths
of universities, national laboratories and in industrial sectors and in the
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degree of integration of the many components within national or sectoral
systems (see for example Freeman 1987, Nelson and Rosenberg 1993,
Metcalfe 1997). Riccaboni et al. (2003), like Brusoni and Geuna (forth-
coming) and Geuna et al. (2003), highlight how the combination of actors
which are integrated into innovation processes and the extent to which
that combination is effective comprising the necessary complementary
expertise is a result of the construction of the national innovation system
and of sub-national innovation systems as the characteristics of a region.
Brusoni and Geuna (forthcoming, 4) suggest that it is the national
system that underpins local patterns. They argue that a country’s know-
ledge base may have a strong science base but lack the engineering cap-
abilities to embody scientific results in profitable products. On the other
hand it can have strong development capabilities that are not supported by
robust science. These authors find that national specializations tend to be
relatively stable, hence patterns of interaction will be so – although this
might not be the situation desired by policy makers seeking to increase the
uptake of knowledge. Moreover, they argue that analysis should focus on
whether a country’s sectoral specialization cuts across different types of
research (knowledge integration). A sectoral knowledge base with high
knowledge integration would have similar specialization by field across
different typologies of research. These authors found that in the chemistry
field (the underlying science for the pharmaceuticals industry) the US has
a much higher integration than the EU while within the EU there was
considerable variety of specializations in particular combinations of chem-
istry fields and in research typologies. For Europe as a whole they found
that it was not that EU firms would not be capable of exploiting an
efficient research system because of a lack of ‘development’ capabilities,
but that what is missing is the basic research bit. The result of this is that
EU pharmaceuticals firms have to source research results from the US
(pages 26–7).
Brusoni and Geuna find distinct differences between the US and
Europe in the case of biomedical–biotech–pharma innovation system.
They conclude that the US system is much more diverse than that in
Europe, having public research organizations that are more generalist and
integrative. This combined with a highly mobile labour force and a host of
regulatory policy initiatives has promoted widespread commercialization
of academically originated research, especially through the formation of
small biotech firms, whereas in Europe universities have developed com-
petencies in molecular biology much less quickly. Hence, geographical
outcomes of research are as a consequence qualitatively different in each
continent. Local centres of excellence around universities and other
research institutes in the US tend to be generalist, integrating innovation
and development work. This sets in train cumulative effects of attracting
talented researchers, high-quality students and increasing shares of R&D
funding as well as the in-migration and establishment of new firms. While
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some of these effects are observable in Europe, funding sources may be
national rather than European and have served to deepen already narrow
competences rather than enabling broad exploration. Moreover, the domi-
nance of the pharmaceutical companies in funding university research
‘may also have militated against the broadening of regional scientific and
organisational competences’ (page 190). They recommend that policy
efforts should be made to generate integration between basic research and
clinical development (as is now happening in the UK, see DTI 2003) and
greater linkages between the various actors in the industry.
The justification for the focus on regional scale for policy intervention
comes from Cooke (2002). He argues that the region is the scale at which
the most important knowledge and exploitation capabilities concentrate,
and secondary ones, attracted by increasing returns to knowledge, includ-
ing local knowledge spillovers are found in secondary nodes or even more
diffused networks knowledge spillovers can be captured. This view is sup-
ported by Oughton et al. (2002) who not only cite Lundvall (1999), who
calls for a greater integration between technology and industrial policy,
but also argue that the regional dimension of both is central and 
that regional government ‘can play the role of catalyst to strengthen
government–industry–university links and regional learning’ (page 104).
Yet this is not that simple. A number of possible models of regional
innovation systems (RIS) exist depending on state form (degree of
regional autonomy and type of activity within a region). Cooke’s (1998,
24–5) typology of three types of RIS (grassroots, network and dirigiste)
illustrates different levels and degrees of institutionalization (system of
governance) within which local or regional government and knowledge
institutions, firms and other local organizations could co-ordinate univer-
sity and industry interaction to foster economic development. Moreover,
Howells (1999) and Gertler (1997) both argue that the role of nation state
institutions is underestimated in respect of both incentive structures and
the long-term effects of cycles of investment on regional specializations.
To reiterate the earlier point, what appears to be a local phenomenon may
not have local causes (Massey 1995).
Eminence
The eminence of particular universities translates into the geography of
innovation in a number of respects because by definition top universities
and their ‘star’ scientists are few in number (Zucker and Darby 1996;
Feldman 2001, 380–1). This scarcity has at least four effects. First, the
more eminent the university, the more research funding it can attract from
a variety of sources, a greater store of potential technological applications.
Second, the higher the calibre of the staff attracted to those institutions,
the more likely they are to act as growth poles which attract eminent sci-
entists and engineers and graduate students to particular locations
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(Florida 1999). Third, the knock-on effect of high-quality basic scientific
research connected to international science by these top researchers is a
key means by which localities are linked to global research systems. Learn-
ing transferred into new firms formed within scientific environments influ-
ences paths of development of firms providing the means of identifying
and developing market opportunities but also shaping their technological
profiles, hence the region’s scientific profile (see Rickne 2000; Saviotti
1998). Fourth, the combination of both makes them more likely to spin-off
new firms than those less research-intensive universities as star scientists
are the most likely group of academics to spin-off new companies (Di Gre-
gorio and Shane 2003). Zucker et al. (1998b) find in their study of start-ups
in 183 US regions that it is the top university researchers in a region who
contribute to firm formation (see also Swann and Prevezer 1996). In this
reasoning, the impact of the ‘best’ universities will be felt more strongly in
some rather than other places.
Defence and biotechnology
In the 1980s, much of the literature on the location and development of
high-tech industries focused on concentrations of activity around govern-
ment research establishments (mainly defence) rather than on universities.
The rise of the defence–industry nexus of activity can be seen for example
in the UK in the Reading–Newbury–Oxford triangle (see Hall et al. 1987;
Breheny and McQuaid 1987; Lovering 1991) and in the US on the west
and east coasts (Markusen et al. 1986, Saxenian 1994). Markusen et al.
(1986) concluded that the US academic–industry linkages can be clearly
recognized only in those regions receiving Federal funding for defence-
related research. An emerging pattern that parallels the defence–univer-
sity nexus of the 1920s to the 1950s is the big investment in university
pharmaceuticals and biosciences (Hart 1988).
In the 30 years since the first biotech firm was formed in the US
(Genetech in 1976) and the 25 years since the first UK company was estab-
lished (Celltech 1980), life sciences research and biotech have assumed an
equivalence of defence in the national research agenda. By the 1990s in
the biotech industry a similar literature on dynamics of the clustering of
biotech firms around universities developed (see for example Kenney
1986).
Geographically, the industry concentrates in a small number of loca-
tions, some of which are emerging as megacentres. This concept, according
to Cooke (2002, 2004), captures the knowledge value chain from explo-
ration, through examination to exploitation knowledge. Thus megacentres
are science-driven, public and privately funded institutional complexes
that in biosciences have as their ultimate goal the production of patient
healthcare. They are hierarchical networks that include: industrial hier-
archy expressed in the ever-concentrating ownership structure of ‘big
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pharma’, government hierarchy regarding basic research funding and reg-
ulation of bioscience, and research hierarchy, most of it concentrated in
medical schools, hospitals and universities. Their importance lies in the
contribution the healthcare, pharmaceuticals and biosciences sector makes
to national GDP, probably under-estimated as at least one-sixth for the
US and 25 per cent for the UK (Sainsbury 1999). Cooke finds megacentre
candidates based on sheer scale of activity to be Boston, California, Mon-
treal and Toronto in North America, Cambridge (and possibly Oxford),
Munich and Stockholm in Europe. He finds that concentrations of firms in
the US in the other five states – New York, Washington, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Maryland – are not in the same order of magnitude of activ-
ity as California (San Franscisco and San Diego) (see Cortright and Mayer
2002, 3). In Europe, other concentrations of firms are in central Scotland
(Sainsbury 1999), in France in the Grenoble/Lyon region and in Germany
in Munich (see Cooke 2004).
The evidence on the causal relationship with university science is
mixed. On the east coast, the presence of biotechnology firms in the
Boston–Cambridge area can be directly attributed to the proactive role of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in fostering entrepreneurship in
new technologies. Yet, in other places, it is not the universities that have
been the catalyst for the growth in the number of firms. In downstate New
York, New Jersey and Maryland (including Washington DC and Philadel-
phia), substantial concentrations of biotechnology activity are a function
of the historical presence of the nation’s largest pharmaceutical manufac-
turers and their R&D activity (Feldman and Schreuder 1996). The emer-
gence of San Diego, Seattle, and Raleigh-Durham as biotechnology
clusters is built upon well-funded medical research establishments (see
Walcott 2001 and 2002 on San Diego and Haugh 1995 on Seattle). Yet, in
the UK, the pattern is that, while biotech firms might be concentrated near
universities, the research units of pharmaceutical companies tend to be
located near their company HQs and not near universities (see Howells
1985).
Other studies have cast doubt on the direct relationship between prox-
imity and university–industry linkages and the performance of individual
firms, hence the nature of the life–science–university nexus. For example
Liebeskind et al. (1996) concluded on the basis of case studies of two suc-
cessful California-based biotechnology firms and their linkages with scien-
tists external to the firm that the presence of long-distance relationships
reduces the strength of the argument that biotechnology collaborations
are locally embedded. Zucker et al. (1998b, 66) found on the basis of case
studies and interviews with Californian biotech firms that what appear to
be geographically localized external economies located near university
stars turn out to exist only for that much smaller set of enterprises that are
linked to particular star professors by contract or ownership – in fact by
market exchange. Moreover, it is these firms that perform best in terms of
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industry growth. Also in the US, Audretsch and Stephan (1996) used data
on initial public offerings (IPOs) of biotechnology firms between March
1990 and November 1992 to examine the functions of scientists linked with
these firms. They find that most often the founders of firms and the chairs
of scientific advisory boards (SABs) are likely to have local linkages,
whereas members of SABs are less likely to have local linkages.
In Europe, Lawton Smith (2005), reporting on a survey in the UK of 75
Oxfordshire biotech firms, found that being close to universities was not
the top locational advantage of Oxfordshire. Neither were universities the
prime source of information. They were ranked ninth along with local
sector networks, national trade associations, technology transfer depart-
ments and independent research organizations. Firms generally did not
view proximity to Oxford University and the local research base as an
important factor in the development of interactions, other than those of an
informal nature. The evidence from this industry supports Malecki’s (1997,
127) suggestion that universities are an overstated ingredient in accounting
for the location of R&D and high-technology industry.
Accountability and responsibility
Changing forms of accountability are being driven by the increasing com-
plexity of policy interventions, incentives and necessity of responding to
audits. Within Europe, universities are increasingly subject to common
national policy measures designed to increase their contribution to wealth
creation. At the same time, institutional differences which determine
particular accountabilities have major impacts on that relationship. In
particular, accessibility and efficiency are related to pre-existing rules or
new rules which govern ownership of intellectual property and the auto-
nomy of institutions to set their own guidelines for technology transfer.
Indeed, coming back to the point made by Owen-Smith and Powell (2004),
Castells and Hall (1994) argue that universities can play a successful inno-
vative role only if they remain fundamentally autonomous institutions,
setting up their own research agendas, and establishing their own criteria
for scientific quality and career promotion. While they suggest that the
more generally academic a university is, the less likely it is that it will con-
tribute to technopole development, an idea supported by Adams (2002).
This argument runs counter to that made above and the evidence with
regard to spin-offs (see below) and from Stanford and MIT in the US, but
until recently has been the case with Princeton (Chapter 8) and Oxford
(Chapter 7).
Incentives to work on industry-related research in the form of funding
of research and/or technology transfer activities are important in the terri-
torial role of universities. In the US to varying degrees (Chapter 5) scient-
ific research is funded at the regional or state level. Thus scientists are
accountable and will be judged according to the funding criteria. At the
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same time, researchers are also enabled or constrained by national frame-
works in which there are ethical considerations on the kinds of research
that can be undertaken and which might lead to commerical possibilities
and their realization, for example in both biomedical and agbio biotech-
nology.
Massification of higher education, teaching and graduate
recruitment
Central to the understanding the effectiveness and quality of networks at
the territorial level is the identification of the impact on the quality of
human capital and mobility between university and industry. Bozeman
and Gaughan (2000) argue that it was human capital generated by gov-
ernments – for example in the US in basic R&D – which led to develop-
ments in the biotech industry and hence to economic wealth. The
government was making investments in scientific capacity generation
rather than financial investments. In their view, public R&D evaluation
should centre on this growth in capacity by developing and nurturing ‘the
ability of groups to create new knowledge uses, not simply develop dis-
crete bits of knowledge or technology’. They make the argument that
human capital is not just that held by the individual as its value lies in the
personal skills and know-how with which individuals engage with others.
Hence these authors suggest that much human science and technology
capital is embedded in social and professional networks which ‘integrate
and shape scientific work, providing knowledge of scientists’ and engi-
neers’ work activity, helping with job opportunity and mobility, and pro-
viding indications about possible applications for scientific and technical
work products’ (page 8).
Evidence on the way that networks facilitate transfers of knowledge
through the migration of individuals between organizations seeking career
advancement comes from Zucker et al. (2002). These authors examined
two different sources of labour mobility among scientists. The first is the
classic pattern labour mobility of changing employer from a university or
research institute to a firm, which they define as ‘affiliated scientists’. The
second, and empirically more common, is when academic or research insti-
tute scientists collaborate on joint research projects or patenting within a
firm or through other activities such as membership of scientific advisory
boards (‘linked scientists’). They found that the quality of the researcher
(as measured by scientific citations), the commercial potential of inven-
tions, moving costs, reservation wage and social networks are significant
determinants for involvement in commercial applications of biotechnology
as employees or as entrepreneurs. Reservation costs are determined by
scientists’ quality, moving costs, trial frequency, interfering academic
offers and productivity of stars already in firms. In group-duration analysis
for biotechnology, stars were found to move to firms faster as their quality
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increased; local firms and productivity of local stars in firms increase; but
as the number of top local universities grows larger the probability of a
star being tied to a firm decreases. Productivity was also assessed in terms
of quality rather than quantity of output. Moreover, the extent to which
the inventor’s knowledge is embedded in economically valuable inventions
is positively related to the interest of outside firms in the person’s work.
Hence the more specialized the know-how inside the firm, the higher the
interest is of a firm hiring an inventor. It is a particularly attractive
proposition for the firm to hire an inventor if the inventor’s work is
independent of other colleagues and can be acquired without necessitating
the recruitment of other researchers. They found that university scientists
who work with firm scientists have a strong positive effect on products in
development, products on the market and employment growth. In the US,
owing to these sources of value, the labour of star scientists has strongly
moved to firms, but, because of the scarcity of star scientists and their con-
centration in relatively few institutions, they have done so in very concen-
trated, localized areas and are the strongest anchor firms to those locations
(Gertler and Wolfe 2002).
The recognition of universities’ key role in shaping the quality and
quantity of human capital is demonstrated by the expansion of university
systems worldwide. Chapter 3 will show that the number of students
attending university in Europe and the US has increased over the last
decade and that a radical change has taken place in the kinds of courses
offered to people in work, in the form of part-time degrees, continuing
professional development and extension courses.
The largest cohort in most universities, that of undergraduate students,
is considered to be the primary contribution of universities to techno-
logical innovation through the human capital it produces (see for example,
Branscomb et al. 1999; Rosenberg and Nelson 1994; Feller 1999; Etzkowitz
1999; Antonelli 2000). At the local level, graduated students and other uni-
versity personnel are a means of enlarging and diversifying the local talent
pool for science-based companies and providing bridges between the uni-
versity, faculty and science-based companies (Lee and Walshok 2003),
transferring knowledge directly to companies and indirectly – through
knowledge spillovers, and an increasing match of employer and employee
skills (see for example Scott 1988; Angel 1991; Saxenian 1994; Henry and
Pinch 2000; Scott and Storper 1987).
Post-graduate students offer a different kind of human capital. Mason et
al. (2004) argue that the incidence of enterprise research linkages with uni-
versities and other public or non-profit laboratories (e.g. charities) in a
given country will be positively related to the orientation of the national
higher education system towards the production of PhDs and other post-
graduates in engineering and science subjects. Thus post-doctoral training
programmes, executive programmes and continuing professional develop-
ment also ‘ensure the continuous dissemination and integration of the
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newest knowledge and most advanced forms of practice to employees in
globally traded clusters of a region’ (Lee and Walshok 2003, iv).
Whether students of both kinds stay in the region following graduation
depends largely on characteristics of those localities (McCann and Shep-
herd 2001). Florida’s (2002) view of the geography of uneven development
is that talented individuals with high levels of human capital are likely to
locate in places which give added strength or support to their productivity
and which contain other talented people with whom they can interact and
learn from, thereby building on existing knowledge and/or generating new
knowledge (see also Dicken and Malmberg 2001; Black and Henderson
1997). In other words, students are more likely to stay not only because of
the number of jobs, but also because of the quality of the people with
whom they will be working. Geographical variations in mobility between
countries and within countries are demonstrated in Chapter 6.
Productivity and efficiency relating to the ability of higher education
infrastructure to increase the stock of capital within the local labour
market will depend on the region’s attractiveness to appropriate labour
and whether people will stay. Rates of attraction and retention vary
regionally. Where rates are very high and local agglomerative forces are at
work, the growth in human capital fostered by HEIs may engender further
local growth in both public and private investments. Once a pool of skilled
labour is established, stocks of human capital – the knowledge and compe-
tences embodied in people – give rise to localized capacities (Dicken and
Malmberg 2001, 357).
Returning to Florida’s point, although the location of talented indi-
viduals is central to explaining why a city such as San Diego has produced
a biotech cluster whereas equally ambitious neighbours such as Orange
County and Los Angeles have not, the importance of individuals in
shaping those environments should not be overlooked (Walcott 2002).
This importance, Walcott argues, relates to the quality of the networks
that develop through the actions of key players. Regional attributes alone
overlook the networks that individuals construct through their associations
with institutions or by virtue of personal leadership. In San Diego, the
nexus of key individuals was based in the university and a group of serial
entrepreneurs played a crucial role in transforming the city from another
Sunbelt site to a ‘Bioscience best practice’ model. Walshok (1994 in
Collinson 2000), also on San Diego, described the critical role of ‘influ-
encers’ who acted as ‘visionaries and champions’ in interactions between
academic/research communities and the business community in the
support for the evolution of Silicon Valley enterprises.
The entrepreneurial university
The entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz et al. 2000) of the last 20
years is defined by the activities it takes to encourage the commercial
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application or spin-off of university scientific and engineering research.
This idea encompasses the entrepreneur as an individual and the indi-
vidual as part of a collective system, which includes formal procedures to
‘sell’ or otherwise commodify and market intellectual property arising
from university research. Governments are increasingly providing incen-
tives for universities to establish technology transfer offices (TTOs) to
facilitate this process.
In the US following the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the number of universi-
ties with TTOs grew rapidly. Although this growth has been ascribed to
the influence of the Act the pattern was rather of the Act giving a boost to
a trend that was already under way (see Chapter 5). In Europe, a great
variety of arrangements results from decisions made within each member
state and by individual universities (see Chapter 4). Critical organizational
factors which encourage academic entrepreneurial activity are faculty
reward systems, technology transfer offices, staffing/compensation prac-
tices and cultural barriers between universities and firms (Siegel et al.
2003) (see also Coombs and Metcalfe 2000). In Europe too, legislation and
policy are only one part of the task environment. For example, in com-
menting on the efforts of Chalmers University in Sweden to transform
itself into an entrepreneurial university, Jacob et al. (2003, 15) commented
that it ‘may be seen not as a policy outcome but an internally driven
process that may be better explained by the culture of the engineering
school than responses to top down steering’. The shift in research policy at
the national level created a climate which legitimized what had been
taking place at Chalmers for nearly two decades.
With the expectation that universities will be enterprising, so evidence
of their performance including patents, licences and spin-offs and publica-
tions is increasingly collected at the national level. Spin-offs, which are
overwhelmingly located in the vacinity of the incubating university, are the
most obvious contribution to local economic development. In the US this
information has been collected nationally since the formation in 1975 of
the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), member-
ship of which has increased as a growing number of universities have alloc-
ated resources for smoothing the process by providing expert services,
patent protection, venture capital and so on. The entrepreneurial univer-
sity is not necessarily a territorial model. The prime responsibility of uni-
versity technology transfer offices is to capitalize on the university’s
intellectual property and not to create local jobs or in other ways to
support economic development. De facto the impact of some of these
activities is local. For example the majority of university spin-off firms stay
within the locality of the university.
Yet while the stimulation of university spin-offs has become one of the
main foci of public policy with Stanford University in Silicon Valley and
MIT as models for others to emulate (Saxenian 1994), such universities are
the exceptions rather than the rule. Research from the US finds that what
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makes some universities better at spin-outs are intellectual eminence, the
policies of making equity investments in start-ups and maintaining a low
inventor’s share of royalties. They found no effect of local venture capital
activity and only limited support for an effect of the commercial orienta-
tion of university research (Di Gregorio and Shane 2003). Jacob et al.
(2003) draw similar conclusions from evidence in Europe, arguing that not
all universities have the potential to become entrepreneurial, where the
propensity for universities to spin off varies considerably as it does in
the US.
The early science parks, such as those at Stanford (1957) and Cam-
bridge, UK (1970) predated the explicitly territorial role. They are both
part of the entrepreneurial activities of universities and increasingly part
of the governance structures of local innovation systems. Massey et al.
(1992) comment that the popular conception of science parks is in two
parts: the definition of what a science park is and a set of postulated causal
relationships, effects which will happen as a result of these characteristics.
On page 21 the authors identify 26 different science-park objectives
ranging from the obvious one of stimulating the formation of start-up new-
technology-based firms to improving the performance of the local
economy to improving the image of the academic institution in the eyes of
government. Numerous studies of science parks have variously examined
combinations of these aims (see Lindholm Dahlstrand and Lawton Smith
2003 for a review).
The majority of the currently existing science and technology parks in
the world were created during the 1990s. Data from the International
Association of Science Parks (ISAP) shows that, by the end of 2000, a
third of science and technology parks (STPS) (worldwide) were located
inside a university campus, or on land owned by a university and adjacent
to the campus itself. Although this proportion is quite low, almost 70 per
cent of the ‘parks’ share services with their university. A similar percent-
age of STPs host university researchers in their facilities. Almost half of
STPs share scientific infrastructures with the university. On the other
hand, 33 per cent of the universities find that it is convenient to have their
technology transfer office (or industrial liaison department) in a STP, thus
being closer to their customers (Survey methodology: on-line question-
naire. Universe: 250 Science/Technology Parks (IASP members). Sample:
94 Science/Technology Parks).
The territorial role
The book is predicated on the premise that universities and policy makers
now generally accept that universities do have a territorial role to play, an
assumption that draws on statements in policy statements and reviews of
the evidence from such organizations as the OECD and the EC. The 1999
OECD report, for example, finds that universities can play a role in
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regional networking and in institutional capacity building. They can act as
regional animateurs through representation on outside bodies and as
intermediaries in providing commentary and analysis for the media. The
Report concludes that universities have much to gain from adapting to
modern realities of the regional economy.
Goldstein et al. (1995) suggest that, in addition to the range of financial
and technological inputs on economic development, at the regional level,
universities can deliver regional leadership, co-production of the know-
ledge infrastructure and co-production of a particular type of regional
milieu. This instrumentalist role, like that of science parks, has placed uni-
versities explicitly within the system of governance of regions though their
engagement in regionally-based initiatives in partnership with local
authorities, business and other stakeholders, to assist in the development
of commercialization and business interaction services (Charles 2003, 13).
Indeed Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997, 4) observe ‘the spread of
technology policy to virtually all regions (which naturally includes univer-
sities), irrespective of whether they are research or industrially-intensive’.
Yet the success of the regional role depends on the matching of HEIs
and the region, the university’s own missions and the policy mechanisms
which exist to build on existing complementarities. OECD (1999, 15)
argues that in establishing the capacity of a university to respond to
regional needs there are a number of important dimensions, not least the
university’s own strategy. In problematizing territoriality, which they
identify as an extremely complex and problematic concept for HEIs, they
raise a number of questions: What would the HEI define as its territorial
unit; what management structures would need to be in place to manage
the portfolio of territorial roles; how can HEIs expand national and inter-
national activity whilst meeting regional needs; do mechanisms exist to
embed a belief that the institution can, and should, operate within differ-
ent territorial levels for the benefit of the region?
In considering what might influence the success and direction of strat-
egy and how universities will respond to regional needs, OECD (1999, 31)
focuses on organizational features and local agendas, raising a number of
questions which are central to what the response might be. These are:
What are the characteristics of the region in terms of its economic base,
cultural activity, employment structure and levels of entrepreneurial activ-
ity and civic networks; what are the characteristics of the regional institu-
tional networks and what lead or regulatory agencies exist; and what
expectations do regional stakeholders voice to HEIs?
To illustrate how these characteristics might be understood, the report
cities Davies’s (1997) typology of four regional types within which the
university system can fulfil a different role: Low income, stagnant
region; Low income, growth region; High income, stagnant region; High
income, growth region. Further, the Association of European Universities
(CRE) created a three-region typology to identify different contexts for
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university–region dialogues. These included regions of concentration (high
levels of economic development and educational development), regions of
economic revival and peripheral regions. The Report argues that it is also
important to understand the number and character of stakeholders in the
region and points out that stakeholders or organizations involved in pro-
moting regional economic development, unlike universities, function
within explicitly defined areas. Hence it is clear that enormous expecta-
tions are being placed on universities whether or not they have the
resources and competences to engage in addressing the challenges associ-
ated with these agendas.
The involvement of the university in regional economic agendas also
depends on the role that the university chooses for itself – within legal and
political constraints (Goldstein and Renault 2004). The impact could be
simply mercantile, through primary income generation effects which benefit
the local economy, as opposed to the technologically pro-active model
where universities attempt to promote technology transfer to influence the
trajectory of local economic development (Lanza and Piccaluga 1995). In
this model, Lazzeroni and Piccaluga (2003) describe universities’ role in very
instrumentalist terms as four kinds of factory: knowledge, human capital,
technology transfer and territorial. Within these organized roles, other and
perhaps hidden individual engagement exists (Kenney 1986, 34).
An issue for policy makers internal and eternal to the university in
designing their responses is that mapping university research on to local
clusters (Peck and McGuinness 2003) is not always straightforward. A
recent survey conducted by Charles and Conway (2001, 6) in the UK sug-
gests that only 19 per cent of business research contracts currently secured
by HEIs were from within the same region as the HEI. This implies that
combining regional HEI expertise with RDA cluster priorities may prove
to be problematic, with competition between regions for sectors and a
duplication of facilities.
For example, Peck and McGuinness argue that on the basis of present
industrial structures (DTI 2001), all three regions in the North could be
argued to possess cluster potential around selected firms based in chemi-
cals, food processing, metal industries and furniture manufacture. There
are also some potential overlaps between pairs of regions in electronics,
automotive assembly and leisure software. At present, there are relatively
few instances of cluster development that involve inter-regional collabora-
tion. Hence, not only might the local industries be the ones which
traditionally have not worked with universities, it is not necessarily the
most efficient strategy to target sunrise industries. Co-location does not
necessarily imply functional interdependence – even in the biotechnology
industry in the US (see Cortright and Mayer 2002). One of the major
limitations of the regional innovation systems literature is therefore that it
is inward-looking and implicitly reinforces the prioritization of the largely
self-sufficient and autonomous region.
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Conclusions
The literature reviewed here demonstrates that universities have been
brought into the general discussion which has long exercised the mind of
geographers and economists – that of why proximity matters in the co-
location of economic activities. Universities as economic actors have
joined firms in this form of analysis. Arguments have been based on analy-
ses of technological, social and economic factors of why geographically
concentrated knowledge flows (knowledge spillovers) contribute to the
effectiveness of the innovation process.
The chapter also highlights that proximity may be more important at
the early stages of the emergence of a new technology and its associated
industry, that university–industry networks might be sector-specific and
that proximity effects might fade over time. Larger firms are more likely to
be able to take advantage of proximity when a field is established. Size of
place also appears to be significant in the growth of high-tech sectors,
especially with KIS, rather than a causal relationship with the source of
knowledge flows but this might vary. Other caveats include the over-
importance of tacit knowledge as a concept within social processes, the
assumption that all networks are good, that institutional regimes are
significant in the kinds of networks their members can participate in
(Owen-Smith and Powell 2004) and that networks’ potential for delivery
of knowledge flows is difficult to prove.
National and regional innovation systems literatures highlight the
varying degrees to which elements within the innovation processes are
integrated within different countries and regions or localities. The emi-
nence of a university is also associated with geographically variable
impacts. Both of these points relate to Owen-Smith and Powell’s point
about the effects of distinctive institutional rules on the importance of uni-
versities in the engagement in the innovation process. 
Close parallels between the defence–university nexus and the university–
pharmaceuticals–biosciences are also highly significant in shaping geographi-
cal patterns of economic and innovation activity. The chapter has also sug-
gested that there are close parallels between the defence–university and the
university–pharmaceuticals–biosciences nexuses – both being highly signific-
ant – shaping geographical patterns of economic and innovation activity.
Underpinning all of the discussion about networks and innovation is the
relationship between universities and human capital formation, development
and recruitment. This is with regard not only to the quality of the localized
pool of labour but also to the quality of ‘influencers’ who catalyse develop-
ments in particular locations. The theme of institutional autonomy re-emerges
in the discussion of how and why universities become entrepreneurial. Finally,
the realities of the territorial role appear as politically determined assump-
tions about the university’s engagement in governance systems whether or not
the expectations of the success of that role are realistic.
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3 Measuring the impact
Introduction
The possibility of measuring the impact of universities on innovation and
economic development, specifically on their local/regional economies, is
central to confirming the validity of the dominant paradigm that capitaliz-
ing on university research equals innovation equals economic develop-
ment. This chapter’s focus is on what is being measured, the criteria by
which ‘effectiveness’ of that contribution is evaluated, the magnitude of
any effects and at what scale the effects are felt, and over what period. It
considers the limitations to measurement methods and hence to informa-
tion about the contribution of universities to economic development in
general and their territorial role in particular. This discussion is relevant to
the current political trend of evaluation – both of policy designed to
enhance the environment for innovation and technology transfer and of
the increasing practice of assessment of university output (Hughes 2003).
Distributed innovation systems
Studies on university–industry interaction point to a number of caveats to
the assumption of the pervasiveness of research and technology external-
ization, collaboration and networking (Coombs and Metcalfe 2000). Most
surveys show that universities and public research institutes are not the
main sources of firms’ external knowledge and that sector is one of the
most important factors in the incidence of links and whether they are pri-
marily within or outside of the national system of innovation.
First, universities are ranked well below customers and suppliers as
direct sources of new technological knowledge for innovation in innovat-
ing firms in every study of external innovation and technology transfer
(see for example Keeble et al. 1997; Lawton Smith 2000; Charles and
Howells 1992; Cosh and Hughes 2001; Lawton Smith 2005; Baxter and
Tyler 2004; Mansfield 1991, 1998; Beise and Stahl 1999; Arundel and
Steinmuller 1998; Monjon and Waelbroek 2003). The Third CEC
Community Innovation Survey (2004) shows that only 5 per cent of
innovating firms indicated that universities were highly important for
innovation (3 per cent for government or private non-profit research insti-
tutes) compared to 28 per cent from clients or customers (the highest
external source). Arundel and Geuna (2004) cite a number of case studies
and surveys that find that fewer than 10 per cent of innovations in the
United States and 5 per cent of new product sales in Germany depended
in some way on public science. Similarly Hall et al. (2000) report that, in
the US, the vast majority of research partnerships registered under the
National Cooperative Research Act (1984) and the National Cooperative
Research and Production Act (NCRPA) of 1993 do not include a univer-
sity. Yet Frenz et al. (2005) find evidence of a positive and significant effect
on firm–university co-operation on innovation using CIS data for 8,172
UK firms for the periods 1998–2000 which suggest that, for the UK at
least, universities are under-resourced.
Second, university research is highly relevant to some industries, not
necessarily high-tech, and not others and while manufacturing firms are
more likely to have close ties, service sector industries also have strong
links. In the case of manufacturing, Salter and Martin (2001) as Pavitt
(1984) and Nelson (1993) had done earlier, found that the contribution of
academic research is very high in some industries such as computers and
pharmaceuticals and low in industries such as rubber and plastic products
and paper. Similarly, Klevorick et al. (1995) conducted a survey of 128
industries and found that, where its relevance was high, the most relevant
discipline was usually either an engineering or an applied science discip-
line rather than a basic science discipline – except in the case of biological
sciences (see also Nelson 1993, Lawton Smith 2000, Faulkner and Senker
1995). This pattern is likely to persist as applied subjects such as engin-
eering geology continue to account for more than half of academic
research in leading OECD countries (Pavitt 2003).
Arundel and Geuna (2004) use the results of the Policies, appropriation
and competitiveness of Europe (PACE) survey of Europe’s largest indus-
trial firms to evaluate both the importance of public science to innovation
and the role of distance in accessing public science outputs at the national
level and international level. Proximity is defined by the importance firms
give to knowledge obtained from domestic versus foreign sources. They
argue that this survey has two advantages for addressing these issues com-
pared to other European surveys such as CIS or comparable surveys in the
US. First, PACE asks firms about the importance of public science results
from four main regions (their own country, other Europe, the United
States and Japan). Second, PACE includes a series of questions about the
methods that firms use to learn about public science results. Research on
the localization of knowledge is largely framed in physical distance but a
NIS approach suggests that distance is related to more than absolute
measures.
The authors found that public science is one of the six most important
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external knowledge sources for the innovative activities of Europe’s
largest industrial firms – second only to knowledge sourced from affiliated
firms. Contrary to expectations, it is most important for firms in low-
technology sectors, followed by firms in high-technology sectors and lastly
by firms in medium-technology sectors. These results differ considerably
from aggregate results using CIS surveys, where public science is one of
the least important sources of technological knowledge. Much of the dif-
ference, however, vanishes once CIS results are weighted to account for a
proxy of innovation output (R&D expenditures) and limited to large firms
that perform most of the R&D in Europe, and which access public science
in North America because it offers unique advantages. They also found
evidence that rather than firms using informal contacts to access domestic
sources of knowledge, they use their contacts to access knowledge outside
the firm’s domestic country. While their results do not support the hypoth-
esis that tacit knowledge is a cause of proximity effects, they do not refute
it either. The authors propose that there is a possible connection with EU
supra-national collaborations that have led to the development of network
proximity.
It should not be overlooked that university research is relevant to the
service sector. Grossman et al. (2001) have found industry challenges in
service industries such as financial services and transportation and logistics
to be an important stimulus to both basic and applied research in the US.
National diversity in spend on research in universities
The level and sources of income for academic research in different coun-
tries is one of a number of explanatory factors for patterns of
university–industry interactions. The following sections examine each of
the following variables which are implicated in what is being measured
and how the results are interpreted.
• the sources, level and stability of overall academic funding and
changes in their relative importance
• the distribution of funding among the different R&D activities (basic
research, applied research, and development)
• the distribution of funding among S&E broad and detailed fields and
national sectoral specializations and their relative strengths
• the distribution of funding among the various performers of academic
R&D and the extent of their participation
• the state of the physical infrastructure (research facilities and equip-
ment)
• the role of the national government as a supporter of academic R&D
and the particular roles of the major national agencies funding the
academic sector
• the regulatory system which determines accountability and includes
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scrutiny of the kinds of research and development undertaken in insti-
tutions including that of public opinion, hence the commercial poten-
tial of different kinds of research
• the extent to which funding for research is at the regional level.
(adapted from NSF 2004)
Academic R&D
Variations in the extent to which academic research is a component of
national R&D and to which academic R&D is funded by industry in
selected OECD countries are illustrated in Table 3.1. In advanced indus-
trialized countries such as the Netherlands, Canada and Italy, academic
research comprises a much greater share of national R&D than in the US,
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Table 3.1 Academic R&D share of total R&D performance, by selected countries:
































Japan and Germany, where a higher share of R&D is conducted by other
organizations, including industry. Overall, government and industry
together account for roughly 80 per cent or more of the R&D funding in
each of the G-8 countries.
The extent to which the balance of funding between government and
industry has been changing over the past two decades is illustrated in
Table 3.2. The pattern is that the government’s share, including both direct
government support for academic R&D and the R&D component of
block grants to universities, has fallen by 8 percentage points or more in
five of the G-7 countries since 1981 (France and Italy have had lower
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Table 3.2 Academic R&D expenditures, by country and source of funds: 1981,
1990 and 2000 (%)
Country and source of funds 1981 1990 2000
Canada
Government 78.8 75.0 59.9
Other 17.1 20.0 31.2
Industry 4.1 5.0 8.9
France
Government 97.7 92.9 91.5
Other 1.0 2. 5.8
Industry 1.3 4.9 2.7
Germany
Government 98.2 92.1 85.9
Other 0.0 0.0 2.5
Industry 1.8 7.9 11.6
Italy1
Government 96.2 96.7 94.4
Other 1.1 0.9 0.8
Industry 2.7 2.4 4.8
Japan
Government 57.8 51.2 50.2
Other 41.2 46.5 47.3
Industry 1.0 2.3 2.5
United Kingdom
Government 81.3 73.5 64.7
Other 15.9 18.9 28.2
Industry 2.8 7.6 7.1
United States
Government 74.1 66.9 65.0
Other 21.5 26.2 27.9
Industry 4.4 6.9 7.1
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Science and Techno-
logy Statistics database, 2003; and National Science Foundation, Division of Science
Resources Statistics, National Patterns of R&D Resources (Arlington, VA, annual series).
From NSF 2004.
Note
1 Italian data are for 1999.
percentage falls). The greatest shift was in Canada where government
funding fell by a fifth, indicating a substantial reorganization of the Cana-
dian national innovation system. The degree of integration of industry and
university research is most developed in Germany which has the highest
percentage of university research funded by industry (more than 11 per
cent, 2000). This is considerably higher than in the US, where such funding
in 2000 amounted to 7.1 per cent, up from 2.6 per cent in 1970. Much of
the increase took place in the 1980s as a result of the new university–
industry R&D centers (Bozeman 2000).
The apparent causal link between economic performance and univer-
sity spend, however, can be misunderstood (Jacobsson 2002). NSF (2004)
and Jacobsson and Rickne (2003) point out that different accounting con-
ventions among countries may account for some of the differences in
amounts of university research funding reported, hence the measurement
of outputs. For instance, the national totals for academic R&D for Europe
and Canada include the research components of general university funds
(GUF) provided as block grants to the academic sector by all levels of
government. Therefore, at least conceptually, the totals include acade-
mia’s separately budgeted research and research undertaken as part of
university departmental research activities. In the US, the Federal govern-
ment generally does not provide research support through a GUF equival-
ent, preferring instead to support specific, separately budgeted R&D
projects. Universities generally do not maintain data on departmental
research, which is considered an integral part of instruction programmes.
US totals thus may be underestimated relative to the academic R&D
efforts reported for other countries. Other accounting differences
include the inclusion or exclusion of R&D in the social sciences and
humanities, the inclusion or exclusion of defence R&D, treatment of
capital expenditures, and the level of government funding included.
Moreover, the organization of scientific work conducted outside of
industry varies greatly between countries. For example, private non-profit
organizations are of some importance in a few countries and therefore
need to be included in the analysis. In particular, this is the case in US,
Israel and Japan with a share of 8–17.5 per cent. The average for the EU is
2.5 per cent, while it is 8.9 per cent for the OECD. The Swedish share is
low, less than one per cent, along with countries such as New Zealand,
Canada and Ireland. Figures are also a misleading guide to value added, as
rapidly growing smaller countries are spending more per head than the
US, but that conceals regional spend. For example, the state of California
spends almost four times as much as the UK on business R&D and would
be ranked 39th (1995) (see Salter et al. 2000, 20).
Does the balance of government versus industry-funded share of acade-
mic R&D have negative effects on academic R&D? This has not been
proved, Crespi and Geuna (2004, 42) developed an approach to analyse
the phenomenon of crowding in (or crowding out). They find, with a
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number of caveats, that the total impact of a given increase in government
investment in HE research will be determined mainly by the importance
of other sources of funds in total research expenditure.
Eminence
The complexity of what is actually being measured is illustrated by evid-
ence on the impact of individual and institutional eminence on inputs and
outputs to and from academic research. The eminence of academics has
been found to have a direct impact on the levels and kinds of commercial-
ization of university research such as patenting and licensing through a
series of Matthew effects (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001). The Matthew
effect is a social psychology effect identified by Merton in 1968 which
means that, the more renowned scientists are, the more honour they
receive, while unknown scientists are not acknowledged (Zhou et al. 2004).
Hence, for the same quality of scientific research, more prestigious scien-
tists receive more citations than less prestigious scientists (Sine et al. 2003,
citing Merton 1968). Carayol (2003) explains that this occurs because some
academics choose research collaborations on the basis of the potential
returns to their own research collaborations – those that are not supported
by industry. Then their reputation enables them to benefit much more
from such collaborations than ones with departments that accept industrial
support in order to maintain or increase their funding. On the other hand,
some laboratories can use accepting industrial funds as a means of achiev-
ing a critical size that would allow them enough funds for funding funda-
mental lines of research.
A variation of this effect is that researchers decide to patent because of
the perceived positive personal and professional outcomes. Propensity to
patent is influenced by the faculty to which they belong. Patenting is more
likely to occur in a supportive environment and where there is ascription
of academic status to commercial success – both of which contribute to
institutional environment in which basic and applied research are likely to
be undertaken simultaneously. This form of Matthew effect has a reinforc-
ing effect when the better universities are able to reinvest in research and
repeat the cycle (Geuna and Nesta 2003).
Sine et al. (2003) investigated a possible Mathew effect of universities’
institutional prestige on their ability to license innovations. Their analysis
of 102 US universities examined in the period 1991–8 found that institu-
tional prestige increases a university’s licensing rate over and above the
rate that is explained by the university’s past licensing performance. This
prestige effect occurs after controlling for the amount of technology pro-
duced by the university, the source of research funding, the presence or
absence of a medical school, the geographical location of the university
and the resources of the technology licensing office. They argue that insti-
tutional prestige leads to stratification in the creation and distribution of
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university-generated knowledge and that the most prestigious universities
will have a disproportionate influence on the evolution of technology and
industry. If a local effect of this prestige is found – as proximity is argued
to be a causal factor in the technology transfer process – then this also has
a direct link to the uneven geography of technology transfer.
Defence and biotech
The rapid expansion in inputs into biomedical research and the corre-
spondingly high level of outputs such as patents, licences and publications
has tended to take the focus away from defence, as the major sponsor of
university research, on the ramifications for academic freedom and indeed
on the civil benefits of defence-funded university research. Military
involvement with science, engineering and technology (SET) is concen-
trated in a fairly small number of countries, with the US dominating: its
defence R&D is more than four times that of the EU and 75 per cent of
the OECD-area budget for defence R&D (OECD 2003). In the EU, the
UK, France, Spain and Germany account for 97 per cent of total govern-
ment military SET (Langley 2005).
In the 1980s, defence research spending was a major component of total
R&D in the US, in France and in Germany, with much of that budget being
spent in the universities as well as the public sector research laboratories
(Charles and Howells 1992; see Evans et al. 1991 on the UK case). From
when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in early 1985, which marked the
beginning of the end of the Cold War period, defence R&D accounted for a
massive share of the US’s spend. That year the US Department of Defense
(DoD) spent $30,332.4 billion on research. In the same year, the UK’s Min-
istry of Defence (MoD) was the world’s second largest single institutional
funder with $4,106.8 million. The MoD spent more than any private sector
organization and more than the total spend on R&D in Spain, Portugal,
Greece, Denmark and Ireland added together. The next largest organi-
zational spenders in Europe were the Ministries of Research and Techno-
logy in France and Germany, both at around $3 billion.
At the end of the decade, in 1989 the UK spent 45.5 per cent of its
R&D budget allocation on defence, France 37 per cent and then a big
drop to Spain 19.1 per cent and Germany 12.8 per cent. In the 1990s in the
UK, defence spending fell by 25 per cent in the 1990s from the peak in
1985–6 (www.york.ac.uk/depts/econ/research/documents/rusi.pdf). Since
2001, the ‘War on terror’ has reversed the drop in military expenditure
that followed the end of the Cold War (Langley 2005). UK defence spend-
ing also remains high. It is the world’s second largest funder of military
SET. In 2003–4 the military spent approximately £2.7 billion on UK R&D.
£2.6 billion came from the MoD – 30 per cent of the total public R&D
budget – and more than 40 per cent of government R&D personnel are
employed by the MoD (Langley 2005). Historically, most of this research
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was undertaken by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency
(DERA) on a non-competitive basis, with DERA sub-contracting about a
quarter of the work outside the MoD. In 1999, the MoD initiated a pilot
scheme whereby a small percentage of the research programme was
opened up to competition. Competition is now firmly established as a
route for the procurement of research programmes. Following the creation
of QinetiQ (the part-privatized commercial arm) and the Defence Science
and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) in 2001, the MoD plans to increase
the volume of work competed for, year on year, so that, by 2007, over 50
per cent of the research programme will be procured via direct competi-
tion (www.mod.uk/business/excel/competition_in_mod_s_research_pro-
gramme.htm). The routes to funding university research are therefore
complicated and constantly changing.
In the US, the DoD provides about 8 per cent of the university research
budget. In the UK in 2000–1 official figures from the DTI are that the
MoD spend in HEIs was £16.9 million, compared with £1,650.6 million
spent in private industry/public corporations. The MoD funds R&D in
universities both directly (through the Joint Grants Scheme) and through
contracts. In 2003, funding provided by the Joint Grants Scheme
amounted to £5.6 million but no information is held centrally about the
number of sub-contracts. These amounts are a considerable underestimate
of the total defence spending in UK universities.
While defence spending on R&D has declined, funding for research in
biosciences has escalated rapidly in Europe and in the US where massive
investments have been made in universities and other research institutes. In
the US life sciences (plus engineering and the computer sciences) are receiv-
ing an increasing share of national R&D funding. In 1999, the overwhelming
share of academic R&D expenditures went to the life sciences, which
accounted for 57 per cent of total academic R&D expenditures, 56 per cent
of Federal academic R&D expenditures, and 58 per cent of non-Federal
academic R&D expenditures. Within the life sciences, the medical sciences
accounted for 29 per cent of total academic R&D expenditures and the
biological sciences for 18 per cent (www.nsf.gov/statistics/
seind02/c5/c5s1.htm#c5s116). An additional 12 per cent of national funding
was provided by NSF, 4 per cent by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA); 3 per cent by the Department of Energy (DOE);
and 2.5 per cent by the Department of Agriculture (USDA). NSF and
NASA experienced the next highest rates of growth: 3.8 and 3.4 per cent,
respectively. In 2002, the NIH budget was $23.6 billion and projected to be
$28.7 billion in 2005, a 2.8 per cent increase on 2004. The rate of increase in
spend is set to slow down. After enjoying double-digit budget increases from
FY 1998 to FY 2003, in FY 2004 the budget increase was only 2.8 per cent,
and for the FY 2005 another minimal increase was recommended (www.the-
aps.org/pa/action/fy2005/FY05Budget.htm). National charities such as the
US Heart Foundation, and the Leukemia charity are also source of major
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funds for research. Figure 3.1 shows the faster growth of Federal funding for
life sciences than for other disciplines. Moreover, in both the US and the
UK there has been a growing convergence between defence and biotech as
biomedical research is increasingly militarized (see Langley 2005).
In the UK, five main sources of national funding exist for biotech-
related university research: the research councils, medical charities, the
Higher Education Funding Councils (for England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland), the pharmaceutical industry and the EU. No funds for
university research are available at the regional or local level. The Medical
Research Council (MRC), like the NIH, has its own research centres (40
centres account for about half the annual budget and employ 3,700 staff
compared to 3,000 staff, and 1,000 students in the universities). The
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) (non-
medical research) funds research in universities and recently in some
government laboratories. (These are the MRC, the Natural Environment
Research Council (NERC) and the Biotechnology and Biological sciences
Research Council (BBRC). BBRC awards £200 million per year to scien-
tists working in universities and eight sponsored research institutes (e.g.
Roslin in Scotland and Babraham in Cambridge) and funds seven thou-
sand scientists, post-graduate students and support staff.) Spending on
research in biological sciences is increasing (www.ost.gov.uk/research/
forwardlook03/tables/index.htm gives detailed breakdowns of spending).
In 2001 the MRC spent £175.7 million of its £346.5 million budget in uni-
versities, ten times larger than the MoD direct spend in universities. The
MRC’s budget rose from £415 million (2002–3) to £500 million (2005–6).
The MRC’s budget is 36 times smaller than the NIH budget but per capita
NIH is still six times greater than the MRC. The MRC’s programmes on
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Figure 3.1 Federal R&D by discipline (AAAS), FY 1970–2001 (obligations in






genomics and proteomics, ‘e-science’, basic technology, stem cells, and
brain science are being taken forward in co-operation with other Research
Councils and key stakeholders, including the health departments and
National Health Service (NHS) and medical research charities. In 2001–2
BBSRC provided £2.13 million of funding per year to scientists working in
universities and in its eight research institutes. Of that, £130.3 million went
into universities. Collectively, according to the 2003–4 HESA Finance
Returns, the amount of income for research grants and contracts for the
biosciences cost centre equals £397,533,000: this is 14.6 per cent of the total
income for research grants and contracts in universities. In addition, the
budget for the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)
for research for biological sciences in 2005–6 was £91.3 million.
Medical charities such as the Wellcome Trust and Cancer UK also pump
millions of pounds into university research each year. For example, the
Wellcome Trust spent £1.2 billion on research grants between 2000 and
2003, declining from a peak of £480 million in 2000 to £393 million in 2003.
Its commercialization department, Technology Transfer, works in partner-
ship with academia, business and investors to promote the translation of
research innovations into healthcare benefits through advice, support and
the administration of tailor-made awards for early-stage research and devel-
opment. Cancer Research UK is the largest volunteer-supported cancer
research organization in the world. The budget for research grants and
activities for 2003–4 was £184.28 million – over half to programmes activities
including clinical units and chairs (£50.23 million) and institutes (£51.17
million), with £10.5 million funding clinical trials. Academics in the UK also
have access to European Commission Funds under successive Framework
Programmes that are the financial instrument of the European Research
Area. The budget for FP6 in the Thematic Priority Life Sciences, genomics
and biotechnology for health is C2,514 million, of which C1,209 million is
allocated for advanced genomics, C1,209 for applications for health, and
C1,305 for combating major diseases. Most of this money goes to the univer-
sities and other public sector research centres. Much larger than all of these
sources of funding is the amount invested by big-pharma. The UK pharma-
ceutical industry spends some £3.3bn a year in R&D – six times as much as
the Department of Health, five times as much as medical charities, and eight
times as much as the MRC (House of Commons Health Committee 2005).
Yet while in both the US and the UK there has been a massive increase
in government funding for biomedical science, Nightingale and Martin
(2004, 565) found there was an explosion of patents and licences in thera-
peutically active compounds – ‘low hanging fruit’ – and they also found a
decline in R&D productivity in the US as measured by the number of
patents per dollar of R&D expenditure. They conclude that ‘any qualitat-
ive productivity increases that biotechnology has brought to R&D has not
kept pace with the increased complexity of the problems that the pharma-
ceutical industry and its regulators are now addressing’. Moreover, the
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peak in the mid-1990s needs to be interpreted within the context of
shifting regulator goal posts, following the Prescription Drug User Free
Act 1992 and the FDA Modernisation Act (1997) which allowed acceler-
ated approval and fast-track registration. In addition, on the basis of the
very small number of biopharmaceuticals evaluated between 1986 and
2004, they find no support for the notion that there has been a biotechnol-
ogy revolution. They find this pessimism reflected in the 2004 FDA White
Paper Innovation or stagnation? which emphasizes the need for translation
and critical path research focused on the clinical assessment of novel prod-
ucts. Similarly, Langley (2005) finds that the civilian benefits from military
SET are overstated, and have a negative effect on openness in SET.
Accountability and ownership
The growing trend of multiple accountabilities is indicated by the enact-
ment of policies which determine ownership of intellectual property – the
terms of trade and the criteria by which the commercial performance of
university research and that of technology transfer offices are evaluated.
Such articulated institutionalization of accountability has implicit assump-
tions about what scientific research is for, the merits of the closeness of the
relationship between industry and universities and the forms that those
should take.
Ownership of IP and publication issues
Geuna and Nesta (2003) find that the increasing number of patents and
licences held by universities has been accompanied by legal changes in the
reward or incentive structure within universities. In a number of EU coun-
tries, researchers may now receive a proportion of the royalties derived
from their patented discoveries even though the patent legally belongs to
the institution. Rules vary by country. Table 3.3 shows the rules on owner-
ship of intellectual property in universities in selected OECD countries.
Hence outcomes in terms of numbers of patents and their ownership will
vary not only by the content of the rules but also by the means by which
those rules are implemented. This is illustrated by OECD’s 2001 survey of
member countries’ technology transfer offices which examined national
laws and regulations. It was found that in countries that enacted legisla-
tion, awareness of and support for technology transfer increased among
the major stakeholders even though relatively little growth in patenting,
licensing, or spin-offs occurred. In addition, most licensing of technology
from universities and public research organizations is based on non-
patentable inventions.
While the universal trend is for universities to find ways of increasing
their income through the sale of intellectual property, there is consider-
able concern, not only from within academia, that this is in conflict with












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the scientific norm of publicizing research results. Specific potential
dangers of an increase in academic patenting and licensing are summar-
ized below (NSF (2004) and Geuna and Nesta (2003)).
• emphasis or diversion of resources toward research areas with com-
mercial potential which may harm or slow progress in these non-com-
mercial areas and may erode the widely held precept that universities
promote knowledge for knowledge’s sake
• clauses in licensing agreements often restrict or delay publication of
research results or require researchers to obtain approval or pay costs
for using their technology in upstream applications
• increased cost of accessing research material or tools etc.
• costs of setting up, maintaining, and administering technology transfer
activities outweigh potential profits on these activities
• exclusive licensing agreements result in higher costs to consumers, a
slower pace of innovation and adoption of the technology
• substitution effects between publishing and patenting
• diverting research resources from the exploitation of long-term
research questions that tend not be suited to the development IPRs
• threat to future scientific investigation from IPR on previous research
• threat to teaching quality.
These potential dangers are recognized in both the US and Europe. In the
US, guidelines were issued by the National Institutes of Health in Decem-
ber 1999 for universities in receipt of Federal funding. These were
designed to discourage patenting unless patent protection was necessary to
attract investment needed for full development. The guidelines urged that
tools be licences with as few encumbrances as possible, and argued against
reach-through royalties – a practice in which the owner of a research tool
seeks royalties on any product that might be developed through its use.
Tool developers, such as emerging biotechnology firms, argue that reach-
through royalties are an alternative to charging high up-front user fees or
restricting access (Business Higher Education Forum 2001, 14). The Com-
mittee’s conclusions were published just as the US House of Representa-
tives made a similar recommendation that research funded by the NIH
should be freely available. In the UK in 2004, the House of Commons
Science & Technology Committee Report on scientific publishing recom-
mended that UK research funding bodies mandate free access to all their
research findings. The Report recommends that all UK HE institutions
should establish institutional repositories on which their published output
can be stored and from which it can be read, free of charge, online. It also
recommends that Research Councils and other government funders
mandate their funded researchers to deposit a copy of all of their articles
in this way. The role of defence in funding university research should also
be more transparent. Langley (2005) argues that professional bodies,
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scientific and engineering institutions and publishers should require that
all academic papers and reports based on work funded by the military
publicly acknowledge this funding and scale.
Yet, while these issues will continue to be debated, most authors find
that no evidence one way or the other to show that the increase in techno-
logy transfer activities is to the detriment of research activity or that
research directions have been changed as a consequence (Hughes 2003;
Geuna and Nesta 2003). Stephan et al. (2002) found no evidence of a sub-
stitution effect of patents for publications and in scientific disciplines such
as life sciences, physical sciences and to a lesser extent engineering they
found that there is a positive effect and they are complementary activities.
Zucker and Darby (2001) found that star scientists working on commercial
problems are not any less productive. On the other hand, Louis et al.
(2001) and Blumenthal et al. (1996) report greater secrecy and less disclo-
sure over research findings amongst industry-funded researchers. Poyago-
Theotoky et al. (2003) and Geuna and Nesta (2003) also sound a note of
caution. In analysing university patenting and its effects on academic
research they find that data collection and interpretation are far from
clear-cut and can be misleading.
Evaluation
As the pressure on universities to commercialize their research has
increased, so has the institutionalization of that pressure in the form of
evaluation of their performance. University research evaluation and allo-
cations of government funding are increasingly related, reflecting global
demands for efficiency and accountability (see Geuna and Martin 2003,
Campbell 2003). Two forms of evaluation are discussed here. The first is
that which evaluates the quality and impact of university research and the
second that which evaluates the commercial value of university technology
and technology transfer.
Geuna and Martin (2003) find that the first kind of evaluation can be
either ex-ante or ex-post but there is no agreement as to which measure-
ments work best and their objectives tend to be defined by the agency that
conducts it. The main virtue of performance-based approaches is said to
be that they increase efficiency in the short term and may provide greater
accountability through being meritocratic, rewarding success and improv-
ing quality. On the other hand they suggest that there will always be
reasons for opposing this approach, not least because the process is costly,
it engenders competition, widens the gap between teaching and research,
discourages risky and longer-term research and leads to an excess of
government influence (pages 16–17).
Evaluations of university research, as in the Netherlands, the UK and
Australia, are characterized by Campbell (2003) as being systemic, nation-
ally promoted and institutionally orientated, with the use of explicit
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grading and ranking systems. (The RAE conducted every five years ranks
units of assessment (subject groups) according to criteria such as quality of
publications and esteem indicators.) Until recently, unlike in the UK
which has the most advanced system, in the Netherlands this was not
linked to research funding. University evaluation in Germany and Austria
is targeted more towards the individual. The German system is based on a
series of metrics rather than peer group review. Widespread adoption of
the UK or Netherlands model is uncertain given what Campbell finds as
the ambiguity and apprehension about the effectiveness of such exercises.
The numerous methods for evaluating the impact of university research
that exist (see Georghiou and Roessner 2000; Jacobsson 2002, 23; Arundel
and Geuna 2001) have the basic problem that they do not fully capture the
non-economic benefits from research or those benefits that are not easily
translated into monetized forms. Moreover, they are likely to suffer from a
variation of the uncertainty principle in physics, Goodhart’s Law, which
states that the instant a measure is used as a target, it loses all value as a
measure because all effort goes into meeting the target and loses sight of
what the object of the exercise is for (Caulkin 2004).
The second kind of evaluations falls into two basic categories: produc-
tion function analyses and studies seeking social rates of return
(Georghiou and Roessner 2000). Production function studies assume that
a formal relationship exists between R&D expenditures and productivity.
Aggregate social rate of return studies attempt to estimate the social bene-
fits that accrue from changes in technology and relate the value of those
benefits to the cost of investments in research that produced both changes.
The authors find that both tend to show that the aggregate rate of return is
positive and make a number of other critiques of methods deployed. A
major problem, however, is that it is not possible to measure indirect
effects accurately. Berens and Gray (2001) suggest that the 7 per cent of
US academic research funded by industry may lead, because of leverage
effects, to a share of approximately 20–25 per cent of academic research
being directly funded by industrial funding.
Bozeman (2000, 628) summarizes the ‘Continent Effectiveness Model’
of technology transfer. This model considers a number of determinants of
effectiveness, including various characteristics of the technology, transfer
agent and the technology recipient. The most important point of the
model is that technology transfer can have several meanings including
market impacts, political impacts, impacts on personnel involved and
impacts on resources available for other purposes and other scientific and
technical objectives. It is based on the assumption that parties to techno-
logy transfer have multiple goals and effectiveness criteria. The model
includes five dimensions of effectiveness: (1) the characteristics of the
technology transfer agent, (2) characteristics of the transfer media, (3)
characteristics of the transfer object, (4) the demand environment, and
(5) characteristics of the demand recipient. It is assumed that no single
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notion of effectiveness makes sense and the model lists six technology
effectiveness criteria, their focus and relation to research and practice.
They range from ‘out-of-the-door’, which is common in practice but
uncommon as an evaluation measure, to scientific and human capital
which is a concern among practitioners but rarely examined in research.
He finds that the out-of-the-door criterion for evaluation is likely to
become more important as a result of the increased concern for quantita-
tive demonstration of results in the US (page 646). The Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) passed by the US Congress 1993
has contributed in part to the ‘metric mania’ gripping the US ‘Federal
bureaucracy’. Bozeman suggests that the public policy argument of the
out-of-the-door criterion is that it is the university’s (or government labo-
ratory’s) job to create technologies or applied research attractive to
industry, but it is industry’s job to make them work in the marketplace. In
the wake of GPRA, this argument may no longer be sustainable. Like-
wise Geoghiou and Roessner (2000) find that the short-term and aggreg-
ate perspective of performance reviews conflicts with the longer-term,
programme-level yet context-dependent perspective of technology
programmes evaluations.
The entrepreneurial role
Looking specifically at the entrepreneurial role, measurement of activities
such as patents, licences, collaborations, joint university–industry scientific
publications and university spin-offs have been the subject of many
studies. Each activity, however, has merits and demerits as indicators of
the strength and quality of the impact of university research on research
undertaken in industry. Moreover, implicit and explicit in the increase in
the number of technology transfer organizations designed to aid these
entrepreneurial activities is the notion that there are barriers or bound-
aries to be overcome.
Patents
Geuna and Nesta (2003, 8) define university-invented patents as ‘patents
with a member of university faculty amongst the inventors, whether or not
the university is the assignee of the patent’. The merits of examining
patent citations and scientific publications are fourfold. (1) They are a
means of measuring the cognitive distance between universities and indus-
try by measuring the impact on innovations in industry and differences in
the relevance of different research fields (Balconi et al. 2004). The web of
science and technology linkages allows for the observation of certain gov-
ernance shifts in certain S&T areas. (2) They measure the intensity of
science and technology interaction. (3) They track potential knowledge
flows between certain scientific and technological fields. (4) They provide
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an indication of the closeness of a relationship between scientific and
industrial laboratories.
Evidence shows that entrepreneurial activity in the form of academic
patents in the US and Europe has increased dramatically over the past
three decades. In the US, the number of patents increased rapidly follow-
ing the Bayh-Dole Act. In the 1970s patents issued to US universities were
fewer than 250 per year, increasing to more than 3,200 in 2001. Over the
period 1991–2000 patents granted rose by 160 per cent. The share of acad-
emic patents has also risen significantly, even as growth in all US patents
increased rapidly during this period. US academic institutions accounted
for more than 4 per cent of patents granted to the US private and non-
profit sectors in 2001, compared with less than 1.5 per cent in 1981. The
share, however, was down slightly from a peak of almost 5 per cent during
1997–9. During this period, the number of academic institutions receiving
patents increased rapidly, nearly doubling in the 1980s to more than 150
institutions and continuing to grow to reach 190 institutions in 2001 (see
Siegel et al. 2003).
NSF (2004) report that, in the 1990s, some 75 per cent of references to
scientific publications in US patent applications originated in publicly
funded science. The number of US scientific papers cited in US patent
applications rose more than sixfold between 1985 and 1998. The number
of new patent applications more than quadrupled between FYs 1991 and
2001, indicating the growing effort and increasing success of universities
obtaining patent protection for their technology. Despite the increase in
institutions receiving patents, the distribution of patenting activity has
remained highly concentrated among a few major research universities
and in a few sectors. The top 25 recipients accounted for more than 50 per
cent of all academic patents in 2001, a share that has remained constant for
two decades. These institutions also account for a disproportionate share
(40 per cent in 2001) of all R&D expenditures by academic patenting insti-
tutions. Including the next 75 largest recipients increases the share to more
than 90 per cent of patents granted to all institutions in 2001 and much of
the 1990s. Many smaller universities and colleges began to receive patents
in the 1980s, which pushed the large institutions’ share as low as 82 per
cent, but the trend reversed in the 1990s. In 1999, 14 patents were pro-
duced for every 1,000 S&E doctorate holders employed in academia,
which was almost double the number in 1993. The rise in this indicator
suggests that states and their universities may be focusing on academic
patenting more than in the past. States vary widely in academic patenting,
which ranges from 0 to 27 patents per 1,000 S&E doctorate holders
employed in academia.
Although the number of patents from universities in Europe is measur-
ably greater in the last two decades, the European Commission’s Euro-
pean Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) found in 2003 a specific European
weakness in patenting. In fact, the US is patenting more actively in Europe
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than Europe itself, particularly for high-tech patents. The report argues
that the future implementation of the EU patent will facilitate patenting in
Europe and there is justification for a concerted EU effort to boost patent-
ing. In France, Belgium, Finland, Germany and Italy, there has been a
decline in university patents owing to the practice of researchers or profes-
sors leaving ownership of the patent to be assigned to the firms that
financed the research project. Other studies have shown that the number
of university invented patents is much higher than the number of patents
owned by universities, e.g. Balconi et al. (2004) for Italy, Meyer (2002) for
Finland and OECD (2002c) for Germany. Other studies have found
similar patterns in Belgium and France (see Geuna and Nesta 2003).
Geuna and Nesta (2003, 10) find that the US has been much more aggres-
sive than Europe in enforcing and exploiting IPRs on the research carried
out by their researchers. Between the late 1980s and the end of the 1990s
the number of USPTO patents granted to US academic institutions more
than tripled and by 2002 numbered nearly 3,300. This rapid growth was
accompanied by the development of specialized management or adminis-
trative organization within universities and by the creation in the science
curricula of specialist training in patent law, and the development of a
code of conduct designed to cope with conflicts of interest.
The relative balance of university versus other PROs in the research-to-
innovation system is illustrated by a study by Cesaroni and Piccaluga
(2002). They constructed a database of comparable data for France, Italy
and Spain on PRO internationally granted patents from the European
Office (EPO) and the US Patent Office (USPTO) during the period
1982–2002. They found that PROs in these countries were granted respec-
tively 911, 723 and 127. The Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
(CNRS) (France), Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR) (Italy) and
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) (Spain) are the
three PROs with the highest number of patents. In France and Italy only
about 10 per cent of granted patents are owned by universities, while in
Spain universities own nearly 50 per cent. The study also highlights the
high level of co-patenting activity, with between 20 per cent and 30 per
cent of the patents having more than one assignee (more than 50 per cent
of which are with firms).
A number of provisos on both the pattern of patenting and the reliabil-
ity of the data are identified in the literature. First, sector and institutional
status are key variables explaining the overall trend of increasing univer-
sity patenting activity. The growth in academic patents has occurred pri-
marily in the life sciences and biotechnology in both Europe and the US
(OECD 2002a; Geuna and Nesta 2003). Patents in two technology areas 
or ‘utility classes’, both with presumed biomedical relevance, accounted
for 39 per cent of the academic total in 2001, up from fewer than a quarter
in the early 1980s. The class that experienced the fastest growth – chem-
istry, molecular biology and microbiology – increased its share from 8 per
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cent to 21 per cent during this period. By the mid-1990s, some 60 per cent
of US university licences result from a biomedical invention (Pressman
2001), such as hepatitis-B vaccine at the University of California, San
Franscisco, and Taxol at Florida State University, while in 1998 41 per cent
of USPTO patents were in three areas of biomedicine, indicating a strong
focus on developments in the life sciences and biotechnology fields. About
half the total royalties were related to life sciences. While the number of
patents is increasing, net income generally is very low and net losses can
occur. Payoff is mostly associated with one or two big hits, the choice of
which may be the result of luck rather than judgement (Mowery and
Sampat 2001, Powers 2003). The 1999 AUTM survey found that about half
of universities’ royalties were concentrated in technology related to the
life sciences. Licensing income is also highly concentrated among a small
number of universities and blockbuster patents. For example, the 2000
AUTM survey found that fewer than 1 per cent of active licenses gener-
ated more than $1 million in income in FY 2000, a figure that includes
licences held by US universities and hospitals, Canadian institutions and
patent management firms.
Second, Geuna and Nesta (2003) found considerable variation in the
propensity for UK universities to patent, with most patents emanating
from the most eminent universities. They reported on a survey (University
Companies Association (UNICO)) conducted in 2002 which found that
the 77 universities that responded (which account for 85 per cent of
research spending in universities in 2001) accounted for 1,402 invention dis-
closures, 745 patent applications and 276 patents granted. The majority of
universities (56 per cent), however, had not had any patents granted, 60 per
cent earned less than £50,000 a year from licences, while 40 per cent had no
income at all from licences; for two-thirds expenditure on IP management
was less than £50,000 but only 14 per cent had no expenditure for this item.
Compared with the US and Canada, the UK is behind in income from
licensing, in the number of licences executed and number of patents issued.
Third, recent attention has been focused on the significance of regula-
tory change in stimulating patenting activity. In both the US and Europe,
legislation has established a common ground for university patenting. Yet
academic analysis suggests that the impact of legislation has been minimal.
In both locations, patenting is not a new phenomenon and specific policy
incentives were not needed for it to develop (Geuna and Nesta 2003).
Fourth, Meyer (2003) argues that university-owned patents are only a
partial indicator of useful research outputs of universy research. This is
because patents are of limited value as measures of innovation as many
patents are not put to use and the distribution of value among those that
are is highly skewed. This problem is also exacerbated by incomplete data
collection, hence its unreliability (OECD 2003; Geuna and Nesta 2003);
and because measuring patents and patent citations underestimates the
value of public science as many innovations are not patented (see Arundel
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and Kabla 1998). Balconi et al. (2004) also highlight methodological limita-
tions. In particular, re-classifying patents by inventor rather than by appli-
cant could lead to a more positive evaluation of university–industry links
in Europe, an evaluation which takes into account the relative inexperi-
ence of European universities in handling IPR.
Finally, the usefulness of the measure itself is in doubt. Cohen et al.
(1998), in line with other studies such as Agrawal and Henderson (2002),
argue that patenting ranks well below graduate recruitment, consultancy
and publication in importance as a means of technology transfer.
Licensing
Licensing has been on the increase in the US and Europe since the early
1990s. Annual AUTM surveys show how invention disclosures, patenting
and licensing of patented technologies has increased and has created thou-
sands of jobs. Income to universities from patenting and licences has
grown substantially over the decade 1991–2000, reaching more than $850
million in FY 2001 – more than half as much again as the FY 1996 level.
Licensing income, however, is only a small fraction of overall academic
research spending, amounting to less than 4 per cent in the FY 2001.
Yet licensing data has its limitations as an indication of how universities
fit into processes of technological change. A recent NSF (2004) report
argues that obtaining patent protection does not always precede negotia-
tion of a licensing agreement, underscoring the embryonic nature of uni-
versity-developed technology. It reports that, according to a recent survey
of more than 60 major research universities by Thursby et al. (2001), 76
per cent of respondents reported that they ‘rarely’ or ‘sometimes’ had
patent or copyright protection at the time of negotiating the licensing
agreement, whereas 25 per cent responded ‘often’ or ‘almost always’. In
addition, most inventions were at a very early stage of development when
the licensing agreement was negotiated, and nearly half the respondents
characterized their inventions as a proof of concept rather than a proto-
type. The majority of licences and options (66 per cent) are conducted
with small companies (existing companies or start-ups). Indeed it is the
Bayh-Dole Act’s mandate that universities give preference to small busi-
nesses. In cases of unproven or very risky technology, universities often
opt to make an arrangement with a start-up company because existing
companies may be unwilling to take on the risk. Faculty involvement in
start-ups may also play a key role in this form of alliance. The majority of
licences granted to small companies and start-ups are exclusive, that
is, they do not allow the technology to be commercialized by other
companies.
In contrast with this extensive information in the US and Canada,
European data on licences is almost non-existent (Geuna and Nesta 2003,
27). In the UK, the number of IP licences granted to UK-based companies
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based on Higher Education Institute’s IP increased by 38 per cent from
382 in 1999–2000 to 527 in 2000–1, while total new (initial) patents filed
rose by 26 per cent from 725 to 913 over the same period. The majority of
these are concentrated in the top few universities (see HEFCE 2003). This
compares with 4,672 new licences and options in the US in the FY 2001–3
(AUTM 2004a).
Publications
The absolute and relative number of scientific publications and the level of
citations are indicative of the strength of the science base by country and
of the synergies between universities and industry by sector. First, the
United States had the largest single share of articles in the world in 2001,
accounting for approximately one-third of all articles (Table 3.4). When
the shares of Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France are added
to the US, these five countries account for nearly 60 per cent of all articles
published in 2001, with the US accounting for 31 per cent (NSF 2004).
However, Europe’s EIS study showed that Western Europe’s article
output grew by about two-thirds from 1988 to 2001 and surpassed that of
the US in 1997. Output gains were substantial across most countries, espe-
cially many of the smaller and/or newer members of the EU. This growth
may reflect, at least in part, EU and regional programmes to strengthen
the S&T base, as well as these nations’ individual efforts.
But, in terms of the citation frequency, the US’s papers dominate, sug-
gesting that US research is rated more highly than that in Europe within
and outside academia. Moreover, citations from the US are much more
likely to be to publications outside the US whereas in some European
countries and Canada the proportion of own-country citations is higher,
suggesting a greater integration of the US than Europe into geographically
extensive systems. Of the top 30 citations on all patents only three were
non-US (UK, France and Japan) with Harvard, Scripps Clinical &
Research Foundation and National Cancer Institution some way ahead in
combatorial synthesis. For all countries the number of citations to their
own country’s papers is higher than for all countries taken together, sug-
gesting a geographical localization effect at the national scale. For the US
this difference is small while for EU countries the difference is much more
significant. In the cases of France, Germany Japan and the UK the
‘own-country’ citations are three to four times higher than for all countries
combined. For Italy and Canada, the most extreme, more than 50 per
cent of citations originate in the author’s own country (Malo and Geuna
2000, 317).
The field distribution of scientific articles changed little between 1988
and 2001. The life sciences dominated the portfolio of the OECD coun-
tries, including the US, and of Central and South America and sub-
Saharan Africa (NSF 2004).
72 Measuring the impact
Herbst (2004) examined the comparative performance of Europe
versus the US in scientific publications using data from the EC (1997) and
CEST. His study shows significant variations between countries and insti-
tutions. He finds that the former shows that between 1981 and 1995
Switzerland had the highest number of publications per inhabitant, ahead
of Sweden, Canada, the US and the UK, and also scores highest on the rel-
ative impact of publications, ahead of the US, Sweden, the UK and the
Netherlands. Herbst explains that averaged data conceal internal varia-
tions of significance: individual US states or German Länder, for example,
may perform better than some of the smaller nations listed. To overcome
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Table 3.4 Number of published scientific articles for all types of organizations in a
number of rich countries, 1999, in relation to GDP (million US dollars,
purchasing power parity) (ranking within parentheses)
Country Number of articles in Number of articles in natural
all fields of science per science, engineering and
GDP, 1999 medicine, 1999 per GDP
Israel 42.9 (1) 39.3 (1)
Sweden 38.6 (2) 36.7 (2)
Switzerland 34.0 (3) 33.1 (3)
Finland 33.4 (4) 31.5 (4)
New Zealand 32.3 (5) 28.1 (5)

















South Korea 10.4 10.3
Luxembourg 1.5 1.2
Sources: NSF (2002): Science and Engineering Indicators, National Science Foundation, US,
and OECD (2003), Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2003:1 for data on GDP; Jacob-
sson and Rickne (2003).
Note
Natural sciences, engineering and medicine includes the following categories: clinical medi-
cine, biomedical research, biology, chemistry, physics, earth and space, engineering and
technology, mathematics.
this, CEST focused on 1,000 institutions worldwide on the basis of biblio-
metric selection criteria. This found that US universities were heavily
over-represented among 100 best rated institutions. When this is broken
down by sub-field (academic discipline), US universities performed
strongly, and in the vast majority of academic disciplines or fields US uni-
versities were over-represented. In fact in more than two-fifths of all sub-
fields assessed, the corresponding relative share of US institutions
amounted to at least 70 per cent. A similar pattern is observable for Nobel
laureates in physics, physiology or medicine, and economics, but not in
chemistry, where Europe has a long tradition and industrial strength.
Zucker et al. (1998b) found that, for an average firm involved in biology,
two genetic sequence articles co-authored by an academic star scientist
and a firm’s scientists result in about one more product in development,
one more product on the market and 344 employees; for five articles these
numbers were five, 3.5 and 860 respectively.
Moreover, the assessment of the impact of scientific publications also
has a time factor. Crespi and Geuna (2004) found that the full effect of an
increase in HE research and development spending on publications takes
six years to occur, and on citations seven years, with no significant return
on investment for at least two years. They also found evidence of decreas-
ing returns for publications and citations to the domestic component of
HE research and development but slightly increasing returns at the inter-
national level. Ranking publications, they found considerable stability
over time, with the US first, UK second, followed by Germany, France and
Canada. The pattern of citations was similar but with the notable excep-
tion of Canada falling behind to 13th place in 2002, compared to third
place in 1987. In making comparison of scientific productivity overall
(defined as how far the scientific system is from the best way of producing
science output), they showed that the US and the UK scientific systems
are the most technologically efficient (the best organizational set up and
highest productivity). At the same time, the US and the UK, like Australia
and Canada, do not have positive productivity growth rates. The knock-on
effect is catch-up: all countries are converging to the efficient frontier
represented by the US, the convergence of the UK with the US is mainly
due to a deterioration in US productivity. While that of the UK has
declined it has been at a slower rate, and 11 of the other 12 countries
studied are catching up with the UK.
The centrality of Canadian universities’ position in industrial research is
illustrated by a study of publications by Godin and Gingras (2000). They
found that, in 1995, the Canadian university sector was present in 81.9 per
cent of the 25,666 papers in the Science Citation Index (CSI) containing at
least one university address (up from 75 per cent in 1980). Government
sectors were present in 16.5 per cent followed by the hospital sector (12.8
per cent) and industry (4.6 per cent). The authors conclude that the real
effect of diversification has been to stimulate university research further
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through collaboration and not to diminish universities’ presence in collab-
orations. Therefore, rather than receding from central places as suggested
by Gibbons et al. (1994), universities – at least in Canada – have been able
to stay at the centre of knowledge production systems as research
collaborators. Moreover, since their data show a growing presence of
industries among knowledge producers, there is evidence of stronger rela-
tionships between the components of the innovation system rather than
marginalization of any one of the actors. Balconi et al. (2004) came to
similar conclusions about the role academic inventors played in chemical
technologies and that they have contributed significantly to innovation in
electronics, instruments and industrial engineering in Italy.
Spin-offs
University spin-offs have symbolic value as indicators of how entrepre-
neurial universities are. They are credited with a number of benefits to
society through their employment generation and generating significant
economic value, thus promoting and encouraging economic development;
linking science to markets and inducing investment in university technolo-
gies and stimulating innovation; helping universities with their mission,
supporting additional research, attracting and retaining faculty, and train-
ing students (OECD 2001b; Shane 2004). Yet the potential for measure-
ment of their performance and inter-institutional and inter-country
comparison is limited because no common definition of what counts as a
public-sector spin-off firm has emerged from the technology policy liter-
ature. The term is used rather loosely and refers generally to any new,
small, high-technology or knowledge-intensive company whose intellec-
tual capital somehow has origins in a university or public research institu-
tion (OECD 2001b). (OECD surveyed 19 countries on their spin-offs
activity, asking for number of spin-offs and definitions used to define
them.)
Current problems of defining what spin-offs are and measuring their
performance is the equivalent of the 1980s vexed question of how to define
‘high-tech’. At the broadest level, a university spin-off is deemed to be a
company founded by members or former members (i.e. existing acade-
mics, research staff, technicians, undergraduates, graduates and post-
graduates). This definition can lead to an extensive range of firms
included, especially when there is no commonly agreed cut-off point of the
time lag between the founder being a member of the institute and the
actual creation of the organization (if the time lag is long, the factors
leading to the formation of the organization may be only associated
remotely with the original institution). Some countries, such as the US,
chose very broad definitions, while the Italy, Hungary and UK definitions
are narrowly focused on single factors: obtaining licences, faculty and staff
foundations, and firms with equity investments, respectively (OECD
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2001b). There is also the problem of including ownership of university IP
in a definition if universities do not own academic IP – as in Sweden.
However defined, the patterns are that spin-off activity is increasing. It
is more common in some countries than others. Spin-offs tend to be
formed more often by the more research-intensive universities. The net
number of spin-offs is small and their size, growth rates, revenues, and
product generation are modest, at least in the first decade of their exist-
ence, and most do not grow into large firms. Spin-offs are mainly in the
biomedical and the information technology fields, and most stay within the
same geographical area as the institution from which they came. Those in
Europe do not tend to grow as fast as in the US and the number of public
spin-offs is small as compared to total new firm creation and corporate
spin-offs (OECD 2001b). Table 3.5 shows a comparison of the rate of spin-
off formation across the OECD.
The explanation for high figures for Germany given by the OECD is
that in the ATHENE study commissioned by the BMBF in 1998 the
organizations counted include non-university research institutions, which
receive some public funding, include the Hermann von Helmholtz
National Research Centres, the Frauenhofer-Gesellschaft, the Max Planck
Institute, and various regional and national research laboratories. Over
the course of the early to mid-1990s, an average of 58 spin-offs per year
had affiliations to these laboratories. With university and Hochschule
spin-off foundations totalling several hundred per year, Germany appears
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Table 3.5 Comparison of spin-off formation across the OECD
Institutions Cumulative Period Per Period Reference
number year
Australia All 0,138 1971–99 10 1991–9 Thorburn
Belgium All 0,66 1979–99 4 1990–9 Clarysse
and
Degoof
Canada Universities 0,746 1962–99 47 1990–8 Cooper
France All 0,387 1984–98 14 1992–8 Mustar
Finland Public labs 0,66 1985–99 4.5 1990–9 VTT data
Germany Public labs 0,462 1990–7 58 1990–7 ATHENE
Germany Universities 2,800 1990–5 467 1990–5 ATHENE
Norway Public labs 0,122 1996–8 41 1996–8 Research
Council of
Norway
United Kingdom Universities 0,171 1984–98 15 1990–7 PREST
AUTM1 Universities 1,995 1980–98 281 1994–7 AUTM
1. AUTM includes universities and research hospitals. Cumulative totals are for
the United States alone, the per-year figures are for US and Canadian institutions.
Sweden is excluded from the OECD data because it includes students.
Source: OECD 2001b.
to be one of the best-performing public entrepreneurs among the coun-
tries for which the OECD has received data. The ATHENE definition is
very broad, including firms founded by recent university graduates,
public employees, and employees from mid-sized or large firms who
have an advanced academic degree. The ATHENE study also estimated
that about half of all firms in technology and science parks could be con-
sidered spin-offs given the affiliations of their founders to academic and
public institutions. In 1996, about 1,200 new firms were established in
science parks, so they estimate that close to 600 could be academic spin-
offs (some of which may be double-counted with the university and other
research institutes).
More recent data for the UK and for the US would suggest that the
formation rate in these countries at least is much higher. In the UK the
formation rate has settled to around 200 per year. The third annual
Higher Education Business Interaction Survey (HEBI) shows the rapid
increase in the number of spin-off companies at the end of the twentieth
century. From around 70 a year on average on the previous five years,
203 were formed in 1999–2000, 248 in 2000–1 and 213 in 2001–2. (The
rate in 2003 slowed as a consequence of legislation contained in Section
22 of the Finance Act. This had an unintended consequence for univer-
sity spin-offs. ‘The intention of the law was to stop up a loop hole that
was allowing companies to avoid paying tax when rewarding employees.
But an unintended consequence has completely killed off our business –
which was going incredibly well until then’ (Tim Cook, Oxford Times,
April 16 2003, 20).) This is about half the number (450) formed in the
same year in the US and Canada (AUTM 2004a). Thus the rate of UK
spin-off performance is better than that in the US when adjusted for the
relative number of universities. Moreover, the spin-off process is more
efficient in the UK on the basis of research expenditure per spin-off. On
average one spin-off firm is formed for every £15 million of research
expenditure in the UK, compared with one for every £44 million in the
US (HERO/DTI 2004). On the other hand, employment generation and
turnover in UK spin-offs are low: only around 12,000 people are
employed in spin-off companies and combined turnover amounts to less
than £300 million. The contribution to regional development varies by
year. The majority of spin-offs are in England, but the pattern of forma-
tion fluctuates. In 2001–2 London had the highest (38) followed by the
North West (27) but in the previous year Yorkshire and Humberside in
the North of England had the most (29) followed by London (27) and
the North West.
The impact of spin-offs on regional economies in other European coun-
tries has been much later than in the UK and the US. In the mid-1990s, in
many European regions the university spin-off process had barely started.
Lawton Smith and De Bernardy (2000) reported on the findings of a FP4
Network which showed that in Munich, Milan, Barcelona and Utrecht
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relatively few SMEs had been generated by universities. In Milan, the
growth of the high-technology SME sector has been largely independent
of the university. In the Munich region, only 6 per cent of high-technology
SMEs were founded by graduates from Ludwig Maximilian University and
the existing technology transfer was nowhere near fully utilized.
On the other hand, in France and Sweden some institutions had very
high rates of spin-offs. For example in France, Sophia Antipolis developed
many spin-offs particularly from INRIA. The most prolific period of
public sector spin-off formation was the late 1980s to early 1990s, which
saw an average of 37 firms formed per year, although the trend in the mid-
to-late 1990s seems to be towards less public sector entrepreneurialism
(OECD 2001b). Gothenburg in Sweden has one of the highest levels of
spin-offs in Europe. By 1995, Gothenburg’s universities had spun-out 350
firms, of which 250 came from Chalmers University of Technology (Lind-
holm Dahlstrand 1997). She explains that, in Gothenburg, the high rate of
university spin-off combined with its official encouragement has had the
effect of reinforcing the process because of continuing links between the
new firms and the institutional origins of their founders.
While other studies have monitored the rate of spin-offs formation and
factors responsible they have generally failed to discuss how to evaluate
their performance of spin-offs other than through employment growth
(see for example Shane 2004) or to consider the significance of sector or
business models (Druilhe and Garnsey 2004). Of those that consider the
rate of spin-off and the growth of firms, Di Gregorio and Shane (2003)
found that spin-off activity is negatively related to the share of inventor
royalties compared to industry licensees, and positively related to total
industry spend on university-based research. The EC (2003b, 77) argued
that creating professional patent and licensing agencies on a regional
basis (thus commercializing innovations for several universities) would
strengthen commercialization. Similarly Hsu and Bernstein (1997)
emphasized the necessity of clearly articulated and well-understood policy
on licensing and IPR. Geuna and Nesta (2003) find that in Europe there is
a considerable lack of expertise in TTOs at the local level. While TTOs
have an important organizational and political role, their precise contribu-
tion is difficult to measure (see Siegel et al. 2003). While variables such as
the university’s royalty and equity distribution formula can be obtained,
a significant contribution may be ‘boundary spanning’ between
customers (entrepreneurs or firms) and suppliers (scientists) increasing
communication.
Focusing particularly on the impact of location on spin-off activity,
Clarysse et al. (in OECD 2001b) used results from a Belgian study of the
early-growth phase of new technology-based firms to explain why Euro-
pean new technology-based firms fail to grow like their US counterparts.
They conclude that ‘structural deficiencies’ such as the financial, fiscal
or regulatory climate cannot explain this slow growth. Rather, the entre-
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preneurial climate of the firm’s region and its experiences and opportun-
ities for knowledge acquisition are determinative. Regions that are not
supportive of spin-off early-growth needs – before the first infusion of
venture capital – have a lower incidence of high-growth ventures. The
challenge for Europe, they conclude, is to create an environment that
allows spin-offs to learn how to translate research into a product tailored
to market demand and to develop an appropriate business model in which
intermediary institutions and incubation centres will play a key role.
Few studies have considered the financial rewards for the individual.
Stephan and Everhart (1998) studied the payback received by US univer-
sity scientists affiliated with biotech companies making an IPO in the early
1990s. They found that 420 university scientists were affiliated with 52 uni-
versity-based firms they studied and 37 of these had sufficient holdings and
close enough ties with the company to warrant disclosure at the time of
the initial public offering. Three others were classed as insiders by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. This means that 10 per cent of uni-
versity-based scientists could be classed as insiders. Over half were
founders (55 per cent). Of these 14 exercised options and then made a sale
and realised a profit during the time of the study. The maximum profit
realized was $11,760,000 in one day, while the mean was $1,237,598. Uni-
versities of course vary in the proportion of profits that academics are
allowed to keep (see Chapter 8 for the example of Oxford University).
The immediate economic benefits are only one criterion for evaluating
the contribution of spin-offs to society. OECD argues that spin-off firms
fill a special niche between public research and the private sector – they
are mediators or intermediaries that sell their knowledge as consultants or
contract researchers. In other words, the importance of public sector spin-
offs lies in their role as rapid conduits of commercially relevant ideas,
rather than in their employment generation or direct contribution to
wealth creation. Morever, other forms of technology transfer and commer-
cialization compete with spin-offs for being the best route into the market-
place. For example, the licensing of commercially relevant technologies to
industry has the advantage of being less time-intensive for research per-
sonnel. The training of highly qualified scientists and technologists is of far
greater significance than the spin-off process (Hughes 2003; see also
Branscomb et al. 1999 and OECD 2001b for similar criticisms).
The massification role and human capital formation
The interpretation of measurable effects of human capital impacts on a
region, like other forms of measurement, necessarily has to take account
of temporal, geographical, political and historical factors. As in other
indictors of universities on economic development at the national and at
the regional level, the measurement evidence is far from conclusive.
Studies which have used econometrics to test for what factors influence
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technological change at the national level have found a close relationship
with technological change and employment of highly skilled workers (see
for example Berman et al. 1994, for the US, and Betts 1997 for Canada).
Crespi and Geuna (2004) found that the impact of the science budget on
the ‘production’ of PhD students is connected with a significant rise in the
number of graduates in a country. They find benefits to this trend, that
there are constant or slightly increasing domestic returns to scale. Coun-
tries which have experienced more rapid growth tend to have more highly
educated workforces (Bils and Klenow 2000). On the other hand, educa-
tion is only one explanation for economic growth. Betts and Lee (2005)
suggest that levels of education can explain only about one-third of the
variation between countries. They find that although studies which
compare cross-country performances do indicate the importance of levels
of education in explaining variations in economic performance, they can
be limited by unobserved differences between countries.
The problem of assessing the outcomes of even applied industry-related
training programmes is illustrated by Brighton’s (2004) review of the UK’s
Knowledge Transfer Partnership (KTP) scheme (previously the Teaching
Company Scheme, TCS) (2001–2). Since it was established in 1975 it has
assisted over 1,500 companies. The rationale for the TCS scheme was that
firms have difficulties exploiting technology outside established cap-
abilities, that they make insufficient use of knowledge base and that there
are deficiencies in graduate skills and employers’ reluctance to employ
graduates. The basis of the scheme is a business-defined project under-
taken by an ‘Associate’ who is normally based in the business and who is
jointly supervised by a ‘knowledge-based partner’ and business. The pro-
jects normally run for two years. This was initially a large company
scheme, but by 2001 90 per cent of businesses were SMEs.
Brighton found a range of outcomes, from the negative – that significant
numbers did not meet technical or commercial objectives – to the positive –
smaller companies do better: prior collaboration improves technical
success, and eminence (defined as RAE grade) had no relation to commer-
cial success. He found that, while the impacts of the programme to the
companies rating over 50 per cent include increases in sales (59 per cent)
and increases in value (57 per cent), the top benefits were less measurable
impacts, particularly increase in technological knowledge or skills (99 per
cent), networking (78 per cent) and increase in R&D (77 per cent). For the
associates, over half were recruited by the company and were paid above-
average salaries. He concludes that the programme compares poorly with
some other programmes on the basis of ratio of grant to increased turnover
– 1:0.83–1:0.87 – but that, of programmes recently completed, many are
aimed at process improvements so that turnover and employment may be
poor measures, the continued added value by associates may not be cap-
tured and wider (and longer-term) benefits may not be valued.
The link between the supply of university graduates and rates of
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innovation at the regional level has been the subject of numerous studies
(see for example Goldstein and Luger 1992; Felsenstein 1994). When
Beeson and Montgomery (1993) estimated the amount of university-
induced migration to a region that would not otherwise have occurred, a
study similar to that of Felsenstein, they found very little evidence of any
measurable effects. Their study of 218 SMAs using census data found that
area employment growth and percentage of the workforce employed as
scientists and engineers are positively related and significantly related to
measures of university quality such as university R&D funding, top-
ranking science and engineering programmes, number of bachelor’s
degrees awarded and bachelor’s degrees in science and engineering. Their
results indicated that university activity differentially affects the demand
for workers with specific skills, and is consistent with the finding of other
researchers that a firm’s ability to implement new technologies is depend-
ent on workers’ skills. However, their data could not reject the hypothesis
that university quality has no significant effect on area income, the
employment rate, net migration rates, or even the share of employment in
high-tech industries.
Likewise, Betts and Lee (2005) point out that none of the evidence does
in fact establish that a thick network of universities is either necessary or
sufficient for a country to experience rapid innovation of productivity
growth and that some countries might obtain skilled labour through immi-
gration. They cite De Fontenay and Carmel (2004), who contend that the
immigration of Russian scientists has done much to foster high-tech clus-
ters in that country, as in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1999), and that Israel’s
military is an important source of well-trained technicians. They suggest
that there is a need to be sceptical about claims that a region with a weak
supply of university graduates can never succeed at innovation. The
quality of schools matters, as does the propensity of the private sector to
import graduates.
For Walshok and the CONNECT Programme in San Diego (see
Walshok et al. 2002), the importance of universities and research centres in
creating San Diego as one of the most innovative regions in the USA lies
in three hooks. These are the store of intellectual capital in a region; the
breadth and depth of advanced skills and knowledge of human capital;
and, connecting these two, the character and extent of catalytic business
and financial networks. Lee and Walshok (2003) developed a series of
indicators of the role of University of California San Diego in workforce
training. In addition to enrolment and graduation statistics they looked at
extension programmes such as non-credit post-baccalaureate education,
non-credit workforce training programmes, students’ motivations for pur-
suing training, and who paid for the training. They found that these
represented greater flexibility than degree programmes and gave rise to a
far greater degree of impact of each campus on its region than their tradi-
tional degree programme enrolments would suggest.
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The territorial role
The emphasis on the territorial role is predicated on the assumption that
proximity, improved innovation and economic performance of firms are
linked. Studies have focused on proximity effects in two main ways: either
looking at the impact of individual institutions on their local economies
through case studies or by modelling knowledge production and spillovers
and identifying the degrees to which the impacts are localized.
Of the first, direct economic impacts as indicated by multiplier values
and employment impact have been undertaken using a regional
input–output model. Several have been undertaken in the UK and show
that the former are in the order of 1.2 per cent to 1.5 per cent (see for
example Glasson (2003) for a review and case studies of Oxford Brookes
and Sunderland University). The impact can be much larger, however. A
recent study (GLA 2004) showed employment multiplier effect for
London HE institutions of 1.98 per cent and a contribution of 2.5 to 3 per
cent of total London output.
Case studies based on surveys of businesses and other organizations
which have asked the importance of the university to locational decisions,
productivity and competitiveness, innovation, and output levels of respon-
dent organizations (Goldstein and Renault 2004) also fall into this cat-
egory. These authors cite Thanki (1999), who finds that these methods
have not captured many of the potential ways that universities contribute
to economic development either because of methological limitations or
because of a failure to understand how regional development occurs, and
also comments that indirect effects are very hard to measure.
A variant of the case study approach is those that focus on activity
within specific regions and which include universities in their focus on
particular sectors such as biotech (see Bagchi-Sen et al. 2004; Lawton
Smith 2005). Such studies show that universities are only one of a range of
sources of technology and are usually not the most important. Even when
they are important, it is not necessarily the closest university that has the
greatest impact. For example Bagchi-Sen et al. (2004) found that, although
collaboration with universities was an important factor in explaining busi-
ness performance in both samples of biotech firms in California and
Massachusetts, physical proximity to collaborators was only somewhat
important. In Britain Athreye and Keeble (2000) found a significant statis-
tical relationship between SME product innovativeness and local (county-
level) university and government R&D expenditure, using a multivariate
model incorporating other influential variables.
Of the second kind (modelling knowledge production and spillovers),
studies show that knowledge flows from universities to industry decline
with geographical distance but have the limitation that they do not model
or trace knowledge flows (Arundel and Geuna 2001) or explain why dis-
tance matters (Arundel and Geuna 2004). Jaffe (1989), using a production
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function analysis based on a model developed by Griliches (1979) that
uses registered patent inventions registered by the US patent office as the
dependent variable, shows that the diffusion of knowledge from the uni-
versity to industry is localized through a positive relationship between
corporate patent activity and university research spending at the state
level, but the effect fades with patent age and with the diffusion of ideas.
Anselin et al. (1997) using the Griliches–Jaffe model identified a consistent
spatial range of interaction between universities and industry. They found
that spillovers of university research on innovation extended over a range
of 75 miles from the innovating Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and
over a range of 50 miles with respect to private R&D. More recently
Anselin et al. (2000) in their analysis of data for MSAs found differences in
the mix of applied local knowledge inputs in general, and in the role of
university research in particular sectors. University spillovers seem to be
specific to certain sectors, being particularly strong in electronics and
instruments, and absent in others – for example drugs and chemicals and
machinery. In the case of the latter, spillovers extend beyond the bound-
ary of the MSA within a 75-mile range from the central city.
Adams (2002, 274) looked at spillovers from academic and industrial
research. He found that academic spillovers are more localized than indus-
trial spillovers. He argues that open science makes it possible for firms to
go to local universities to obtain information that is reasonably current
and not proprietary – normal science. This increases the localization of
academic spillovers. However, when quality of the school and the science
is taken into account, there is a difference in geographical patterns. Labo-
ratories that work with top private universities search over longer dis-
tances, not merely with top institutions but also with other universities.
Top private universities concentrate more than others on basic research,
and spillovers from these institutions are not necessarily localized. Adams
makes the point that public universities are constrained by policies that
are conducive to localization. Similarly Mansfield and Lee’s (1996) study
of R&D expenditure by firms in universities found that firms prefer to
work with local university researchers, formalized at a distance within 100
miles of the firm’s R&D laboratories. This fadeout in firm support of uni-
versities is less for basic research than for applied research. Firms also
support applied research of less distinguished faculties nearly as much as
faculties in top schools, though basic research supported by firms takes
place mostly at top schools (in Adams 2002). On the other hand, a study of
2,300 German firms by Beise and Stahl (1999) found that firms located
near universities or polytechnics do not have a higher probability of using
the results of publicly funded research. They, like Martin and Sunley
(2003) in their criticism of Porter, recognize that a central issue is the geo-
graphical unit of analysis i.e. how near counts as proximity.
Howells (2002) cites a study by Feldman (1999) which finds that codi-
fied knowledge in the form of patents may be localized but fades rapidly
Measuring the impact 83
(i.e. after the first year following the patent). Even in this relatively short
period of time the competitive edge given by localization in some key
sectors is important. Yet, maturity of the technology does not necessarily
mean a cessation of research links, as the portfolio of links can expand
through the establishment of sets of norms of behaviour involving formal
and informal contact, creating and transforming established relationships
and having an indirect effect (Smith 1997).
Goldstein and Renault (2004) set out to estimate the magnitude of
the contribution to changes in regional economic well-being, and to separ-
ate out the regional development impacts of different functions of univer-
sities. They studied all 312 MSAs in the US over the period 1969 to 1998
but in two time periods, 1969 to 1986 and 1986 to 1998, using a quasi-
experimental approach which examined which university-based activities,
e.g. teaching, basic research, extension and public service, technology
transfer, technology development and businesses spinning off from univer-
sity research, are the most responsible for any net regional development
impacts from the presence of universities. Average annual earnings per
worker was used as the measure of regional economic development.
They found that research and technlogy functions generate significant
knowledge spillovers that result in enhanced economic development that
would not otherwise have occurred. Yet, they also found that the magni-
tude of the effects was small compared with other factors but also varied.
In the earlier period they found that, rather than the presence or activities
of universities, important factors included general regional economic con-
ditions, agglomeration economies and aspects of industry structure. In the
later period, total university R&D activity was significant, but there was
no evidence to support the hypothesis that human capital creation was
important. While university patenting was non-significant, local factors
such as the presence of an airport and the size of the business services
sector were important. The authors explain the difference by saying that
before 1986 economic development was not part of universities activities,
but since then the match has been increasing, with the trend for economies
to become generally more ‘knowledge-based’.
Conclusions
This chapter has set out the many different ways of measuring impacts of
universities on economic development, internationally, nationally and
regionally, and raises a number of questions about what is being meas-
ured. The review has found that the importance of universities to innova-
tion and economic development is overstated and that methods and
targets chosen vary and the practice of measurement is undertaken for dif-
ferent reasons to show different outcomes. Moreover, the use of data can
be selective to support argument; any data set also at best shows a partial
picture when it is total links that matter (Lee and Walshok 2003). Not all
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contacts are measured, of course as Betts and Lee (2005) point out, the
focus on innovations directly linked to universities, such as patents, seri-
ously undercounts the impact of university scientists and engineers. For
example, faculty consulting is not tracked by formal university means.
Data are often not comparable because of differences in national indus-
trial structures and national and regional innovation systems and not least
because of the differing definition of regions, the difficulties in demon-
strating both direct and indirect impacts, and measuring the variety of dif-
ferent forms of engagement. Hence, the causal link between universities
and economic development has not been proved by current methods.
This chapter has indicated that measurement of inputs and outputs has
to take account of considerable variations in the position of universities
within national systems of evidence, the propensity of different sectors to
assimilate and stimulate university research and the fact that this will vary
by country and by region. It has also highlighted the multi-dimensional
features of multiple accountabilities of universities that are implicit in the
agenda of evaluations of performance. For example, as a result of a combi-
nation of historical, psychological and economic factors, some academics
and institutions will have more impact than others. It has also been argued
that any measurement of universities’ contribution to economic develop-
ment must take account of the still pervasive level of defence R&D
funding in the core group of countries that dominate global defence activ-
ity. In the UK, as in the US and France, a deeply embedded relationship
exists between universities and the MoD, which ‘pervades research, devel-
opment, teaching and science communication, and extends across disci-
plines from engineering and the physical sciences, through life sciences
and the social sciences’ (Langley 2005, 73).
The chapter has also pointed out the necessity of considering the time-
frame of effects and the unpredictability of longer-term trends. If the role
of universities in the formation of new innovation systems is to be under-
stood, then this involves mapping processes which span over decades and
where mechanisms involved are many and difficult to trace.
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4 Europe
The knowledge society depends for its growth on the production of new
knowledge, its transmission through education and training, its dissemina-
tion through information and communication technologies and on its use
through new industrial processes or services. Universities take part in all
three processes and are at the heart of the Europe of Knowledge.
(EC 2003a, 4)
Introduction
This statement from the European Commission’s Third European report
on S&T indicators 2003: towards a knowledge-based economy demon-
strates that universities are central to European Union economic and
social policy. European science, along with regional policies, is designed to
address the European paradox which is that Europe has a strong science
base but poor performance in terms of technological and industrial com-
petitiveness compared to the US (EC 1996; EC 2003a). The creation of a
‘Europe of Knowledge’ has been a prime objective for the European
Union since the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 and the ‘Euro-
pean Higher Education Area’ set out in the Bologna Agreement in 1999.
These new systems of governance in which the EU and national govern-
ments will work together are designed to combat the unnecessary
fragmentation and compartmentalization of university research and teach-
ing policies to overcome that paradox (EC 2003a). The accession of ten
new states to the EU in 2004 further complicated efforts to bring about a
unified system of teaching and research.
The Lisbon Agenda recommends raising national expenditures on
R&D. By 2010, investment on research should account for 3 per cent of
GNP (EC 2003b, 20–1). The co-existing plan for the European Research
Area (ERA) is intended to remove remaining obstacles to researchers’
mobility, will institute a system of benchmarking of R&D policies of
member states and will establish a Community patent (EC 2003b, 21). This
strategy, it has been argued, is long overdue. Noll (1998, 10–11), for
example, finds that Europe has not made as great an investment as the US
in its university systems, commenting particularly on Germany, where
spending has been stagnant since the 1970s; on France, where only the
grandes écoles have fared reasonably well in the budgetary process; and
the UK, where ‘only universities at the top of the system are equipped to
provide world-class education, and universities are starved of resources in
comparison with those in the United States and the rest of Europe’.
Possible explanations for Europe’s poor showing in world rankings are
that, since the mid-1990s, the EU has lagged behind the US in terms of the
absolute volume of R&D, in the rate of growth of R&D activities and
R&D intensity and that the US has the advantage of a much greater match
and integration between the different elements within innovation systems.
The EC (2003b, 55) finds that one of the distinctive features of R&D
expenditure in the EU in comparison with Japan and the US is the ratio
between the public sector (including government and the higher education
sector) and the private sector. In the EU, public research accounts for a
much larger share than in either Japan or the US, likewise the business
share of total R&D funding is lower, although this is changing and there
has been an expansion of competitive research funds relative to core
funds, particularly from industry.
Moreover, not only may the supply of cutting-edge scientific research
be inadequate, the EU may also be losing out because of the unattractive-
ness of the European environment to US research: too little US research is
done in Europe. These problems could be addressed through higher levels
of research funding but also through higher degrees of pluralism in
funding sources and a higher integration of research with teaching, clinical
research and medical practice (Pammolli et al. 2001, v). Walshok (2002)
argues that key to the San Diego region’s economic success was interdisci-
plinary research in its universities and research laboratories. Therefore
integrating different elements within the research and innovation process
has important effects at the regional as well as national level.
Against this background, this chapter sets out to consider what factors
will mediate both EU policies towards the EU higher education system
and the potential impact on economic development across Europe and its
regions. This is illustrated by examples from some of the EU15 countries.
The chapter discusses whether the evidence is more compelling that uni-
versities will contribute more to economic development in some of those
countries than in others. It does this by assessing which of the eight para-
digms are dominant and what the implications of this are for Europe as a
whole.
Distributed innovation systems
In the move towards a coherent system of governance across Europe,
Georghiou and Kuhlmann (2002) find a shift in the rationale for EU
innovation policy, which between the 1960s and the 1990s was based on
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market failure arguments, to the now structuralist-evolutionist approach
based on the systems of innovation approach. In the ascendancy are strat-
egies to develop bridging institutions, networks and the means of over-
coming firms’ resistance to adopt new technologies. This has meant a
radical change of direction for the EC’s research policies, the moving away
from the programmes of collaborative research under the Framework Pro-
grammes and work in the Commission’s own laboratories which account
for only 5 per cent of public funding to an approach which involves mobi-
lizing the ‘entire research resource of Europe’. The Commission’s pro-
posed new measures for 2007–11 further embrace the concept of an
integrative approach to innovation – which will be at the forefront of
policy. They include incentives for cross-border collaboration and the use
of structural funds for innovation (Mason et al. 2004).
Europe has traditionally relied on the internationalization of scientific
networks to improve the research and development activities of member
states, through the Framework Programmes. These programmes are
highly selective, and success is influenced by eminence and reinforced by
participation (Geuna 1998, 686). This author finds that science research
productivity influences both the probability of joining an EU-funded R&D
co-operative project and the number of times an institution has partici-
pated in EU projects.
The first four Framework Programmes focused on building research
communities, with growing emphasis on technology transfer and human
capital and mobility. The Fourth Framework Programme (FP4) had a
budget of ECU 13,100 million, and covered all the research and techno-
logical development (RTD) activities which were funded by the European
Commission during the period 1994–8. With a budget of C14,960 million,
the Fifth RTD Framework Programme (1998–2002) was intended to help
solve problems and to respond to major socio-economic challenges facing
Europe. ‘To maximise its impact, it focuses on a limited number of
research areas combining technological, industrial, economic, social and
cultural aspects’ (europa.eu.int/comm/research/fp5/fp5-intro_en.html).
The drive towards a stronger and more unified European scientific and
technological research effort, underpinned by understanding from the
social sciences, is explicit in the EU’s Framework Programme for
Research and Technological Development, a major tool to support the
creation of the ERA. Framework 6 covers the period 2002–6. It includes
social science research themes which address such issues as the relation-
ship between public and scientific communities, for example public trust in
decisions made on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and stem cell
research. While a growing share of European universities’ income is
generated through EU programmes, under Framework 6 they will still
account only for 5.4 per cent of total public research effort (see
www.iserd.org.il/what.htm).
Illustrating the emphasis placed on greater co-ordination between the
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different actors in the innovation process within the European Union,
Georghiou and Kuhlmann (2002) report that the new policy instruments
for the ERA include:
• networks of Excellence, designed to reinforce European scientific and
technological excellence through integrating research capabilities
across Europe
• integrated projects which are expected to cover innovation and the
dissemination, transfer and exploitation of knowledge
• Article 169, which opens the possibilities of participation in member
states’ national programmes by organizations from outside the home
country.
Diversity and uniformity in national innovation systems
The scale of the task of overcoming fragmentation and moving towards
greater integration in Europe is considerable given the number of univer-
sities and increasing heterogeneity within member-state innovation
systems as universities move away from the Humboldt model (EC 2003b,
5). The post-2004 European Union plus the other countries of Western
Europe has approximately 4,000 universities. This equals the number of
HE establishments in the US (EC 2003b).
The relative importance of universities in national innovation systems
varies by country. In Greece, Portugal and Italy they are core components
but not in Germany (where research institutions such as the Max Planck
Institute dominate), France, Finland and Denmark. Most countries
operate a dual support system in which core separate institutions allocate
university funding and funding for research projects – as in Germany, the
UK and the US. France, the main exception to the dual support model,
operates a mixed system. Core funding of about 25–30 per cent comes
from the MRET while the rest comes from a multiplicity of sources.
Across Europe systems of HE are changing in diverse ways. In some
countries, broadening the range of institutions within the ambit of higher
education has increased the points of potential contact with industry.
Some more than others have adapted to the prevailing philosophy of
becoming knowledge-based economies (OECD 1999, 26). A further
example of systemic changes is that in some countries higher education
systems have begun to absorb non-university public research organizations
(such as research institutes e.g. CNRS in France, CSIC in Spain, etc.)
(Geuna and Nesta 2003, 3) (although in the UK, the drive to privatize
government laboratories in the mid-1990s led to a reverse trend – Lawton
Smith 2000). EC (2003a, 24), using composite indicators of investment in
the knowledge-based economy (which includes educational spending and
human capital growth – new PhDs and researchers), finds that the Nordic
countries Finland, Sweden and Denmark are the ‘best prepared and are
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rapidly turning their economies into knowledge-based economies, while
another six, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the
UK have a level of growth much closer to the European average’. It is 
also the Nordic countries that have the most competitive economies –
Finland (1), Sweden (3), Denmark (5) and Norway (6) (World Economic
Forum 2004) – which suggests that there is some connection between the
two.
While these changes are profound, as compared to even the early 1990s,
structural differences between the US and Europe remain. Whereas
Europe has been more proactive in promoting university–industry interac-
tions, the US has a deeper structure of interactions between university and
industry, with tighter networks linking leading firms and universities
(Geuna et al. 2003). These authors suggest that in the US it is the need for
knowledge that generates network formation rather than the policy
actions of governments (although this is qualified by experiences in the
US). On the other hand, policy in Europe has created networks that are in
search of demand. One of the explanations for the lack of demand was the
decline in European R&D expenditure in the 1990s, for example in
Germany, France and the UK, thus reducing the demand for university
research. Moreover, there can be decreasing returns to networking, and
only a few permanent long-distance links result in the socially optimal pro-
duction of knowledge (citing Cowan and Jonard 2003 in the same volume).
Next, six countries illustrate the diversity in national innovation
systems, and the degrees to which there has been a realignment of national
and institutional policies towards a greater engagement with industry,
hence the economic development agenda. The discussion highlights the
increasing degree of integration within the UK, Netherlands and Swedish
university systems, whereas it is shown that in Italy, France and Germany
other research institutions have traditionally had much closer relations
with industry than the universities have.
The UK
The UK has perhaps the most advanced and coherent stated agenda of
harnessing universities to wealth creation and at the regional scale. While
this represents a recent and evolving policy agenda which dates back to
the post-1979 Conservative governments, it has many similarities with the
position which universities played in the economy in the nineteenth
century and that of the former polytechnics, most of which became ‘new’
and now ‘modern’ universities in 1992 (Charles and Howells 1992).
The 1979–97 Conservative governments prioritized the commercial role
at the expense of the research role of universities. In 1981, the UK’s total
spending on R&D as a proportion of its GNP was higher than that of any
other member of the G7, with the exception of Germany, but slumped
under successive Conservative governments, as did the number of Nobel
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laureates, which fell dramatically after 1980 (SBS 2003). The rationale
contained in the 1988 DTI White Paper DTI – the department for enter-
prise and reinforced in the 1993 White Paper Realising our potential: a
strategy for science, technology and engineering was that there should be a
greater emphasis on enterprise, greater value for money and exploitation.
Following the election of Labour governments in 1997 and 2001, this
pattern has been reversed with increasing amounts awarded to science and
universities under successive Comprehensive Spending Reviews. The
rhetoric, however, has strong similarities to that under the Conservatives,
emphasizing building bridges between science, business and government
in order to increase national wealth and quality of life. What is different is
the regional role. That appeared in 1998 in the White Paper Our competit-
ive future: building the knowledge-driven economy.
Significant systemic changes in the structure of the higher education
system are under way which affect the economic development agenda.
Four changes are illustrated. The first is the mergers between universities,
intended to provide greater opportunities for providing a more integrated
and coherent set of opportunities for industry–university collaboration.
The biggest is the merger of Manchester University and the University of
Manchester Institute of Science and Technology in 2004. It is now the
UK’s largest university with an estimated 34,000 students. Although the
2002 proposed merger between the two top London colleges, UCL and
Imperial, did not go ahead, others are predicted.
Second is the impact of evaluation of research and the resulting
competition for eminence between universities. The RAE which takes
place every five years, the sixth being in 2008, provides quality profiles for
research across all disciplines. For 2008, submissions from institutions will
be assessed by experts in some 70 units of assessment (www.rae.ac.uk/) on
a variety of criteria. The key one is the publication of four journal articles
in top-quality journals by individual academics. Currently the RAE does
not take account of the more applied, industry-related research which
does not immediately translate into ‘academic’ output. This can act as a
disincentive to academics whose careers depend on undertaking research
that can be published and in other ways counted to taking on industry-
related projects.
The third is the changing distribution of research in the academic base
as some scientific fields are declining, particularly chemistry and physics,
while others, notably biosciences, are increasing. Chemists fear that there
could be as few as six university chemistry departments left in ten years’
time. Recent high-profile closures of chemistry departments include that
of King’s College, University of London, which is credited as having
developed crucial techniques which led to the discovery of DNA. Cur-
rently there are between 35 and 40 departments but the Royal Society of
Chemistry has predicted that at best 20 will survive and at worst only six
(those at Durham, Cambridge, Imperial, UCL, Bristol and Oxford) will
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remain in 2014 (Curtis 2004). As with physics, there will be regions not
served by a locally focused university department (SBS 2003).
The fourth is the greater financial and political incentives for universi-
ties to work with industry. The 2003 White Paper The future of higher edu-
cation announced the expansion of the Higher Education Innovation Fund
(HEIF), with funding from the Office of Science and Technology (OST) to
stimulate enterprise from research across the regions (DfES, 2003). This
expanded HEIF, on which OST and HEFCE will be working together, will
have two main aims: first, to build on the success to which all universities
have contributed in knowledge transfer; second, to further broaden the
reach of these activities particularly through support for ‘less research-
intensive’ university departments. The White Paper proposes to create a
network of around 20 Knowledge Exchanges as a new strand of HEIF,
which will be exemplars of good practice in interactions between ‘less
research-intensive institutions and business and underline the distinctive
mission of these’ (DfES 2003, 39).
Such is the drive towards university–industry interaction in the UK that
Richard Lambert, the author of the Lambert Report on business and
higher education links, has been asked by the DTI to chair a committee
that will draw up standard paperwork for the commercial exploitation of
academic ideas, producing model contracts. This is intended to overcome
the problems of lack of clarity over IP rights such as the ownership of
patents or designs as well as the increased time and costs in negotiations
that have prevented some deals from being completed. The Report recom-
mended a new stream of public funding for ‘business-relevant research’
and a greater role for business in influencing courses and curricula (Hill
2004, 60).
In changes to the economic relationship between universities and indus-
try, universities have received large increases in ‘third party’ (i.e. other
than government) research funding which now accounts for well over 40
per cent of university research funding compared to less than a quarter in
1988–9. The result has been a significant short-term increase in the appar-
ent productivity of the research base but one which puts its sustainability
at risk. Therefore OST is proposing that universities recover the full eco-
nomic costs for the totality of research they undertake. From 2005–6 the
research councils will be given additional resources of £120 million per
year to pay a larger proportion of the cost of research they are supporting
(SBS 2003, 6). This will dramatically increase the cost of research and may
act as a disincentive to industry which studies have shown matters more in
some, mainly traditional industries, than in others (see Lawton Smith
2000). A policy statement put out by the Engineering and Physical Sci-
ences Research Council is highly instructive on what it sees as the balance
between basic and applied research. Currently, 35 per cent of its grants
involve partnerships with industry. It aims to ratchet that up to 50 per cent
and to exercise a tighter grip over where the money goes, targeting a third
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of grants on priority areas. Hailing the 500 spin-outs it has helped fund in
the last decade, the statement devotes 20 per cent of its length to areas
such as ‘Working for Wealth’ and ‘Industry sectors’, but less than 5 per
cent to ‘Fundamental Research’.
In the UK, universities are given incentives to perform better at out-
reach while it is also recognized that industry needs to raise its game (see
for example HM Treasury 2003) and that regional offices of state agencies
such as patent office could do more to raise awareness of potential for
using technology. Many universities have responded to signals within the
local economy and, working with industry, have established degree
courses dedicated to providing specialist skills. The Oxford Brookes
Motorsport degree developed in conjunction with the motorsport industry
is one example (see Lawton Smith et al. 2003).
In a drive to create a nexus of teaching, research and business that
bears a similarity with the Grenoble model (Chapter 8), in 2005 the UK
government established the ‘science city’ initiative. Newcastle is one of six
universities that are intended to be world-class centres for science and
innovation. Newcastle is working in partnership with the city council and
the regional development agency One NorthEast and is looking for Treas-
ury support to create 250 new technology-based businesses over the next
decade and 5,000 science-based jobs by 2010 (Baty 2005).
The Netherlands
The Netherlands, like the UK, has a holistic approach to innovation policy
with policies aimed at individuals and attitudes as well as at companies and
organizations in the public and private sectors (Hughes 2003, 2). Yet
Hughes finds a number of paradoxes, with the country performing well on
some indices and below the EU average on others. The Netherlands’
economy scores well against other EU economies on measures such
as relatively high levels of R&D expenditure, patenting, scientific output,
and relatively positive nascent entrepreneurs’ attitudes to failure, as well
as relatively high levels of equity and venture capital, of innovative output.
It scores well in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey (GEM).
While the Netherlands has a lower level of university spin-offs than other
EU countries owing to the now well-recognized pattern of constraints in
relation to university–industry interaction, policies to overcome these
problems are in place. For example Kreijen and van der Laag (2003)
outline a new streamlined techno-partnership strategy designed to raise
the quality rather than the quantity of spin-offs and a number of
complementary measures aimed at facilitating spin-offs. In line with both
the GEM survey and the conclusions of these authors, others such as
Waasdorp (2002) and Stevenson (2002) argue that many of the conditions
that are thought to be necessary for high levels of innovation entrepre-
neurship based on technology transfer are now in place.
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On the other hand, there are significant weaknesses in the scientific
labour market. The proportion of new science and engineering graduates
per 1,000 of the population is half the EU average and employment in
high-tech and medium-tech manufacturing and high-tech services is about
average compared to the EU (EC 2001a). Moreover, Muizer (2003) found
considerable weaknesses in the technology transfer processes, which is
also consistent with the GEM programme analysis which suggested that
there were doubts about the effectiveness of measures introduced to trans-
fer technology from universities and public research centres to new and
growing firms.
Sweden
Since the 1990s, Sweden has sought to emulate US models of strategic
research, carried out in the university system but linked to long-term
industrial and social interests. The new paradigm brought into the Swedish
system a Mode 2 knowledge-production model rather than the Mode 1
which occurred after the Second World War and became the dominant
framework of science and science policy (Edqvist 2003, 215, 281). Edqvist
reports that new institutions – Foundations, established in 1994 – have
brought about fundamental changes which have amounted to a restructur-
ing of the university research system. The new Foundations have been
allocated larger resources and were intended to become sites of dialogues
between different interests – researchers and the politicians and industrial-
ists who served on their boards. In addition, in 2001, three new research
councils and a new agency for research and development were established
to replace a number of research councils and other bodies. The aim of the
new organizational structure was to promote concerted action in key
scientific fields, strengthen researcher control, promote collaboration
between different research fields and improve the dissemination of
information about research and its findings. Further, the new structure
aims to stimulate interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research and
provide outstanding scientists with adequate support to allow them to
develop their own independent innovate research (www.sweden.se/tem-
plates/cs/BasicFactsheet____3925.aspx).
Italy
In contrast, although since the 1980s Italy has introduced new laws allow-
ing universities the right to obtain private funding, introduced measures to
increase their autonomy and changed the law regarding ownership of
intellectual property, Italian universities are still not active in pursuing
technology transfer strategies. Until 2001, ownership of IPR was regulated
by Italian patent law which dated back to 1939. A recent amendment
shifted all IPR over academic research output to individual researchers
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(Balconi et al. 2004, 133). The problems lie in that not only do universities
still lack managerial knowledge necessary to organize a for-profit range of
activities (Etzkowitz et al. 2000), but it is only recently that they have
started moving away from a passive attitude towards IPR-related techno-
logy transfer (Balconi et al. 2004, 133). One of the driving forces for
change was the financial crisis resulting from severe cutbacks in public
funding which challenged the conservatism of classical teaching
(Etzkowitz et al. 2000). Balconi et al. argue that
despite being regarded by the law as the natural owners of all IPRs
concerning their employees’ inventions, Italian universities have
traditionally made no effort to take advantage of this, and left patent-
ing entirely to individual professors’ initiative. IPRs over inventions
derived from sponsored research programmes were left entirely to the
sponsors, either private (such as many chemical and pharmaceutical
companies, or ST Microelectronics, the largest European semiconduc-
tor company) or public ones (the most important being the National
Research Council (CNR) and the National Agency for Energy and the
Environment (ENEA)).
Inventions stemming from generic funds from the Ministry of University
and Research (MUIR) were often left with no IPR protection, unless indi-
vidual professors took the initiative and even then often found resistance
in their administrative offices.
At the regional level, industry has taken a proactive role in stimulating
university–industry links. For example, the confindustria, the industrial
association of Lombardy, has had a major influence in shaping the univer-
sity course system covering the natural sciences. Yet, such changes are said
to be ‘modest since the percentage of industrial research remains low and
universities have not been accepted as partners in the innovation process’
(Etzkowitz et al. 2000). These authors find that the polytechnics, on the
other hand, have been more successful in finding industrial partners. The
most famous ones, located in Milan and Turin, were originally set up by
Olivetti and Fiat respectively to secure the recruitment of engineers for
these firms.
France
Like Italy, France has introduced new reforms to its public research
systems designed to ‘increase its socio-economic relevance’ (Llerena et al.
2003). These authors assess the changes that were made in the late 1990s,
focusing particularly on the 1999 Innovation Law (Allegre’s Law) that at
last allowed academics to participate in the development of spin-offs
(Llerena et al. 2003). It also instituted a call for tenders to fund the estab-
lishment of public and regional incubators (Lanciano-Morandat and
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Nohara 2002b). The new policies are intended to address the French
weakness which is its failure of public research, which dominates French
R&D, to interact with industry, limiting the country’s capacity for eco-
nomic growth. Llerena et al. (2003) conclude that the incentives to encour-
age academics to become entrepreneurs and the institutions to support
this activity are missing or too weak. Senker (2005) finds that, in the case
of the biotech innovation system, France underperforms largely as a result
of the highly fragmented research system, block grant funding which
attempts to co-ordinate research and the tenure held by academics that
discourages competition between research institutions.
Germany
Germany has also recently adopted an integrated policy framework.
Georghiou and Kuhlmann (2002, 204) report that the German ‘Futur’
initiative, a new kind of foresight programme, is illustrative of the new,
systemically orientated RTD and innovation policy instruments in Europe.
The programme is run on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF) as a means of priority setting for future innovation-
oriented research policies. The process, which is designed to identify
future funded research programmes or projects, started with workshops in
2001. The German system, however, has a number of institutional rigid-
ities which will need to be overcome. These, according to Etzkowitz et al.
(2000), include the prevalence of the traditional central European view of
natural science as a value by itself, tensions between federal and state
responsibility for education and research and the inertia of public institu-
tions.
German universities are financed and operated by the 16 German
states. The Federal government determines only general guidelines laid
down in the Framework Act for Higher Education (Hochschulrahmenge-
setz) (HRG). Each state has its own legal regulations, the Higher Educa-
tion Acts (Hochschulgesetze). Each state develops HRG regulations, and
develops its own education legislation which differs from state to state.
Leifner et al. (2004) describe how the German university system is under-
going drastic reform, but cultural differences prevent the effective applica-
tion in German universities of funding mechanisms and incentives
developed elsewhere. In particular they point to its inflexibility, the lack of
or unattractive job opportunities for young and promising academics, a
lack of competition between universities and between a university’s
departments for financial resources. Very few incentives for outstanding
research performance are available. The low degree of differentiation
(range of courses, quality standards in teaching and study fees) is in part
responsible for the cultural stasis. They remark that ‘in contrast to univer-
sities in the US, these differentiation mechanisms are barely visible or
non-existent’ (page 24).
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In 2005, it was announced that Germany was going to revive its stagnat-
ing university system by creating elite universities to rival Oxbridge. The
Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder, and the 16 regional prime
ministers signed a C1.9 billion agreement for the Excellence Initiative
which will provide additional support for institutions competing to form a
German Ivy League of about ten universities and finance the development
of about 30 research clusters and 40 graduate schools between 2006 and
2011. Three-quarters of funding will come from the national government
and the remaining quarter from the states (Chapman 2005).
Eminence
The link between universities and economic performance is related in part
to the quality of universities as demonstrated by their ability to attract the
most external funding and the quality of their research staff and students.
The 2003 EIS finds evidence of strong regional variations in performance
in Europe, which is in part linked to the presence of universities. It finds a
positive relationship between regional innovation and GDP. The most
innovative regions in the EU are in Sweden (Stockholm and Sydsverige),
Finland (Uusimaa) – these have the best-educated workforces – and the
Netherlands (Noord-Brabant) and Germany (Stuttgart and Oberbayern)
which have the best patent performance.
The assessment of quality or eminence and associated rankings is
increasingly becoming the indicator of the strength of Europe’s scientific
and technological reputation. Evaluation is being built into the process of
development of the European Research Area (Georghiou and Kuhlmann
2002). They predict that it is likely that such rankings based on other
entrepreneurial indicators such as patenting, industry income and spin-offs
will appear in the near future.
Defence and biotech
Within Europe, two parallel trends can be observed. The first is the
growing increase in funding for life sciences research and a decrease in
defence funding, the two major areas of government and industry spend-
ing on science and technology. In both cases a small number of countries
have dominated European activity (see Chapter 3). The second is a con-
centration of activity in particular locations, what Cooke (2004) calls ‘the
rise of bioscience megacentres’, a pattern which is well established in the
US. In defence, the US, France and Sweden experienced the strongest
decline in the 1990s.
In the UK the megacentre pattern in defence relationship is evolving
through new and expanding collaborations being set up between universi-
ties, government bodies and defence corporations. There are three main
initiatives. The first is the Defence Technology Centres (DTCs), which are
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now the main route for defence funding. These are located at Bristol,
Cambridge, Cardiff, Cranfield, De Montfont, Imperial College, Southamp-
ton and Surrey. The second is the Towers of Excellence which ‘aim to
produce world-beating projects’. They are co-operative groupings, led by
the Ministry of Defence, which bring together key players in the UK
defence industry sector and leading UK academic establishments. Their
main characteristics are that Towers are generally created at the level of
major sub-systems technology and that the location of Towers must be
selected in partnership with defence equipment suppliers, since the ulti-
mate objective is to give them the capacity to supply world-class equip-
ment (see www.mod.uk/toe/#dtcs). They include programmes at Cranfield
and Imperial College. The third is the Defence and Aerospace research
partnerships (DARPs) including one in High Integrity Real Time Systems
(HIRTS). The purpose of the DARPs is to carry out work, which is of
value to the defence and aerospace community as a whole, and thus is best
undertaken in an open partnership, not as a company-specific activity.
Members of the HIRTS DARP are BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce plc,
QinetiQ and the University of York (www.cs.york.ac.uk/hise/darp.php).
While the MoD provides information about programmes which involve
university research, Langley, however, found it impossible ‘to obtain
details of the extent and levels of funding by the military sector in UK uni-
versities’. He cited a written response in Hansard (2003) given by the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence which reported that
the MoD had placed contracts over the period 1999–2003 worth over £3
million. The universities involved were likely to be those involved with the
Defence Technology Centres and Towers of Excellence.
The pattern of a concentration of defence-related activity is replicated
in the bioscience sector. Efforts are being made to concentrate activity in a
few locations with universities spearheading these developlments (Cooke
2004). Two examples of this are (1) the tri-national Biotech cluster known
as ‘BioValley’ covering the Alsace in France, the north-west of Switzer-
land and the region of South Baden in Germany with one of the world’s
highest density of life science industry and (2) London University in the
UK.
London University is bidding to launch itself as a leading centre for
bioscience in a bid to overtake Oxford and Cambridge, thus hindering
efforts to increase integration of Europe’s activities. Between 2003 and
2007, the London Development Agency (LDA) plans to build two bioin-
cubators and revive the Enfield science park. Yet, in line with so many
developments at the regional level in the UK, it pledged to bridge the
funding gap and improve access to business angels – but not to spend any




New expectations on universities to contribute to society are far wider
than at any other time in history (OECD 2003, 8–9). In addition to their
traditional teaching and research roles, they are being remade as the focal
point of transformations in the economy and society more generally. For
example, they must cater for new needs in education and training which
arise from the knowledge-based economy, become more engaged in
community life. And, ‘given that they live thanks to substantial public and
private funding, and that the knowledge they produce and transmit has a
major impact on the economy and society, universities are also account-
able for the way they operate and manage activities and budgets to their
sponsors and to the public. This leads to increasing pressure to incorporate
representatives of the non-academic world within universities’ manage-
ment and governance structures.’ This is a significant paradigm shift from
the Humboldt and Vannevar Bush models of the past, realigning the
status, function and accountability of universities and challenging their
autonomy, which academics have argued is crucial to their broader contri-
bution to society.
Within the EU, the prospects of a common pattern of accountability are
limited because of national differences in the stance taken on the ethical
and moral issues for particular kinds of research, for example on defence
Box 4.1 The BioValley
The BioValley was created in 1996, with the prospect of a trinational region
becoming an European Centre of biotechnology. After the merger of Ciba
and Sandoz into Novartis in 1996 Dr Georg H. Endress and Hans Briner
had the vision of a Silicon Valley dedicated to biotechnology and chemical
technologies in the Upper Rhine region. They implemented the BioValley
concept into a concrete initiative. In 1997 the former BioValley Promotion
Team and the former General Manager Beat Löffler acquired an Interreg II
European programme with a budget of C2.2 million. Many of the projects
and activities described below were started and created during the Interreg
II period between 1997 and 2001. In July 2002 a new budget of nearly C2.4
million, funded by Interreg III and co-financers in the three countries,
started. It is scheduled to end by mid-2005. BioValley ranks among the top
three European bioregions, including 15,000 scientists in life sciences, 70,000
students, over 150 academic or public institutions and more than 400
research groups. There are high-quality higher education and research
establishments at the universities of Strasbourg, Freiburg, Basel and the uni-
versities of applied science in Mulhouse and Offenburg. Five Nobel Prizes
for research in chemistry and medicine have been awarded to scientists
working in BioValley over the past 15 years.
Source: www.biovalley.com
and bioscience. In the case of the latter, in 2003 it was argued that the
prospects for a European policy on stem cell research within a European
Research Area are limited because the ethical and scientific decisions on
acceptability of stem cell science are left to member states. This makes it
clear that there are some fights that even the EU knows that it cannot win
(THES 2003b, 14).
Massification
After the Second World War, higher education expanded rapidly in
Europe (Geuna 2001, 609). Within that broader trend, there are substan-
tial variations in recruitment in general and in the proportions of students
in science and engineering subjects, the numbers of researchers and in pat-
terns of mobility. As with national differences, substantial differences exist
between Europe as a whole and the US in recruitment patterns, although
the size of the graduate population is similar.
In 2000, the EU produced a total of 2.14 million graduates compared to
2.07 from the US. Five member states accounted for almost 80 per cent of
EU graduates. The UK contributed the most (504,000), followed by
France (500,000) and Germany (300,000). In the 1960s, only 3 per cent of
the UK’s population went to universities, now some 43 per cent are in
higher education while in Finland the figure is 60 per cent. Spain has also
rapidly expanded its university system with the number of institutions
rising from 46 to 66 in the 1990s as state universities were set up in
national capitals and private universities appeared in big cities. The
country is now, however, like Italy, facing problems of under-recruitment.
In October 1994, 305,000 new students entered Spanish universities but
this level was not maintained and the number had declined to 250,000 by
October 2000 (Bompard 2003, 10, 11).
The number of graduates in science and engineering (S&E) varies both
by discipline and by country. In the EU15, just over a quarter of the
555,647 graduates were in S&E with more engineering than science gradu-
ates (14 and 12 per cent). Ireland, the UK and France account for most of
the S&E graduates, with the highest proportions found in Ireland,
Sweden, France, Austria and Finland (EC 2003b, 186). Countries such as
Denmark and Belgium have very low shares of very highly qualified
people in their younger populations, and a general problem of an ageing
population of S&E researchers.
Career opportunities for researchers in Europe vary considerably within
the EU. In 1999, approximately 920,000 people were working in the EU as
research scientists and engineers (RSE). Researchers in universities
account for a third of all Europe’s researchers and 80 per cent of funda-
mental research in Europe (EC 2003b, 5). The total is about 300,000 less
than the total number of researchers in the US. The countries with the
largest number of researchers are Germany, the UK and France, which
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combined host over 60 per cent of all of the researchers in EU member
states. Italy and Spain have the next most RSE but each with less than half
the number in France. Although during the 1990s the number of
researchers increased by 24 per cent, this was slightly below the 26 per cent
increase in the US (EC 2003b, 180). On the basis of these figures, the EC
concludes that the US creates greater opportunities for researchers than
Europe (page 253). Moreover, as in the UK as discussed in Chapter 3, all is
not well in France. In March 2004, directors of more than 2,000 French lab-
oratories and research centres, dissatisfied with decreases in the country’s
research budget, submitted resignations of their administrative functions to
the science ministry. Funds had been frozen even at the national medical
research centre, Inserm (Henley 2004). The mass resignation was largely
symbolic, however, as scientists will continue to carry out their scientific
duties and receive full pay. To address the concerns, a new budget of
C3 billion by 2007 in scientific research was announced by the Prime Minis-
ter (http://english.people.com.cn/200403/10/eng20040310_137075.shtml).
One of the major problems for Europe as a whole is the limited influx
of individuals from other continents, the argument being that in-migrants
are likely to be among the most talented. Young and Brown (2002)
propose that talent attraction of star academics, researchers, highly skilled
knowledge workers is increasingly replacing inward investment attraction
as a key role for regional development agencies. Bachtler (2004) supports
this with the example of Quebec, where the government is offering five-
year income tax holidays to attract foreign academics in IT, engineering,
health science and finance to take employment in the region’s universities.
In Finland, Nokia invests in the cultural adaptation of foreign IT workers
as a way to improve productivity but also to help to retain this ‘talent’
(OECD 2004). But compared to the US, European universities are attract-
ing fewer students and in particular fewer researchers, from other
countries.
Entrepreneurial universities
Chapter 3 showed that the increasing rate of patenting, licensing and spin-
offs in Europe have been accompanied by changes in the laws in many
countries concerning government ownership of intellectual property and
the terms and conditions under which organizations can move towards the
entrepreneurial model. Many countries have adopted new policies to
encourage entrepreneurial activity. Italy, for example, has altered its
technology transfer regulations to benefit SMEs whilst there are new funds
and emergence of incubators to fuel high-technology innovative activities
in France (Hague and Oakley 2000).
Not only do countries vary in the degree to which the entrepreneurial
model has become articulated in national policy discourse, but some uni-
versities are further along that path than others. Clark (1998) considers
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Twente (Netherlands), Warwick, Strathclyde (both UK), Chalmers
(Sweden) and Joensuu (Finland) to be paradigmatic of the entrepreneurial
response to the new challenges now faced by higher education. Changes in
organizational structure undertaken by these universities have involved
adopting a reinforced management core, improvement in their peripheral
development, diversification of their funding bases, stimulation of the aca-
demic sphere and integration of the entrepreneurial culture into the
organization.
One of the earliest to do this was the University of Twente, which posi-
tioned itself in the 1980s as the ‘entrepreneurial university’. This was
enshrined in the establishment of the University of Twente Entrepreneur-
ship Centre (UTEC) which brings together activities in the field of entre-
preneurship from across the university (OECD 1999, 43). It has also
established UT-Extra, which acts as a private foundation to encourage
entrepreneurial activity. This was necessary as Dutch law inhibits universi-
ties from being involved in excessive forms of entrepreneurial activity
(Hague and Oakley 2000, 46).
The territorial role
The territorial role is ascendant in the European Union because of the
application of the subsidiarity principle, that the development of research
must be co-ordinated to promote projects for the development of research
which are as close as possible to the citizen (EC 2001a, 4). This report
stresses that regions are expected to have an important bridging role
between the European and the local level, ‘including strengthening inter-
national cooperation by mobilising the potential of local universities
together with regional and local authorities’. Universities are encouraged
to be entrepreneurial and to spin off new firms, to engage more closely
with firms in their immediate hinterland and to take on social responsibil-
ities (see EC 2003a).
Regionalization, hence the territorial role, varies by character and
degree across member states of the EU, including the extent to which the
financing and management of HEIs occurs at a regional level. Germany’s
Länder are the strongest sub-national units, while Spain’s autonomous
regions vary in degrees of power. In France, while regions have only
limited power, regional authorities on average fund a third of final expen-
diture on higher education (although this varies considerably). The EC
report concludes that less clear impulses towards regionalization occur in
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal and Sweden. The diversity in the extent to which the territorial role has




The potential contribution that universities can make to regional develop-
ment was recognized in the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher
Education (1997) (The Dearing Report), which included the chapter ‘The
local and regional role of higher education’. The Report identified one of
the four main purposes of higher education as being ‘to serve the needs of
an adaptable, sustainable, knowledge-based economy at local, regional
and national levels’ (paragraph 5.11). This position was expanded in the
White Paper Our Competitive Future (DTI 1998, chapter 5), in the Sains-
bury Report on Biotechnology (1999), the 2000 White Paper on science
and innovation policy and in the 2003 Lambert Review of Business–
University Collaboration. The role of the university as regional economic
growth protagonist was confirmed in practice as a policy objective since
the formation in 1999 of the nine English Regional Development Agencies
(RDAs). An ambiguity in UK policy is that at the national level policy
objectives both of the Department for Education and Science (which has
overall policy for universities) and of the Higher Education Funding
Council for England, HEFCE (which has responsibility for funding univer-
sities in England) state that to be really successful universities must be free
to take responsibility for their own strategic and financial future. (Similar
funding agencies exist for Wales and Scotland, which have their own, more
powerful regional development agencies which predate those in England.)
At the same time, the policy announced in the 2003 White Paper that the
RDAs were to be given a stronger role in steering the Higher Education
Innovation Fund, which will amount to £90 million in 2005–6, will remove
some of this autonomy by devolving powers to the RDAs whose missions
do not include the support of scholarship, do not want to take on
responsibilities for funding basic research but are charged with stimulating
economic development. And, as exemplified by the LDA’s response to the
Lambert Review (www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/consultations_and_legisla-
tion/lambert/consult_lambert_al_universities.cfm), they do want a role in
co-ordination across regions to avoid duplication and competition. Against
this background, the majority of universities now are in favour of
developing a territorial role, which is hardly surprising given the financial
incentives.
A recent study of UK universities (Charles and Conway 2001) found an
increasing alignment between the geographical unit considered of greatest
priority in the institutional mission and the Government Office or
Regional Development Agency region. This was almost 43 per cent, an
increase from 25.30 per cent in 1997, whereas the locality had decreased
from 15.66 per cent in 1997 to 8.70 per cent in 2001. Also the percentage of
universities which said that the regional or local area was not of any
significance to the mission had decreased from 8.43 per cent to 4.30 per
cent, although, as Charles (2003, 13–14) points out, there are philosophical
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and methodological problems in defining a university’s ‘local’ community
(see Goddard et al. 1994). New or modern universities, possibly reflecting
their history of LEA funding, gave economic development a higher prior-
ity than the old universities (86 per cent: 44 per cent). Indications are that
there will be a polarization within the university system as the newer uni-
versities opt out of the RAE system and focus their efforts on winning
third-stream funding – encouraged by funding proposals in The future of
higher education for less research-intensive universities for funding for
skills development and technology transfer through the establishment of
20 knowledge exchanges (page 36). The main post-1997 financial incen-
tives for the funding of research, which implicitly might have commercial
applications, encouraging the adoption of the entrepreneurial model and
the territorial role, are shown in Table 4.1.
The majority of regions (defined as RDA regions) have established
Regional Science Councils. For example, The Science and Industry
Council of the North East of England (submission of the Science and
Industry Council of North East England to the Lambert Review) was
established in December 2001 at the instigation of One NorthEast with the
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Table 4.1 UK incentives to university–industry engagement
Department Initiative
DfEE, DTI, HEfCE Higher Education Reach-Out to Business and
the Community (HEROBC) scheme 1999.
Universities can apply for special funding for
activities to increase their capability to respond
to the needs of business, including companies of
all sizes and the wider community, where this
will lead to wealth creation
• includes the promotion of spin-out companies
DTI/OST/ Engineering and Science Enterprise Challenge
Physical Sciences Council Fund, 1999 financed Enterprise
(EPSRC) Centres and the Foresight Directorate
• encourages regional-level activity
Faraday Partnerships 2000
• joint university–industry initiatives
Biotechnology Challenge Fund
OST/HEFCE Joint Infrastructure Fund (JIF) (1998)
Science Research Investment Fund (SRIF) (2001)
OST/Treasury/Wellcome Trust University Challenge Fund (UCF)
and Gatsby Foundation • provides seed funding to help selected
universities make the most of research funding
through support for early stages of commercial
exploitation of new products and processes
HEFCE Higher Education Innovation Fund (2001)
• £140 million over three years to encourage
academic spin-off
Source: Author’s survey.
objective of maximizing the contribution of the North East of England’s
scientific research base. It both enables ‘high-level communication
between universities, industry and the public sector’ and ‘champions the
role of science and technology in the region’. The strategy for success is
developing five centres of excellence to act as focal points for commercial-
ization of science in the region and is based on five technologies that
reflect the universities’ research strengths.
Other initiatives are organized by the universities in collaboration with
others to provide a regional focus on RDAs. Examples include Knowledge
House established by Newcastle University. This is co-ordinated between
all the universities in the North East and provides an entry point for SMEs
which want to access the universities’ expertise. Another mechanism
involving Newcastle is the Regional Centre for Innovation in Engineering
Design (RCID) which is a collaborative venture with two other regional
universities and offers engineering design and services to around 15 of the
region’s innovative SMEs. The RCID works on a cluster basis.
Italy
In Italy, universities’ territorial role is not very advanced and neither are
universities in general engaged in locally or regionally focused systems of
governance. Viale and Ghiglione (undated, 3) argue that universities are
relatively strong within Italy but not very strong within Europe or within
the world, and links with industry are relatively underdeveloped. While
companies tend to establish links directly with universities rather than
through regional technology transfer agencies, universities and research
centres in Lombardy rarely play the role of setting up hybrid agents of
innovation such as science parks. They find that the only successful
example is the Photonic Research Centre at the Politecnico di Milano
funded by Pirelli, which implies spontaneous convergence of industry and
academia with approval and incentives from local government. These
authors conclude that ‘the Lombardy universities are far from the univer-
sity actor in the technology market. Technology policy concentrates on the
national level and only three regional laws for innovation finance have
been introduced. They have partially failed as a result of the lack of a
serious technology foresight study’.
Spain
In Spain, the extent to which a territorial role is adopted by individual uni-
versities depends variously on the region and the city. Spain has, within a
spectrum of regional governments, a sub-group of strong autonomous
regions based on separatist claims, such as Catalonia and the Basque
country which have significant amount of power and resemble the German
Länder (OECD 1999, 34). In Catalonia, for example, universities have
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been targeted as the means by which economic development will be stimu-
lated. Public and private spending on S&T, human resources and infra-
structure have all been increased in recent years. As yet, OECD finds that
more finance has been allocated to technology programmes than to incen-
tives for spontaneous industry–university interaction.
The Barcelona science park, located close to research activity in the Uni-
versity of Barcelona, Catalonia Polytechnique University (CPU) and CSIS
institutes, is argued by the OECD (1999) to represent a more dynamic
model. Trilaterial relationships have developed: the University provided
the site, Catalonia autonomous government and the Spanish government
have supported the project economically and politically since its inception.
A virtuous circle of academia–government–industry relations has been
translated into an integrated system which involves universities, research
institutes, governments, private companies, research personnel and infra-
structures. The city council of Terresa, home to the School and College of
Industrial Engineering of the CPU and other university institutions through
the Terresa Staryegi c Plan (PECT), has established a collective strategy
for the future of the city. This involves promoting a unified campus, making
it the country’s second university city (after Barcelona), and involving the
university as one of the city’s defining factors for the future.
Germany
In Germany, complete control over all aspects of education is with the 16
Länder rather than the federal government. In this respect, financial and
administrative responsibilities rest with each individual state. In spite of
this regional aspect of funding, however, OECD (1999, 28) concludes that
there are few requirements from state governments for German HEIs to
engage with the regions. And, although HEIs are funded and administered
at the sub-national level, ‘the Humboldtian tradition of German universi-
ties affords them a significant amount of autonomy’.
Sternberg’s studies of university and industry linkages published in 1998
and 1999 found considerable differences between Länder in the levels of
university–industry linkages, and not ones which would be predicted from
the university–industry-proximity hypothesis. Sternberg (1999, 535)
showed that even in Baden-Württemberg, one of the most economically
successful regions in Europe, the region’s very good R&D infrastructure
and rather high technology potential were not reflected in its share of
intra-regional contacts with research institutions of innovative SMEs. In
contrast, the technologically less advanced regional economies of the
Lower Saxony research triangle and of Saxony show higher shares of
intra-regional linkages with research institutions. He concluded that no
statistical evidence can be found for the assumption that prosperous
regions have stronger intra-regional links than peripheral ones. Sternberg
concludes that, in Lower Saxony, one out of two effects which operate
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simultaneously in a true innovative milieu are lacking. While proximity
effects (reductions in costs) operate, underdeveloped socialization effects
(collective learning, co-operation, socialization of risks) are missing.
France
France’s national decentralization strategies which began in the 1960s with
the formation of DATAR (an autonomous central body in charge of
regional development) have since the late 1990s included mechanisms to
encourage small companies to increase their links to universities. A clear
strategy in France is the establishment of partnerships between universi-
ties, industry and political bodies in the French regions. This was articu-
lated in the 1998 report for the Economics Minister (Guillaume 1998).
After the decision made by the former EC Director Edith Cresson to
favour innovation (Green Book on Innovation, 1995), Jospin’s govern-
ment proposed to develop measures in order to improve start-ups from
research institutes and universities. The creation of National Centres for
Technology and Innovation was approved in 2000. These are funded at the
sub-regional level and are in the national programme of technical resource
centres (almost 20 at the moment in France).
Yet France has not adopted such an aggressive national stance on clus-
ters as the UK as each region, in the absence of a defined national policy,
adopts its own strategies. For example, the Pôle Universitaire Européen
Lille Nord-Pas de Calais brings together seven universities, two research
institutes, local governments and chambers of commerce. The main aim of
the network, according to OECD (1999, 52), ‘is to pursue international
relations and communicate the role of the region to the outside world’.
(See also Chapter 8 below on Grenoble.) OECD (1999, 136) finds the
French system to be interesting in that there are concerns within the uni-
versity system of the consequences and benefits of decentralization as
paradoxically increased decentralization ‘requires greater national co-ordi-
nation to ensure that different areas stick to the one vision’.
Conclusions
It is at the European Commission level that the ideal of creating a far
more integrated system of innovation is enshrined in policy. This is the
dominant paradigm. Universities are to be at the heart of the drive
towards making Europe able to compete more strongly with the US. To
achieve that goal, the emphasis is on greater co-ordination of research and
teaching across Europe, networking to overcome barriers to industry
working with universities, improving the career opportunities for scientists
and student mobility. The territorial role is the second most important
paradigm: regions and universities are the major points of delivery of the
production and dissemination of new knowledge.
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The challenge for European policy makers is illustrated by the differ-
ences in the extent to which the integrated model is extant in different
countries. At the one extreme the UK and the Netherlands have most
fully adopted the new model at national level, and Italy and France least.
The picture is complicated by a variety of political systems in which the
regional scale provides direction to the university system and by the timing
and nature of laws which have enshrined the entrepreneurial university
concept which is more established in the US than Europe (Etzkowitz
2003). Germany has the most developed regional tier of government but
needs to overcome cultural and organizational rigidities, and the UK in
these examples the least. Countries also vary in the quality of science, the
dominance of universities and defence and life science research activity in
the national system of innovation; each of these has profound implications
for points of contact with industry. As Chapter 1 showed, the UK domi-
nates European ranking on university quality, and, in Cambridge and
Oxford, has two of the top ten ranked universities in the world.
This chapter has shown that research in both defence and bioscience is
concentrated in a few countries and locations. Efforts to create ‘mega-
centres’ which integrate efforts of researchers from different organizations
and across geographical boundaries are more pronounced in biotech than
in defence.
Evidence on the relationship between proportions of scientists and
engineers produced by universities and economic development is confused
by the possibilities for mobility and career advancement depending on
how the national innovation system is constructed. Europe as a whole
compares badly with the US. While the EC (2003b) concludes that Nordic
countries including Denmark are investing in higher education and rapidly
turning into knowledge-based economies, Belgium and Denmark also
have low shares of highly qualified people in their younger populations.
New systems of governance in which universities are being repositioned
vis-à-vis both industry and their territories bring with them new sets of
accountability, challenging the much-prized autonomy of universities to
decide what kinds of organizations they will be. The greater emphasis on
evaluation of universities performance both at the European and at the
national level is a further indication of the instrumentalist position in
society that universities are required to adopt (see Charles 2003). The
evidence indicates that autonomy combined with the greater variety and
expenditure on university research at Federal and state level is what gives
the US the competitive edge over Europe. The implications of this for the
longer term are threefold. The first is that the consensus that appears to
have been reached between the competing interests of universities and
their academics and the other stakeholders in society will not hold and
that Europe needs to be aware that the American model also has its
internal critics. This is particularly in relation to the increasing ownership
and control of business over the university research (see Chapter 5).
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Second, unless the emphasis that Europe has placed on upgrading skills is
consistent through the careers of scientists and engineers, then Europe will
continue to lag behind the US. Third, strategies to involve universities in
supporting EU enlargement and convergence processes must be informed
by realistic assessments of the capacity of the universities to deliver and
the geo-industrial structure of their hinterlands.
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5 The United States
Introduction
National policy in the US, as in Europe, emphasizes the role of universities
as a driver of economic development. For example, the US Council on
Competitiveness (1998, 14) states, ‘The nation that fosters an infra-
structure of linkages among and between firms, universities and govern-
ment gains competitive advantage through quicker information diffusion
and product deployment.’ This chapter documents how the US system of
higher education has evolved to become more integrated especially in
science and technology (Noll 1998), and has a clear territorial focus at
Federal and state level, while remaining characterized by institutional
autonomy.
Distributed innovation systems
The economic and technological leadership enjoyed by the US is accord-
ing to Malecki (2005 drawing on Mowery 1983) owed to the three features
of its national innovation system. These are its enormous scale; the shifting
roles of the three performers of R&D – industry, universities and federal
government; and the importance of new firms in the commercialization of
new technology. In addition, for far longer in the US than in Europe, uni-
versities have had access to measures which have supported the research
to innovation process, providing key elements in that infrastructure. Three
features which illustrate the history and development of integration
between universities and industry within the US national innovation
system are legislation and funding, the growing number of joint research
centres and public policy towards research collaborations.
Legislation and funding initiatives
National research programmes that have industrial applications date back
to the late nineteenth century. The NIH was established in the late 1880s
and the Research Corporation in 1912 (Table 5.1). In the mid-1920s,
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Table 5.1 Major legislation affecting universities’ links with industry in the US
Measure Date Effect
Morrill Act 1862 Established Land Grant universities which were dedicated
to the support of agriculture and the mechanic arts. Control
of universities left to the states. Examples include MIT
National Institutes 1887 The Federal focal point for health research
of Health (NIH)
Research 1912 Set up to help universities patent inventions
Corporation
National Science 1950 Government responsibility for funding basic 
Foundation (NSF) research, later specialized research centres were
established such as Engineering research centres
NSF 1973 Industry–university cooperative research centres
Patent and 1980 Formalized university ownership of IP and hence 
Trademark Act capacity to commercialize university research. In 
(Bayh-Dole Act) universities, innovators were eventually guaranteed 15 per
cent of returns on their investment
Economic 1981 Reduced the cost to industry of funding university 
Recovery Tax research
Small Business 1982 Encouraged small business to explore their 
Innovation technological potential and provided the incentive 
Research to profit from its commercialization
Programme (SBIR)
National 1984 Eliminated treble damage of anti-trust so that firms, 
Cooperative universities and federal laboratories could engage in 
Research Act joint pre-competitive R&D
(NCRA) Establishment of Co-operative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADA)
Technology 1986 Under CRADAs federal laboratories empowered 
Transfer Act to co-operate in R&D with private firms and may assign
private firms the rights to any intellectual property arising
from joint work. Amended in 1989 to allow contractor-
operated federal laboratories to participate in CRADAs
(Mowery 1998)
Omnibus Trade and 1987/8 Advanced Technology Program (ATP). Provided 
Competitiveness matching funds for industry-led R&D consortia, 
Act some of which involve universities or federal labs as
participants
Defense 1993 Renamed DARPA to ARPA; authorizes dual-use 
Authorization Act: technology transfer projects
Technology Transfer 1996 Strengthened rights of firms to exclusively license 
Improvements and patents resulting from CRADAs
Advancement Act
Small Business 1997 Expansion of the public/private sector partnership 
Technology to include the joint venture opportunities for small 
Transfer Program business and the nation’s premier nonprofit 
(STTR) research institutions
Budget doubling 1998– Greater spend on life science research
of NIH 2003
Sources: Rosenberg and Nelson 1994; Mowery 1998; Bozeman 2000, 634; Shapira 2004a,
www.sba.gov/sbir/indexsbir-sttr.html.
policies requiring faculty to disclose their inventions to university adminis-
trators were part of a new formalization process (Mowery and Sampat
2001). This pattern began first in the public universities, the University of
California being the first, followed by private universities led by MIT. The
creation of formal technology transfer units began in the 1930s. This new
organization whereby intellectual property was managed to the benefit of
the university meant that technology could be made available to a variety
of firms. Etzkowitz (2003) suggests that this reorganization enabled Stan-
ford University to make available the inventions in physics and electrical
engineering in the period before the Bayh-Dole Act.
While these programmes and legislation laid the foundations for for-
malized university–industry linkages, the majority of programmes and leg-
islation were initiated either during or after the Second World War, with
the 1960s seeing a massive expansion in government-funded research in
universities. The National Science Foundation (NSF) and other pro-
grammes arose during the Second World War as a result of success in har-
nessing university research to wartime needs (Adams 2002, 275; Shane
2004, 45). As in Europe, radical changes began in 1979 when the govern-
ment of Ronald Reagan, like that of Margaret Thatcher in the UK,
changed political climate with regard to the function of universities
(Kenney 1986, 28). Between 1980 and 2000, the US Congress passed eight
major policy initiatives dealing with technology transfer and the means of
promoting it (Bozeman 2000, 628). Like legislation in general, legislative
changes were a response to issues arising from well-established trends.
The most famous, the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, was passed by Congress as
a response to complaints that Federal funding, which led universities in a
more basic direction, also weakened university–firm linkages (Etzkowitz
2003). Thus, Etzkowitz argues, it was the universities that were active in
technology transfer that lobbied for the passage of the law in order to
obtain a stable, regulated environment for the disposition of intellectual
property rights emanating from Federally funded research. The Bayh-
Dole Act permitted government grantees and contractors to retain title to
inventions resulting from Federally supported R&D and encouraged the
licensing of such inventions to industry. Although some Federal agencies
permitted universities to retain title before the Act, this law established a
uniform government-wide policy and process for academic patenting (NSF
2004). The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax, which extended industrial R&D
tax breaks to research supported at universities, also encouraged the take-
up of patents and licences.
The effects of the former were complex and systemic and not confined
to increasing the number or quality of patents and licences. First, there
were reports that the increased rate of university patenting did not seem to
increase the number of important academic patents, but it did greatly
expand the number of marginal patents. Before 1980 academic patents
were on average more important and more general than corporate
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patents, judging from citation patterns, but by the end of the 1980s that
difference had disappeared. The overall quality of patents from leading
universities declined somewhat, but the patents of newcomers were for the
most part of less value. Thus, increased patenting did appear to yield
decreasing returns. Moreover, only a few of the newcomers were able to
replicate the success of the existing patent leaders. Mowery and Ziedonis
(2002) argue that any effects of the Bayh-Dole Act on overall academic
patent quality reflect the Act’s effects on entry, rather than on the incen-
tives of academic researchers and administrators in long-active academic
patenters. While there may or may not be a direct relationship with
patenting, Florida (1999, 2) argues, that while the Act may have helped
universities to commercialize innovations, it may exacerbate the skewing
of the university’s role towards some notion of driving regional economies.
By 1960, Federal support for basic research amounted to over 60 per
cent of the total funding and, by 1965, real resources going into academic
research were more than twelve times what they were in the mid-1930s.
Rapid growth in the level of funding continued until around 1980, with the
real rate of growth about 3 per cent a year. Between 1990 and 2002, infla-
tion-adjusted Federal dollars for academic R&D grew by 66 per cent
(Malecki 2005).
Concomitant with this rate of growth was a cultural attitude, and basic
research ‘not only became respectable, but widely perceived as what uni-
versities ought to be doing’. Two indicators of American world leadership
in most areas of science were the number of Nobel Prizes and the influx of
foreign students – the reverse of the pattern before the Second World
War. NSF, however, has accounted for less than one-fifth of Federal
support for university research in the post-war period, with NIH account-
ing for a third and another third accounted for by the Department of
Defense, NASA and Department of Energy. In 1989 half of academic
research funding went to the life sciences, compared to 16 per cent for
engineering – which exceeded physical sciences. By the late 1990s, univer-
sities owned 30 per cent of DNA patents (OECD 2001a). The growing
involvement of industry in university research is demonstrated by the sta-
tistic that, by 1998, corporations sponsored nearly $2 billion in research
performed at universities, or nearly 9 per cent of all research performed at
US colleges and universities. Noll (1998) prophesied a polarization within
the US university system, arguing that declining state appropriations and
profits from medical services, a situation made worse by the shrinking of
Federal grant support, will work to the detriment of some of the smaller
research universities, which may abandon their attempts to maintain this
status.
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Joint university–industry research centres and research joint
ventures
Two particular features of US university–industry linkage infrastructure
are legislation which formalizes the intent of collaboration and the large
number of joint university–industry research centres.
Joint university research centres date back to the formation of the NSF.
A study by Cohen et al. for Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) of 1,056
centres with more than $100,000 in funding and at least one active industry
partner had total funding in excess of $4.12 billion (see Cohen et al. 1994).
The centres involved 12,000 staff and 22,300 doctoral level students.
Florida (1999) suggests that the popularity of collaboration can be
explained either as the corporate ‘manipulation view’ that corporations
seek to control relevant research for their own ends, or that, from the ‘aca-
demic entrepreneur’ view, university faculty and administrators act as
entrepreneurs, cultivating opportunities for industry and public funding to
advance their own agendas. The Cohen et al. study supported the acade-
mic entrepreneur thesis. They found that 73 per cent of university–
industry research centres indicated that the main impetus for their forma-
tion came from university faculty and administrators and only 11 per cent
came from industry. These centres, however, existed because of Federal
funding. A third policy initiative was the establishment by NSF of several
programmes that tied Federal support to industry participation. These
include the Engineering Research Centres and the Science and Techno-
logy Centers.
Engineering Research Centres receive the most generous public
funding – income for the 21 centres was running at about $2 million a year
in 1995. As cash contributions from industry averaged only $24,000, the
centres were effectively subsidizing R&D in industry (Geiger 2003, 13).
Geiger finds that centres are driven by technological opportunities – but
that safeguards to the interests of the Centres are built in by vetting by
NSF. He finds that in the Industry/University Cooperative Research
Centers (IUCRC) programme, the leverage works in the opposite direc-
tion. NSF acts almost as a facilitator for far smaller co-operative centres
with grassroots support and substantially increased funding for these in the
1980s. Grants from industry are much higher, a minimum of $300,000,
while a full NSF grant originally provided $100,000 (later $70,000) of
annual support for five years. In 2000 these centres received $5.2 million
from NSF compared to $68 million from other, chiefly industry sources.
Hence the centres have to meet the real needs of industry. While the state
version has been discontinued, those at the Federal level remain. For Geiger,
‘the implicit issue seemed to be the problem of targeting investments to
stimulate economic development within the state rather than nationally’.
To this end the programme explicitly sought to attract smaller firms which
fit less well into the centre paradigm. In the 1990s most states moved
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towards investing in non-university programmes for outright technical
assistance. He argues that states and localities face the challenge of captur-
ing returns in the form of economic development from public support for
research, which may inhibit a socially optimal investment in discovery.
Like other technology transfer legislation the National Cooperative
Research Act (NCRA) was passed in the 1980s. The 1984 Act created a
registration process so that research joint ventures (RJVs) can disclose
their research intentions to the Department of Justice. By 2002, there were
800 formal RJVs filed under NCRA. On average, 15 per cent of RJVs
have at least one university partner and of these over 90 per cent are US
universities (Audretsch et al. 2002). Like Florida, Audretsch et al. conclude
that firms with university partnerships are motivated not by desire to
control activity but by efficiency objectives. Generally, collaborating firms
have greater productivity and greater patenting activity. Hence a key
motive of the firm to undertake such collaborations is to have access to
university personnel, both graduate students and faculty, and laboratory
facilities.
Another collaborative programme is the Advanced Technology
Program (ATP), part of the National Institute of Standards and Techno-
logy. This is designed to ‘bridge the gap between the laboratory and
the market place’ (www.atp.nist.gov/www/images/icons/misc/bridge.jpg)
through research laboratory partnerships with the private sector. It offers
early-stage investment to accelerating the development of innovative tech-
nologies that promise significant commercial payoffs. The programme
assigns rights to the for-profit partner of a university to industry as this can
result in universities not being able to apply for patents and removes any
motivation for universities to disclose inventions. In 1994 it was reported
that this caused universities such as MIT not to accept ATP awards (Stan-
ford University News Service 1994). It has also faced opposition from
policy makers. In 2001 the US Congress House of Appropriations Com-
mittee questioned its value (Feller 2004, 24).
Diversity versus uniformity and governance
Features of the North American HE system
The US system of higher education is far more heterogeneous than that of
any other country. An indication of this is the number of different ways it
has been characterized, although a number of features are common to all
descriptions. Feller (1999) identifies four features of the American system
of higher education: decentralization, competition, regionalism and cou-
pling of research with graduate education. Clark (1992) adds largeness,
dual tiers and diversified finance, Davis and Diamond (1997) include insti-
tutional pluralism, Shapira (2004a) highlights diverse science and techno-
logy policy systems and Malecki (2005) characterizes the system in terms
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of massive government funding for health and defence-related research,
high academic quality and the willingness to invest in long-term develop-
ment of new and often multi-disciplinary fields.
The US has over 3,600 higher education establishments, 550 of them
issuing doctorates, and 125 identified as ‘research universities’. The
Carnegie Foundation defines these as: ‘the presence of doctoral programs,
and significant amounts of federal grants’ (in Noll 1998). In 2001, the top
200 universities accounted for 96 per cent of all R&D expenditures (NSF
2004). Of these, some 50 accounted for the lion’s share of American acad-
emic research capacity, public funding in support of university research
and the country’s Nobel Prizes for science.
Although university-performed R&D accounts for only 12 per cent of
the US total, it is also highly correlated with the total R&D performance
in a state (Table 5.2). The top ten states in university-performed R&D
include the top ten states in total R&D except that North Carolina and
Georgia replace New Jersey and Washington. Although R&D expendi-
tures are concentrated in relatively few states, patterns of R&D activities
vary considerably among the top R&D-performing locations. Variations in
the R&D expenditure levels of states, however, may simply reflect differ-
ences in economic size or the nature of their R&D efforts.
NSF (2004) reports that the six states with the highest levels of R&D
expenditures – California, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Massachu-
setts and Illinois (in decreasing order of magnitude) – accounted for one-
half of the entire national effort. Adding (in descending order) Texas,
Washington, Pennsylvania and Maryland, the top ten states accounted for
two-thirds. As in earlier years, California had the highest level of R&D
expenditures in the nation ($55 billion); it alone accounted for over one-
fifth of the $247 billion US R&D total. California’s R&D effort exceeded
by nearly a factor of three that of the next highest state, Michigan, with
nearly $19 billion in R&D expenditures. After Michigan, R&D levels for
the top ten states declined incrementally to $8.6 billion for Maryland.
Although leading states in total R&D tend to be well represented in each
of the major R&D-performing sectors, the relative share of each state’s
R&D performed by these sectors varies. States that are national leaders in
total R&D performance are also usually leaders in terms of R&D
performance by the industrial sector, which is not surprising because
industry-performed R&D accounts for 77 per cent of the distributed US
total. Thus, nine of the top ten states for total R&D (all but Maryland)
were among the leading industrial R&D-performing states.
Eminence
The US system differs from the traditional European system in that
private universities – which comprise the majority – play a far more
dominant role in research systems than in other countries. The private Ivy





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































League universities such as Harvard, Princeton and Yale (Ivy League is
the name generally applied to eight privately owned universities (Brown,
Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Pennsylvania, Princeton and
Yale) (etc.princeton.edu/CampusWWW/Companion/ivy_league.html)) have
enormous endowed wealth, the result of private philanthropy over two
centuries. Although in the early 1990s seven of the top ten universities
were private, among the top 104 research universities only 33 were private,
the public universities succeeding on the basis of attracting funds from the
state, Federal funding and industry (Siegel et al. 1999). These authors
explain the dominance of private universities in the ranking of the top uni-
versities as arising from an important difference between public and
private universities – public universities may have less flexibility and may
be less focused on university–industry technology transfer than private
universities are.
Noll (1998, 16) finds that the US system whereby the close relationship
between universities, national laboratories and industry, with universities
managing government research facilities, is responsible for the situation
whereby 70 per cent of the authors of scientific and technical publications
are affiliated to academic institutions – which leads to the situation
whereby ‘most of the world leaders in the United States are universities’.
The pre-eminence of the US research universities (on the criterion of such
bibliometric data), compared to Europe, is not just related to funding
levels but, according to Herbst (2004), is to do with the structural setting in
which the research is undertaken – the ‘production–morphology nexus’.
Herbst, like Noll (1998), finds a competitive advantage in flexibility: that
the rest of the world is bureaucratic and inflexible compared to the US. He
concludes that ‘European and US higher education cultures can be seen
on different shores of development’. US universities have a flat hierarchi-
cal set up (of teaching and research), that is, with low student–faculty and
low staff–faculty ratios, whereas low performance levels correlate with
more pronounced hierarchies below the level of faculty, that is high
student–faculty and high staff–faculty ratios (‘staff’ here referring to
administrative and technical support personnel). Thus according to this
analysis European universities are much more top-down managed than
those in the US and need to become much less hierarchical and more
decentralized in order to compete with those in the US.
Defence and biotechnology
The massive government funding for defence and health-related research
has involved close integration between universities, industry and the
government’s own research centres in both cases. Defence spending,
according to Malecki (2005), is, in the absence of an explicit industrial or
technology policy, the US’s implicit technology policy. This has long been
the case. The close integration between universities, defence research and
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industry is illustrated by some statistics from the 1980s in Scherer and Ross
(1990). In 1987, 36 per cent of industrial R&D outlays were financed under
government contracts, mostly covering military and space development.
The manufacturing sector in the late 1980s conducted 97 per cent of all
industrial R&D and was then the prime mover in generating technological
progress. Since then the share of industrial R&D on both defence and
space, although dropping from the peak in the mid-1980s, still contributes
millions of dollars to universities and, through both the application of
research and the training of scientists, has been associated closely with
economic development concentrated in a small number of locations.
For example, defence funding of MIT (which was the largest recipient
of research funding in the Second World War) and other universities
including Harvard and a growing concentration of industrial laboratories
in the Boston area ‘offered an intellectual and technological labor pool
unsurpassed in the nation, if not the world’ (Saxenian 1994, 14). New
Mexico’s high R&D intensity is largely attributable to Federal (specifically
Department of Energy) support of two federally funded research and
development centres (FFRDCs), Los Alamos National Laboratory and
Sandia National Laboratories (NSF 2004). This spending amounts to being
an implicit regional as well as industrial policy (Malecki 2005).
Examples of recent initiatives illustrate how those patterns are being
reinforced. In 2004, Congress passed a defence spending bill that included
$1.5 million for Purdue University’s planned Center for Advanced Manu-
facturing. Purdue will also benefit from funding in the bill for the Crane
Naval Surface Warfare Center, with which it is collaborating on research
to reduce the national security threat of shoulder-launched missiles. The
money is part of a $418 billion defence package that funds the Pentagon in
2005 and includes emergency war spending (www.boilerstation.com/
planet/stories/200407240purdue_planet1090646943.shtml). Other examples
include Chevron, which was paid $55.8 million to provide fuel to Utah
defence facilities, and the state’s universities, particularly Utah State Uni-
versity, which landed $37 million in defence contracts working primarily
on missile systems (www.shns.com/shns/g_index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=
UTAH-DEFENSE-07-05-04).
Bioscience is the research sector currently most closely associated with
national funding of research in universities, which is most influenced by
national policies (Cook-Deegan 2000). Funding for research and legis-
lative change which encouraged patenting and entrepreneurship have
been the key differences between the US and Europe (Malecki 2005). He
argues that it is the funding for the science base rather than the biotech-
nology industry and the relatively easier environment for academics to
start up companies that have laid the foundations for start-up firms to be
created out of the science base.
Funding for biomedical research in the US over the three decades has
grown rapidly since the late 1970s when 11 per cent of all US Federally
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funded R&D was directed towards biomedical research (Senker 1996,
221). By the start of the twenty-first century, the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) had become ‘the world’s largest source of support for bio-
medical research’ (Cook-Deegan 2000, 801). Since then, the NIH have
contributed a substantial increase in funding relative to the other main
federal funding agencies. Between 1990 and 2003, NIH’s funding of acade-
mic R&D increased the most rapidly, with an estimated average annual
growth rate of 7.2 per cent per year in constant 1996 dollars, increasing its
share of Federal funding from just above 50 per cent to an estimated 66
per cent. This compares with the next largest block of academic R&D
expenditures, which went to engineering, about 15 per cent in 2001.
The distribution of this funding is uneven. California, Maryland, New
York and Massachusetts are the top four states that receive NIH funding
for academic science (Cook-Deegan 2000, 805). Unlike other countries,
the US has also allocated funds to use the industry as a means of encour-
aging economic development. The Experimental Program to Stimulate
Competitive Research (EPSCoR) was established to identify, develop and
utilize a state’s academic science and technology resources in a way that
will support the creation of wealth and enhance the life of the state’s cit-
izens (www.epscorfoundation.org/). It is administered within seven
Federal agencies including NIH, NASA and the NSF. Specifically,
EPSCoR stimulates sustainable R&D infrastructure improvements at the
state and institutional levels to significantly increase the ability of EPSCoR
researchers to compete for Federal and private-sector R&D funding, and
accelerates the movement of EPSCoR researchers and institutions into the
mainstream of Federal and private R&D support. Only those states that
historically receive less Federal R&D funding and have a demonstrated
commitment to develop their research bases and improve the quality of
science and engineering research conducted at their universities and col-
leges are eligible to participate in EPSCoR. Bioscience research, in con-
junction with the NIH, is a key target. Research activity by itself, however,
is not enough to ensure the growth of the biotechnology industry. For
example, Atlanta and Houston are major biomedical research centres but
with limited commercial activity (Cortright and Mayer 2002).
More than the straight commercial and economic development consid-
erations, regulation of particular areas of research, especially stem cell but
also agbio, have a direct effect on the US science effort and distinguish the
US from other countries. For example, in 2001, the House of Representa-
tives voted to ban all human cloning. The House rejected an amendment
to the bill that would have carved out human cloning solely for embryonic
stem cell research (ESCR) while outlawing its use to produce children. As
a consequence, US scientists faced a setback as Federal research grants,
whether applied directly or indirectly, were frozen. The freeze was lifted
for projects that utilize existing stem cell cultures, but has implications for
research. The administration’s stance is that embryonic stem cell research
120 The United States
is an ethical question. According to the release, taxpayer’s dollars should
not fund the destruction of human embryos, regardless of the source,
including excess embryos slated for disposal at in-vitro fertilization clinics.
President Bush has decided to allow Federal funding of embryonic cell
stem cell research to go forward, but only on cells already in existence.
The Bush decision in respect of Federal funding for ESCR was not a
‘freeze’ but a limited liberalization of existing policy, under which there
had never before been Federal support for destructive embryo research,
most recently under the so-called Dickey Amendment, which Congress
has passed every year and which makes such funding illegal. Although
such policy had major consequences for the university sector as a whole,
the decentralized system is illustrated by events in California. In 2004,
Governor Schwarzenegger of California put the issue to the vote, follow-
ing a petition from the people of California. Californians came down on
the side of stem cell research by passing a controversial bond measure that
devotes $3 billion to human embryonic stem cell experiments and com-
prises the biggest-ever state-supported scientific research programme in
the country.
Accountability
In the US, as in the UK, the reality is that universities are responding to
the prevailing political agenda of establishing programmes and offices
designed to stimulating economic development through technology trans-
fer (see Bozeman 2000 and Siegel et al. 2003). As a result, while university
technology transfer offices have gained in political importance, they are
also caught up in the tensions between the traditional model of ‘open
science’ and the new ‘commercial science model’. In both the US and the
UK there is evidence of distress signals from within the system (Bundy
2004). For example Rahm (1993) surveyed 1,134 university technology
managers and university researchers in the top 100 research universities.
She found that four out of ten technology managers said that firms they
had dealt with had placed restrictions on university researchers sharing
information with their departments of research centre colleagues. Nearly
five in ten of the researchers mentioned this restriction and said that it had
‘created a feeling of conflict for them between loyalty to the firm and the
university’s value of open knowledge’.
Slaughter and Rhoades (1996 in Bozeman 2000) concluded that the
external policy environment of co-operative technology and competitive-
ness is having effects on the structure of academic work, including salary
distribution by field and faculty research choices and rewards, and is
having a divisive effect between the engineers and scientists on the one
hand and arts and letters on the other (see also Florida 1999).
More recently, the US Council on Competitiveness (1998) summarizes
concerns as being the low levels of funding for universities in disciplines
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such as the physical sciences, for laboratory costs and state of the art
equipment, and for graduate fellowships in physical sciences and engin-
eering (see Chapter 7 below) as well as tensions in the relationship
between business and universities. The latter include the potential dangers
in the trend toward exclusive licensing of patented university research,
exclusive licensing of genetic information, that patenting practices in
advanced materials and other sectors could compromise the open and free
exchange of basic research information and the lack of linkages between
universities and SMEs. Moreover, there are worries in both the universi-
ties and industry about the levels of support for frontier research. Similar
concerns are expressed in the Business-Higher Education Forum (2001)
and by Bok (2003) (formerly president of Harvard).
Bok (2003) warned that universities are showing signs of excessive com-
mercialization of every aspect of their work. He finds that the need for
money is a chronic condition of American universities and that ‘the recent
surge of commercial activity is best understood as only the latest in a series
of steps to acquire more resources’, along with financial cutbacks. But, at
the same time, there is over-optimism among university officials, and the
hoped for profits often fail to materialize while the damage to academic
standards and institutional integrity is a reality.
Studies have indeed examined changes in faculty behaviour in the after-
math of their involvement in commercialization activities. In line with Blu-
menthal et al. (1996), Louis et al. (2001) find that academic scientists
engaged in entrepreneurial activity are more likely to deny requests from
fellow academics for research results than other faculty members not
engaged in entrepreneurial activities. Similarly, Cohen et al. (1994) find
evidence both of the publication of research results being delayed and of
information being deleted from papers. Delays, often related to patent
applications, can be considerable. It can also be related to evidence that a
drug is not as efficient as that of a competitor. He recommends that the
universities collectively take the lead in establishing shared and enforce-
able guidelines for limiting disclosure restrictions in research.
A further dimension to the level of increased dependency is when uni-
versities lose state aid when benefactors step in and whether this amounts
to ‘privatisation without any conscious dialog about it means’ (see
Marklein 2003). The article featured the University of Wisconsin,
Madison, which has found that the state has cut back on funding when
private sponsorship is used to supplement income. The article reported
policies of universities in other states such as South Carolina, Colorado
and Wisconsin, which like Texas are looking to free themselves from state
controls that place limits on their ability to raise tuition fees or raise
private money.
The Madey v. Duke University case on academic patent infringement,
according to Van Hoorebeek (2004), has focused attention on the society
role played by universities. Madey worked at Duke for nearly a decade
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but resigned in 1998 after being removed as lab director. Madey claims
that his removal was predicated on his refusal to use the ‘lab’s equipment
for research areas outside the allocated scope of certain government
funding’. Despite Madey’s removal from the lab, Duke continued to use
some of the lab’s equipment, including the equipment embodying Madey’s
patents. Because of this unauthorized use of Madey’s patents, Madey sued
Duke for patent infringement (Miller 2003). The denial of the petition for
certorari set out in an Amicus brief in June 2003, precluding the experi-
mental use exception for private universities (but not public universities –
they are exempt) in the US, ‘seals the coffin on the experimental use
exception for private universities’ (see Miller 2003). This was a mechanism
that provided a defence to patent infringement in the US and a mechanism
which has parallels around the world. It has a number of potential ramifi-
cations for university-level interactions including universities being at the
mercy of patent holders, delaying and blocking further research innova-
tion, increasing the cost and duration of research, the demanding of unrea-
sonable returns in exchange for the use of the patents, preclusion of
experiments, and stopping on-going research if there is a danger of patent
violation and administrative costs.
The complexity of the ethical and political issues surrounding the eco-
nomic importance of university research is further illustrated by a series of
challenges by AUTM to proposals to change existing legislation proposed
variously by the NIH (see AUTM 2004b), the American Intellectual
Property Law Association and Senate (www.autm.net/about/About
AUTM_positions.cfm). Although in the end the NIH decided that it did
not have the authority to intervene, the case is still an important indicator
of the complexity of the ethical and political issues surrounding the eco-
nomic importance of university research.
Massification
Three trends are observable in the US. The first is that from within acade-
mia critiques are emerging of what Florida (1999) calls the simplistic posi-
tion that universities contribute to industry through technology transfer.
Instead, Florida (1999, 8) argues that regional policy makers should
‘reduce the pressure on universities to increase technology transfer efforts’
but rather ‘ensure that the infrastructure that their region has to offer will
be able to attract and retain the top talent and be able to absorb academic
research for commercial gain’. This position is supported by Bozeman
(2000), who has found that universities’ role of human capital and training
in technology transfer, including industry’s use of students as cheap
labour, is becoming more widely recognized.
The second trend is a growing body of evidence to support Florida’s
argument. For example, NSF (2004) finds a strong association between the
geography of the development of high-tech industry in the US and the
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skills in regional labour markets, with California topping both lists (see
Table 5.3 for the distribution of high-tech enterprises by state). The
number of high-technology establishments rose from 402,000 in 1998 to
428,000 in 2000 and represented an increasing share of all start-up,
growing from 5.8 to 6.1 per cent of total business establishments in the
period 1998–2000. The state distribution of this indicator is similar to that
of three other indicators: bachelor’s degree holders, S&E doctoral degree
holders in the workforce, and workforce in S&E occupations.
The third trend is that the US is recognizing that Europe’s higher edu-
cational system may be more effective in producing graduates in science
and engineering, thus putting Europe in a stronger competitive position in
establishing, attracting and retaining high-tech companies. Noll (1998, 12)
finds that one of the major differences between the US and Europe is that
the concentration of higher degrees in the natural sciences and engin-
eering is higher in Europe than in the US, especially since Europeans have
begun to place an emphasis on mass higher education to produce a more
technically sophisticated workforce. At doctoral level, however, he finds
little difference in the distribution of degrees in terms of duration and
intensity of study.
Entrepreneurial universities
Commercialization of research began to take off in the period between the
First and the Second World War with the increasing amount of involve-
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Table 5.3 Quartile groups for high-technology share of all business establishments:
2000
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
(10.53%–6.71%) (6.54%–5.31%) (5.21%–4.22%) (4.21%–2.98%)
California Arizona Alabama Arkansas
Colorado Delaware Alaska Hawaii
Connecticut Florida Idaho Iowa
District of Columbia Georgia Indiana Kentucky
Illinois Michigan Kansas Louisiana
Maryland New York Maine Mississippi
Massachusetts North Carolina Missouri Montana
Minnesota Ohio New Mexico Nebraska
Nevada Oregon Oklahoma North Dakota
New Hampshire Pennsylvania South Carolina South Dakota
New Jersey Rhode Island Tennessee West Virginia
Utah Texas Vermont Wyoming
Virginia Washington Wisconsin
Source: NSF 2004, www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind04/c8/c8.cfm?opt=6.
Note
States in alphabetical order, not data order.
ment with industry, although the volume was low and many universities
were against faculty benefiting from the exploitation of their research and
many academics formed their own companies without involving their uni-
versities as a consequence (see Shane 2004). Hence, while entrepreneurial
activity has long been embedded in the university system, the 1980s saw a
rapid increase across the board in the number of patents, licences, spin-off
companies, science parks and university–industry collaborative activity.
The institutionalization of the commercialization of the technology trans-
fer process took effect through the widespread establishment of TTOs.
Legislative and industrial change, and more recently the political agenda
(Florida 1999), are often given as being catalysts for these developments.
Patenting and licensing
Institutions that have been the most successful in commercializing univer-
sity research – Columbia, University of Washington and Emory – owed
their success to biomedical patents. Most important, the distribution of vir-
tually all measures associated with patents remained highly skewed. For
example, the top 20 universities in terms of licensing income for 1999
received 74 per cent of all licensing income; the 20 with the most active
licences and options had 61 per cent of the total; the top 20 patenters were
issued 46 per cent of all academic patents; and the 20 largest TTOs
employed 44 per cent of licensing professionals (AUTM Licensing Survey:
FY 1999). The comparable number of top research performers accounted
for 37 per cent of university R&D in 2000). The top universities in each of
these categories are not identical, but they substantially overlap. Table 5.4
depicts the leaders of academic patenting and commercial ties generally.
Geiger points to the limitations of the data in indicating economic
development. These are that patenting and licensing are exceptional by-
products of academic research; and are confined to a very few fields and to
a very few institutions – an elite that established patenting offices,
developed a campus culture that encourage patenting and built a strong
presence in biotechnology. These are the universities of California, MIT,
Stanford, Columbia and Wisconsin. Columbia, for example, has earned
millions of dollars from its Axel patent for a gene-transfer process used in
the commercial production of proteins; Harvard in 1996 received the
majority of its royalties from a heart-imaging contrast agent. The Univer-
sity of Washington owed its patenting payoffs to technologies for produc-
ing Hepatitus B vaccine and interferon. Such big winners are all the more
conspicuous at universities with smaller overall patenting efforts – the
anti-cancer drug taxol at Florida State and anti-tumour agents at Michigan
State (GAO, Technology Transfer).
Powers (2003), using AUTM data, found that private universities and
Land Grant universities out-perform other universities on various
measures of technology transfer outputs, having undertaken more
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commercially orientated activities. Specifically, private universities were
high performers in terms of invention disclosures and running royalities
while Land Grants were slightly higher than private ones in terms of
licences executed. Consistently with this, in each case relatively few high
performers skew the data. Three key factors consistently account for
performance differences: research expenditures, the size of technology
transfer offices; and their age. He concludes that in fact, after addressing
skewness problems and controlling for other resource factors, the evidence
seems to suggest no difference in performance for institutional type – but
those with larger research expenditures and older TTOs enjoy perform-
ance advantages.
Industrial change
During the 1990s, industries that used commercial applications derived
from ‘use-oriented’ basic research in life sciences fields such as molecu-
lar biology and genomics emerged and matured. Changes in the US
patent regime strengthened overall patent and copyright protection and
encouraged the patenting of biomedical and life sciences technology.
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Table 5.4 Select data, 16 universities with most licensing revenues: 1999
University – Licensing % life Patents Total Industry Start-up 
R&D rank revenues science issued active research companies
$ millions licences $ millions
and options
Columbia 25 95.8 85.7 0, 77 00,706 0, 3.4 5
Cal System1 80.9 66.0 0,281 0,1078 0,177.6 13
Florida State 92 57.3 97.0 0, 5 00, 20 0, 0.7 1
Yale 29 40.8 98.7 0, 37 00,237 0, 14.4 3
Stanford 8 40.1 81.9 0, 90 00,872 0, 41.3 19
Washington 5 27.9 80.0 0, 36 00,207 0, 57.4 na
Michigan State 42 23.7 99.6 0, 63 00,134 0, 11.2 1
Florida 26 21.6 98.8 0, 58 00,124 0, 34.9 2
Wisconsin 2 18.0 75.1 0, 79 00,346 0, 16.1 4
MIT 12 17.1 69.9 0,154 00,565 0, 83.1 17
Emory 46 16.2 58.2 0, 44 00, 82 0, 7.5 4
SUNY System1 13.6 95.5 0, 53 00,298 0, 17.5 3
Harvard 23 13.5 94.9 0, 72 00,388 0, 12.2 2
Baylor Med. 24 12.5 98.4 0, 25 00,221 0, 17.6 0
New York 55 10.7 0, 30 00, 30 0, 7.7 2
Johns Hopkins 1 10.5 99.7 0,111 00,370 0, 46.9 7
Total, all universities 675.5 80.0 3,079 15,203 2,178.2 275
16 univ: % of total 74.0 84.0 0, 39.5 00, 37.3 0, 25.2 30.2
Sources: AUTM Licensing Survey: FY1999; Life Sciences % from AUTM Licensing Survey:
FY1996; R&D$ from NSF 2000 data; Johns Hopkins inc. APL; Geiger 2003, 32.
Note
1. UC campus R&D rank: LA-4; SD-6; B-7; SF-9; D-17; I-67; SB-88; R-108; SC-128. SUNY
campuses: B-53; SB-63; A-109. The table also shows only those universities receiving more
than $10 million in 1999.
The creation of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit to handle
patent infringement cases was one factor in the strengthening of overall
patent protection. The 1982 court decision (Diamond v. Chakrabarty)
that upheld the patenting of engineered life forms later extended
to genetic material and patenting of more general concepts which
‘made active patenting virtually irresistible for universities’ (Geiger
2003, 30).
Geiger (2003) reports that drug and medical patents were the chief
drivers behind this growth. They accounted for a rise from 18 to 46 per
cent of academic patents. But, he argues, these figures understate their
importance. Drug and medical patents provide far and away the bulk of
licensing revenues for the major participants. For the twenty universities
that garnered the highest royalties in 1997, 81 per cent of the income came
from life sciences patents. Biotech subsidises patenting in other areas.
‘Without these windfalls the current scale of academic patenting could
scarcely be supported’. Legal fees for a single patent application averaged
nearly $14,000 in the 1990s. Moreover, the potential for royalties was
enormous: earnings particularly from biomedical patents meant that
licensing revenues in the 1990s increased at roughly twice the rate of uni-
versity patenting.
Institutionalization
Institutionalization took place with the formation of professional associ-
ations of technology transfer officials within university, government and
industry sectors. These include the Association of University Technology
Managers (AUTM) in 1974, the Federal Technology Transfer Executives
and the Licensing Executives Society. Etzkowitz et al. (2000) argue that, as
a consequence of the formation of these organisations, a ‘trilateral
network of innovation has been put in place’.
In 1980 only 25 US universities had technology transfer offices.
Following the Bayh-Dole Act, many institutions founded a TTO. By
1990 there were more than 200 and more than 2,500 in 2003 (Bozeman
2000; Siegel et al. 2003, AUTM 2003). Universities such as MIT and
Stanford, which did have offices and had technology transfer activities
which had been anomalies within the university system, following the
Bayh-Dole Act now became models for other universities to emulate
(Etzkowitz et al. 2000). These authors state: ‘Other schools such as
Columbia, which had previously viewed themselves as playing a policy
and service role in supplying faculty members going to Washington to
serve temporarily in government, now found themselves trying to estab-
lish new ties with industry, often in their local region.’ While Siegel et al.
(2002) see the university–industry technology transfer as a mechanism
for generating local technological spillovers as well as a source of
revenue for the university, the regional role that technology transfer can
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play in fostering regional economic development is not high on AUTM’s
list of priorities. Instead, the strategy has been to focus on licensing to
established companies, royalty maximization, an increased amount of
faculty research support as part of licensing deals and professional
service to academic staff (Tornatzky et al. 2002, 24). Fogarty and Sinha
(1999) found a simple pattern and not one desired by policy makers –
that there is a significant flow of intellectual property flowing from uni-
versities in older industrial regions such as Detroit and Cleveland to
high-tech regions such as Greater Boston, San Francisco and New York
metropolitan regions.
Spin-offs
The history of university spin-offs dates back to before the First World
War (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994). A small number of high-profile univer-
sities such as Stanford and MIT were responsible for large numbers of
spin-off firms throughout the twentieth century, while others have had
major successes. A growing number of universities are involved in estab-
lishing programmes designed to encourage spin-offs but as yet there is no
generally accepted model (Sandelin 2002). Of the major success stories,
Carnegie Mellon hit the jackpot with its incubation of Lycos, the internet
search engine company; it made £25 million in its initial stake in the
company when it went public. Yet other universities have not been so suc-
cessful. For example Boston University lost tens of millions of dollars in its
‘ill-fated investment in Seragen’ (Florida 1999, 3).
In the first national study of the economic impact of a research univer-
sity, the BankBoston Economics Department for MIT (1997) reported
that by 1997 graduates of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had
founded 4,000 firms which, in 1994 alone, generated $232 billion of world
sales. Within the United States, the companies employed a total of 733,000
people in 1994 at more than 8,500 plants and offices in the country – equal
to one out of every 170 jobs in America. Eighty per cent of the jobs in the
MIT-related firms are in manufacturing (compared to 16 per cent nation-
ally), and a high percentage of products are exported. The five states
benefiting most from MIT-related jobs were California (162,000), Massa-
chusetts (125,000), Texas (84,000), New Jersey (34,000) and Pennsylvania
(21,000). Figure 5.1 shows where these plants are located. Box 5.1 sum-
marises the impact of MIT on the US economy.
Science parks
The first research parks in the US were founded in the 1950s and were
originally set up in order to increase the possibilities and profitability of
commercializing university research, and to meet the needs of
entrepreneurially-minded academics. The Stanford Industrial Park was
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Each dot shows one plant or office
Map 1 EMPLOYMENT AT ALL PLANTS OF
MIT-RELATED COMPANIES
Figure 5.1 The impact of MIT on the economy of the US (source: BankBoston
1997).
established in 1951, ‘partly to utilize the university’s embarrassingly vast
land holdings’ (Geiger 2003, 19). The North Carolina Research Triangle
Park was created in 1959 as a deliberate attempt to stimulate economic
development in North Carolina. These two were the largest and most suc-
cessful of the 13 that existed in 1969 and 24 in 1979 (Luger and Goldstein
1991). In the following decades, universities in the US became more
directly involved in supporting new business development activities,
including the establishment of business incubators. By 1992, the US
National Business Incubation Association reported that more than 50 uni-
versities and colleges had participated in this effort. Using a broad defini-
tion of science parks, Kung (1995) found that in 1992 there were as many
as 188 centres, 57 Incubators and 103 parks in the US.
Geiger (2003, 20) concludes that in spite of the low-level but
important faculty ties with research park tenants, ties do little to enhance
faculty entrepreneurship through patenting or forming start-up com-
panies. In areas where research parks are closely associated with
research universities, the source of growth is the university. Moreover,
the situation for business incubators is little different. At the end of the





that many should be regarded as failures. By the late 1990s, the trend
again was of integrating industry and universities – but using new models
(Geiger 2003, 22).
Geiger illustrates this point with reference to the Centennial Campus at
North Carolina State University. The plan to create a technopolis is also
part of the strategy to advance NC State to be ‘one of the country’s
leading land-grant universities’. The university’s integrated strategy is to
move academic units to the site, attract major corporations and attract
grants for research centers such as textiles and engineering with a further
objective of spawning start-up firms. The university is building on its tradi-
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Box 5.1 The impact of MIT on the US economy
• Eighty per cent of the jobs in the MIT-related firms are in manufactur-
ing (compared to 16 per cent nationally), and a high percentage of
products are exported.
• The MIT-related companies, if they formed a nation, would rank as the
24th largest world economy in 1994.
• Massachusetts firms related to MIT had 353,000 worldwide jobs; Cali-
fornia firms had 348,000 worldwide jobs.
• Other major world employers included firms in Texas, 70,000; Missouri,
63,000; New Jersey, 48,000; Pennsylvania, 41,000; and New Hampshire,
35,000.
• More than 2,400 companies have headquarters outside the Northeast.
• The MIT-related companies are not typical of the economy as a whole;
they tend to be knowledge-based companies in software, manufacturing
(electronics, biotech, instruments, machinery) or consulting (architects,
business consultants, engineers). These companies have a dispropor-
tionate importance to their local economies because they usually sell to
out-of-state and world markets, and because they so often represent
advanced technologies. Other industries represented include manufac-
turing firms in chemicals, drugs, materials, aerospace; energy, publish-
ing and finance.
• MIT graduates and faculty have been forming an average of 150 new
firms a year since 1990.
• MIT graduates cited several factors at MIT which spurred them to take
the risk of starting their own companies – faculty mentors, cutting-edge
technologies, entrepreneurial spirit and ideas.
• In Massachusetts, the 1,065 MIT-related companies represent 5 per cent
of total state employment and 10 per cent of the state’s economic base.
• The companies include 220 companies based outside the United States,
employing 28,000 people worldwide.
• Some of the earliest known MIT-related companies still active are
Arthur D. Little, Inc. (1886), Stone and Webster (1889), Campbell Soup
(1900) and Gillette (1901).
Source: BankBoston 1997.
tion of being more applied than a research university. Tellingly, the uni-
versity – and Geiger – recognize the potential for conflict of interest, which
the university argues that it negotiates from a position of strength (its aca-
demic standards) but it is recognized that this model requires a large input
of faculty time. The state of Georgia and the Yamacraw at Georgia Tech
project is a further novel model of using industry–academic collaboration
to further economic growth. In this case the emphasis was on cutting edge
research and the training of experts, an investment in human and intellec-
tual capital which survived the depression in the telecoms industry, much
as Princeton did (Chapter 8).
The territorial role
In the US, as in the UK, the innovation-led territorial role is front-line
policy at Federal as well as state level. Rather earlier than in the UK, the
alignment of interests of universities with industry and regional economic
growth which were described in the ‘triple helix model’ (Etzkowitz and
Leydesdorff 1995) became part of the established rhetoric within universi-
ties as well as government (Florida 1999). Etztkowitz (2003) sees a trans-
formation in the broader role of the university as ‘regional innovation
organizer’.
Bozeman (2000) describes the current phase of policy, which can be
dated to the early 1990s, as being similar to that which was influential from
1945 to 1965: that the government role should be closely tied to authorized
programmatic missions of agencies. Support for this analysis comes from
Shapira (2005a), who finds that US policy has undergone a series of para-
digm shifts (Figure 5.2). The latest shift, under the G. W. Bush administra-
tion, is one of decentralization, whereby state-based partnerships and the
spreading of regional S&T capability are promoted. Now, as in the UK,
state policy makers press universities to articulate what they can and do
provide to the economic well-being of the state. Powers (2003, 22) finds
that the research universities embrace the concept of universities as wealth
creators when they believe that it can result in a more favourable financial
treatment by the legislators. Overall, the effect of the paradigm shift is that
of a technology transfer accretion by all state universities rather than a
planned and co-ordinated effort built around the strategic strengths of the
various institutions and their specific external environments. This, Powers
suggests, results in duplication and inadequate support.
Shapira’s (2005a) diagram (Figure 5.2) illustrates a series paradigm shift
from the period up to the ending of the Cold War and the beginning of the
current entrepreneurial phase to the current climate. In this the focus in
the US, as in Europe, is on clusters and on SMEs and technology integra-
tion. Unlike in biosciences, spin-offs from defence contracts from the DoD
are inhibited by the conditions attached to research funding for example at
Johns Hopkins University (Feldman 1994 in Shane 2004).
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Evidence of how states are using their own funds to bolster research in
their universities comes from Berglund (1998). By the mid-1990s, states
were spending at least $2.7 billion dollars of their own funds on pro-
grammes on applied research and technological advance, most of which
had regional development aims. In total, by 2001, state and local govern-
ments provided 7.1 per cent of academic R&D funding. Since 1980 the
state and local share has remained between 7 and 9 per cent. Private acad-
emic institutions received a much smaller proportion of their funds from
state and local governments (about 2 per cent) and institutional sources
(about 10 per cent) and a much larger share from the Federal government
(72 per cent). Shares of funding described above, however, only reflect
funds directly targeted to academic R&D activities by state and local gov-
ernments. They do not include general-purpose state or local government
appropriations that academic institutions designate to use to fund sepa-
rately budgeted research or cover unreimbursed indirect costs. Hence the
actual level of state funding is higher than these figures suggest, particu-
larly for public institutions (NSF 2004).
The large difference in the role of institutional funds at public and
private institutions is most likely because of a substantial amount of
general-purpose state and local government funds that public institutions
receive and decide to use for R&D. Both public and private institutions
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Figure 5.2 R&D systems in the US: paradigm shifts (source: Shapira 2004a).
I 
received approximately 7 per cent of their respective support from indus-
try in 2001. Since the early 1980s, the Federal share of support has
declined.
Yet this latest phase cannot be dissociated with the decreasing level of
Federal funding which has been matched by a rise in industry-funded
research (NSF 2004), a pattern similar to that in the UK. The effects of
this trend have been, according to Florida (1999, 3), that industry has been
more involved in sponsored research and universities have been focused
more on licensing and patenting their technology and creating spin-offs to
raise money. Some of this is ploughed back into the university system in
order to strengthen research areas that are of interest to industry (pages
5–6).
The quality of the response to the territorial role varies across institu-
tions. The South Technology Council (STC) (a consortium of Southern
states) has been conducting evaluations of science and technology pro-
grammes since the mid-1990s. One involved using a reputation approach
to determine exemplary institutions (see Tornatzky 2003, 237). The
judging panel were asked to identify which institutions they felt were
‘actively and successfully participating in, or linked to state and local eco-
nomic development’. The majority are public, with only Stanford and
Carnegie Mellon being private universities. Half are in the top 20 acade-
mic institutions in R&D expenditures and all but Carnegie Mellon (85th)
are in the top 50. The best practitioners were Carnegie Mellon University,
Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), North Carolina Univer-
sity, Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University, Purdue Univer-
sity, Stanford University, Texas A&M University, University of
California-San Diego, University of Utah, University of Wisconsin, Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Tornatzky (2003) explains
that factors which are associated with this ranking range from mission
statements which espouse relationship with industry to programmes which
connect undergraduates with local industry. Yet studies of evidence for
the enthusiasm of the regional role suggest this has been espoused more
by administrators than by faculty, who were much less enthusiastic about
business partnerships with industry and a market-driven university
(Bozeman 2000, 639).
Examples of universities that have been involved in transforming
economies are San Diego, which has gone from a military-dominated to a
high-tech economy, Georgia and, more generally, the biotech sector. The
University of San Diego’s CONNECT programme, established in 1985, is
the most successful of a regional strategy (see Walshok 2002). It has been
adopted in several other countries such as Scotland where the University
of Edinburgh’s CONNECT programme is supported by several other
Scottish universities, the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council, eco-
nomic development agencies, business advisers and financial institutions
(OECD 1999, 88):
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Founded in 1985 at the urging of San Diego’s business community,
UCSD CONNECT is widely regarded as the nation’s most successful
regional program linking high-technology and life science entre-
preneurs with the resources they need for success: technology, money,
markets, management, partners, and support services. Part of the Uni-
versity of California, San Diego (UCSD), CONNECT has a dual role
in accelerating growth: it provides added value and delivers targeted,
high-level expertise to San Diego’s technology business community by
teaming up with the region’s most prominent industry-specific organi-
zations and individuals, and by partnering with world-class UCSD
resources, such as the School of Medicine, Jacobs School of Engin-
eering, San Diego Super Computer Center, and Scripps and Salk
Institutes.
CONNECT’s services are tailored to meet the varying needs of San
Diego entrepreneurs at all stages of their business life cycles and
growth. Since its inception, CONNECT has assisted more than 800
technology companies. Its programs serve as a catalyst for the devel-
opment and exchange of ideas, a forum to explore new business
avenues and partnerships, and an opportunity to network with peers.
www.connect.org/about/index.htm
Shapira (2005b) shows how universities are part of the state of Georgia’s
strategy for regional technology promotion. This includes the develop-
ment of entrepreneurial research universities such as Georgia Tech and
creating knowledge pools for technological innovation. Shapira identifies
the following factors: a substantial increase in state technology spending
and the evolution into a comprehensive technological development strat-
egy, aimed to make Georgia a premier location for advanced technology
development. The vision is that, by 2010, Georgia will be ‘Among top five
states with a technology-based economy’ (sentiments echoed by many of
the RDAs in the UK). The Georgia Research Alliance (GRA) is a collab-
orative state initiative with six research universities in Georgia, established
1991. Its aim is to use research infrastructure to generate business and eco-
nomic development in targeted technologies, i.e. advanced telecommuni-
cations, biotechnology, environmental technologies and existing
industries. It includes the encouragement of inter-university collaboration,
engagement with industry, the attraction of eminent research scholars and
research teams, supplementary endowments (this initiative preceded the
‘Bucks for Brains’ programme in Kentucky, Chapter 8), the development
of research facilities, including new technology centers and a Technology
Development Investment programme which funds the university side of
collaborative industry research programmes. Investment in the 1990s
amounted to more than $200 million by Federal and state government and
by industry, including $126 million invested by the state.
Shapira concludes that the GRA has been successful in a number of
134 The United States
areas, such as prompting private initiatives – e.g. private incubators,
venture capital (VC), and repeat entrepreneurs. These successes have high
symbolic value. On the other hand, Shapiro also finds that the effects are
geographically concentrated, being mainly focused in Atlanta, and that the
Alliance targets advanced research rather than diffusion of knowledge
(which also favours Atlanta). He also argues that there are a number of
weaknesses in the local system of governance.
Biotechnology is the sector most obviously targeted at the regional
level in the US (see for example Malinowski 2000: 17). Some 16 states
used a portion of their tobacco settlement to fund bioscience-related
research and development (three have also targeted technology transfer
and commercialization). Examples are Michigan Life Sciences Strategy,
Ohio’s bio-medical research and technology transfer trust fund, and the
Kentucky ‘Bucks for Brains’ programme. In Kentucky, $5 million has gone
to the Cancer Centre from the state and another $15 million has come
from the James Graham Brown Cancer Foundation, a university charity.
The effect is that the diversity of funding across the US enables weaker
universities to get funding for research and establish centres of excellence
in ways that are not possible in the UK.
State-level initiatives are also designed to boost the economy through
supporting research and the biotech industry. Nearly every state in the US
now has some institutionalized support for the industry. A survey of 77
local and 36 state economic development agencies reported that 83 per
cent have listed biotechnology as one of their top two targets for industrial
development (Grudkova 2001). Table 5.5 illustrates the complexity of
state level initiatives though the examples of California and Massachu-
setts. The downside of this level of interest is that such an emphasis on
biotechnology has resulted in ‘bidding wars’ between states that attempt to
entice firms to relocate by offering financial incentives (Feldman and
Ronzio 2001, 11).
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that, since at least the nineteenth century, US uni-
versities and industry have shared common interests. The convergence of
their separate worlds has increased and, according to many commentators,
is a key source of the US’s competitive advantage. In addition to the rising
costs of research and a more general tendency for industry to externalize
its R&D, US-specific factors which have brought about a greater integra-
tion of activity within the innovation process are legislative change for
example on the ownership and control of intellectual property, the expan-
sion of joint university–industry programmes, massive funding for univer-
sity research from the Federal government and industry, particularly in
defence and more recently life sciences. At the same time, universities’
pursuit of an economic agenda has gained legitimacy (Etzkowitz et al.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2000) at the state level. In economically weaker states, such as Georgia,
universities are being used to spearhead economic development being
closely engaged in evolving state-level governance activities.
At the same time, as in the UK, issues of accountability and concerns
about the public good have been documented. Bozeman (2000, 650), for
example, has written, ‘Public policies of the 1980s and 1990s unleashed the
cooperative technology policy genie from the bottle and research shows
that some wishes have been granted. But genies, not just wishes, bear
watching.’ As Powers (2003) points out, some states are so eager to
advance an economic agenda that they can turn a blind eye to the conflicts
this creates.
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6 Labour markets in Europe and
the United States
Human Capital is Europe’s most important asset
(Spring 2005 European Council)
Introduction
This chapter focuses on perhaps the most important but relatively under
emphasized role of universities in economic development – that of the
supply, training and mobility of human capital. As this chapter will show,
that what industry might need from universities is ‘talent not technology’
(Florida 2002) is increasingly recognized by the European Commission, at
the national level in European countries and in the US, and in both contin-
ents in individual regions and localities. Evidence for the importance of
access to highly skilled people comes from Simmie et al.’s (2002) analysis
of innovation in five European cities (Amsterdam, Milan, Paris, Stuttgart
and London), which found that, of the 25 reasons why firms would choose
to locate the development of a new innovation in their city region, avail-
ability of professional experts specializing in technology scored the
highest.
The potential for universities to contribute to the supply, training and
mobility of highly skilled people is affected by a number of factors relating
to the geographical scale at which processes are occurring. The potential
supply of graduate labour is mediated by the research and teaching profile
of universities and the potential match with the firms within a local or
regional economy (see Beeson and Montgomery 1993) which changes over
time. The degree of match is influenced by the extent to which labour
markets are geographically bounded, to which industries are localized or
dispersed, and by inter-disciplinary differences in employee mobility and
inter-sectoral variations in firms’ propensity to recruit graduates.
Employer demand is influenced by many factors, including the national
and international economic climate, historic patterns of national develop-
ment and structural change, and corporate competitiveness, both in the
commercial market and in the labour market (Pearson et al. 2001).
The supply of training is affected by similar sorts of factors, which include
the level of demand from local industry or financial incentives by govern-
ment to meet existing and nascent demands. Mobility has a number of
dimensions: universities as ‘talent magnets’ for both students and highly
qualified people, especially in increasingly important international labour
markets, through participation in international training and mobility pro-
grammes, and allowing facilitation of ‘hybrid occupational labour markets’
whereby scientists and engineers work in their own firms or in other firms
while retaining their academic posts (Lanciano-Morandat and Nohara
2002a). These authors describe the scientific labour market as a ‘bridging
institution’ between academia and industry for the co-production and
transfer of knowledge and competences.
The distributed innovation process
The economic argument is that the effectiveness of innovation processes is
improved by an increase in the level of skills in the economy through a
number of direct and indirect effects (see Chapter 2). The skill composi-
tion of the workforce affects the technology used by firms, as skilled and
educated workers are better able to absorb knowledge and implement new
technologies (see Woznaik 1984; Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987; Dankbaar
2004). Hence, universities may increase local productivity growth, if, as
suggested by Lucas (1988), the ability to develop and implement new tech-
nologies depends on the average level of human capital in the economy.
Therefore, firms in areas with strong universities may have an advantage
in implementing new technologies, thereby increasing their growth and
potentially further demand for more graduates. This, however, depends on
the level of demand in the economy for skills.
A general trend in Europe and the US is the number of jobs requiring
S&E skills. In the US, the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) (2001)
reported that the S&E labour force was growing by almost 5 per cent per
year, while the rest of the labour force was growing at just over 1 per
cent. The BLS projected that S&E occupations would increase at three
times the rate of all occupations. The projected rise by the BLS was 2.2
million, representing a 47 per cent increase in the number of S&E jobs by
2010. The rates of increase between 1980 and 2000 ranged from 18 per
cent for the life sciences to 123 per cent for jobs in mathematics and com-
puter science.
Diversity in innovation systems
Variations by country in the supply of skills, both in absolute numbers and
in the relative distribution between academic fields, is a crucial factor in
the functioning of innovation processes and national economic perform-
ance (Chapter 3). Moreover, industrial training and the ability to attract
non-national students and academic staff have also been found to be
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highly significant in the quality of R&D undertaken by industry in science
and engineering.
Supply of graduates
In both Europe and the US, the number of undergraduates, overall and in
S&E subjects in particular, is increasing as the link between education and
economic development has become a central policy agenda. In 2002, the
EU15 produced 2.14 million S&E graduates, compared to 2.07 million in
the US. The UK produces the most S&E graduates in Europe (some
504,000), closely followed by France (500,000) with Germany third
(300,000). These three countries account for almost two-thirds of the EU
total. The UK also has the third highest proportion of tertiary graduates in
science and technology per 1,000 of the population aged between 20 and
29 (21.1 per cent), behind Ireland (24.2 per cent) and France (22.2 per
cent), compared to 10.9 per cent in the US and 13.2 per cent in Japan. The
rate of increase in scientific and technological graduates during the 1990s,
however, varied between countries, with virtual stagnation in Germany,
moderate growth in the UK and sustained growth in France (Lanciano-
Morandat and Nohara 2002a).
Within those broad categories are considerable variations in discipline
and recruitment patterns. In the UK for example, HESA data shows that
in 2002–3, the UK had a total of 125,860 HE students studying biological
sciences. Of these, 5,590 came from other European counties and a similar
number from outside the EU. Over a fifth (25,300) were post-graduate stu-
dents. In spite of the rapid expansion in the area, this is less than the
number taking engineering and technology degrees (131,575). Research
across the EU for the European Commission shows that there are short-
ages in particular skills such as IT, and under-utilization of other, expen-
sively developed skills such as life sciences and some areas of engineering
(Pearson et al. 2001), indicating mismatches in supply and demand for
graduates and training. This problem was expected to be exacerbated by
the growing demand for bioscience skills. It has been predicted that
Europe could have three million biotech jobs by 2005, a huge leap from
400,000 in 1995 (Woods undated).
Moreover, two of the main findings of the Roberts Report (2002, 2) on
the supply of people with science, technology, engineering and mathemat-
ics skills suggest that the UK system is inefficient in meeting those short-
ages. These are that there are insufficiently attractive career opportunities
in research for highly qualified scientists and engineers, particularly in the
context of increasingly strong demand from other sectors for their skills;
and science and engineering graduates’ and post-graduates’ education
does not lead them to develop transferable skills and knowledge required
by R&D employers.
It was not until April 2004 that the major UK public funding agency for
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science and engineering in universities, the Engineering and Physical Sci-
ences Research Council (EPSRC), announced that it would be significantly
strengthening the links between post-graduates and industry and enabling
universities to partner industry more effectively (www.epsrc.ac.uk/
PostgraduateTraining/default.htm). The means chosen to do this is the
Collaborative Teaching Accounts. The idea is that, instead of compart-
mentalizing individual schemes, a university can bid for a single collabora-
tive account and manage the funds awarded across a range of activities
and departments. This amalgamates five current schemes – the Engin-
eering Doctorates, CASE, Knowledge Partnerships, Masters Training
Packages and research assistant intern secondments. Thus universities
which are successful in bidding have greater scope for formulating their
own strategies for human capital development, but will require consider-
able resources to be allocated for this purpose.
In the US, the number of undergraduate engineering degrees has fallen
from a peak in 1985 at 77,572 to 59,258 in 2001 (4.7 per cent of bachelor
degrees awarded) (NSF 2004). Physical sciences, which at their peak in
1966 accounted for 3 per cent of bachelor degrees awarded, have declined
steadily to 1.1 per cent. Graduate enrolment in S&E programmes,
however, has increased. Levels reached a new peak of nearly 455,400 stu-
dents in 2002, having recovered from the downward trend of 1994 to 1998
(NSF 2004). This represents a 6 per cent gain over enrolment in 2001 and a
5 per cent gain over the previous peak, in 1993, of about 435,700 students.
The number of post-doctoral appointees in S&E fields in US institutions
reached a total of 32,100 in 2002, also an all-time high. Table 6.1 shows the
breakdown of graduate student enrolment in the US.
Graduate enrolment in the US in 2002 grew in all major S&E fields and
in nearly all subfields. Engineering and mathematical sciences led in per-
centage gains, both rising more than 9 per cent over the previous year.
Other fast-growing fields were computer sciences and biological sciences,
which each increased by 6 per cent. At master’s level, engineering
accounted for 13.5 per cent, physical sciences 8.3 per cent and biological
sciences 16.0 per cent. The number of doctoral degrees in engineering
peaked in 1996 with 6,309 before declining to 5,501 in 2001 (13.5 per cent
compared to 10.6 per cent). The number of doctoral degrees in physical
sciences declined slightly too, thus representing a declining share of doc-
toral programmes (8 per cent in 2001 compared to nearly 10 per cent in
1986), when biological sciences accounted for 16 per cent of doctoral
degrees awarded. Overall, the number of S&E doctoral degrees awarded
by US academic institutions in 2001 was essentially the same as in 1993.
Moreover, only about a quarter are employed in firms, while nearly two-
thirds were employed in academic positions following graduation but were
increasingly faced with having to accept temporary academic posts. This is
a similar situation to that in the UK but in the UK the rate of post-
doctoral graduates leaving the university is much higher owing to the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































shortage of longer-term posts (Lanciano-Morandat and Nohara 2002a).
These authors reporting on NSF data for 2000 find that overall in the US
the recruitment of PhDs by industry is increasing, but varies by subject.
For example, the share of PhDs in engineering entering industry is greater
than that of PhDs in science: 57 per cent of those with doctorates in engin-
eering were working in the private sector in 1997 compared with 40 per
cent for computer science and 20 per cent for the life sciences. In Germany
far fewer doctorates in engineering stay in academia. Enders (2001) in
Lanciano-Morandat and Nohara (2002a), shows that one year after obtain-
ing their doctorates, some 60 per cent of engineering graduates are
employed in the private sector, while 60 per cent of biology and mathe-
matics PhDs stay in the public sector, mainly in universities.
For the European Union to compete with the US, the targets are to
increase the number of students, eliminate the unnecessary fragmentation
and compartmentalization in research and teaching policies, raise the
quality of education and encourage mobility between students and indus-
try and between member states through the establishment of European
Higher Education Area (EHEA). This policy links the goal of improving
economic performance to human capital formation from undergraduate to
professional development. Its objectives were set out in November 2001
when the Directorate General of Education and Culture of the European
Commission released a working document, ‘From Prague to Berlin, the
EU Contribution’, which outlined ten concrete measures the Commission
would take in order to bring the Bologna process forward (www.bologna-
berlin2003.de/pdf/Zgaga.pdf). The most radical of these is the adoption of
a system of easily readable and comparable degrees with first degrees no
shorter than three years and a system of credits; a European Credit Trans-
fer System (ECTS), and the elimination of remaining obstacles to the
mobility of students and teachers.
Within Europe member states are at different stages in being able to
comply with these measures. The UK, for example, is in some ways ahead
of the Bologna process, particularly in the structure of new degrees, in the
standard three-year undergraduate degree and in accreditation of qualifi-
cations. The UK has introduced two-year foundation degrees, making
them the main work-focused higher education qualification. These are not
bachelor’s degrees but could be upgraded to bachelor’s degrees with four
more terms of study. The UK with its standard three-year degree pro-
gramme, which is what the Bologna process requires, will not have to
make fundamental changes like other countries such as Germany, France,
Italy and Eastern European countries, where the norm is degrees taking
five, six or seven years. On the other hand, a concern for the UK is
whether one-year master’s degrees will be seen as being of less value.
Some problems in harmonization of procedures for validating degrees are
likely as the UK’s system is generally not one which measures length of
time in study as opposed to the outcomes of that study (SBS 2004b).
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The adoption of the Bologna process is likely to be more difficult in
Germany than in the UK because of the split in German higher education
between universities and Fachhochschulen which have degree courses of
different lengths and different balances between theoretical and practical
education. Typically initial university degrees take five or six years to com-
plete. Germany does, however, have a more established tradition of par-
ticipation in student programmes such as Erasmus which may be
important in the propensity of German students to capitalize on employ-
ment opportunities in the EHEA.
France’s reform of its higher education system will make it more like
the proposed European higher education system. This is being imple-
mented on the basis of a new legal framework informed by a set of decrees
in 2002 (www.esib.org/BPC/Countries/france/France2.pdf). The major fea-
tures of reform include a new degree (the master’s degree which can be
professionally or research orientated); the organization of all the higher
education studies into semesters and course units; the general implementa-
tion of ECTS in the design and meaning of new degrees; the delivery of
the Diploma Supplement if international mobility is at stake; the general
principal of regular national assessment of HE institutions; and the
broader principle of validation of previous studies and personal experi-
ences of students.
Graduate education and training
Different models of university systems produce different kinds of connec-
tions via the scientific labour market between universities and industry.
Some are more hierarchical than others. Lanciano-Morandat and
Nohara’s (2002a) study illustrates a number of distinctive features of the
organization of career paths in different countries.
In German extra-industry research institutions the academic labour
market is organized by the supervisory authorities, which operate on two
different levels: ‘the federal government lays down a general framework of
rules and procedures governing the university system, a framework within
which the individual Länder or states are able to develop a certain number
of options. The Länder are also very active in negotiating professors’
salaries, since they are requested by the universities to find the necessary
funds’ (Musselin 1990 in Lanciano-Morandat and Nohara 2002a). The
relationship with industry is determined by the university career path
leading to the status of professor that is the obligatory route for all acade-
mics and which allows individuals subsequently to be considered for posi-
tions of responsibility in extra-university research institutions funded by
the state or by industry, such as the Max Planck Institute, the Helmholtz
Centres and the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft and so on. It is through these
public or semi-public research organizations that German industry
receives a steady flow of professors, doctoral students and post-docs as
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part of a process of cross-fertilization that reflects the close co-operation
between science and industry.
Lanciano-Morandat and Nohara (2002a) find that in the US, the acade-
mic labour market is characterized both by different missions of teaching
and research institutions and by the tenure system, which offers young
academics in research institutions an incentive to produce knowledge.
Unlike in France or Germany, ‘where the discourse is egalitarian and
where the universities are all supposed to be of comparable quality and to
award degrees of the same value’ (Brisset-Sillon 1997), universities in the
US are systematically ranked, which has the effect of hierarchizing and
segmenting the academic labour market (page 14).
Yet, at the same time, an increasing share of undergraduate, doctoral
and post-doctoral students in European and American universities are
being supported by joint industry/university programmes. Dedicated
national programmes designed to increase the degree by which such skill
acquisition is subsidized by the state include those in which university
personnel supervise graduate or undergraduate students who are located
in the collaborating firm’s premises. Some of the best-known examples
include, at the undergraduate level, the Co-op scheme which began at
Waterloo University in Canada. This has now spread worldwide and aims
to achieve closer relations between business and universities by requiring
undergraduates to spend one or more terms in monitored employment.
At the doctoral level examples include France’s CIFRE scheme and the
UK’s CASE (Co-operative Awards in Science and Engineering). (Les
conventions industrielles de formation par la recherche (CIFRE) partner-
ships are managed by ANRT (National Association of Technical
Research) on behalf of the Ministry in charge of Research. The pro-
gramme allows a doctoral student to carry out his or her thesis in a
company by carrying out a research and development programme in con-
nection with a team of researchers within the company.) An example of
post-doctoral programmes is the UK’s TCS (now the Knowledge Transfer
Partnership (KTP) programme) (see Chapter 3). (This is dedicated to
helping SMEs and industry in general innovate through collaboration
with the universities, colleges and research organizations that could be of
value in developing new products, services and processes. See
www.ktponline.org.uk.) Mason (2000) found that British doctoral stu-
dents are more likely than their French counterparts to be involved in
industrial projects, particularly with SMEs in electronics and biotechnol-
ogy industries, which has a knock-on effect of increasing the likelihood of
students looking to industry for employment on the completion of their
studies.
An increasing number of international student programmes are
designed to increase interaction and integration of cultures between uni-
versities or public research centres and industry (see below). Profit-
orientated programmes provided by universities for in-service training for
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employees in industry or business include extension programmes and
continuing professional development (CPD).
In the US, a study by the Battelle Memorial Institute and the State
Science and Technology Institute (2001, 18) reports that bioscience work-
force initiatives have been introduced addressing the skills supply issue.
These include the establishment of two-year associate’s degree pro-
grammes, for example, in Massachusetts and 13 other states, and changes
in curricula at colleges and universities to reflect better the workforce
needs of bioscience firms. Examples of changes in higher education
include a PhD programme in biotechnology offered by two universities in
Maine and a new master’s programme focused on biotechnology in New
York, and outreach programmes for bioscience companies to determine
skill training and education needs (Florida and New York).
Mobility
Improving mobility is a central plank in the EU’s and many countries’
labour market and educational policies. Numerous OECD countries have
designed policies for attracting various types of talent (students,
researchers, IT specialists, research scientists etc.), such as tax incentives,
repatriation schemes and improving the attractiveness of academic careers
(OECD 2004). Bachtler (2004) finds that talent attraction of star acade-
mics, researchers and highly skilled workers is increasingly replacing
inward investment attraction as a key role for regional development agen-
cies (Young and Brown 2002).
The objective of improving mobility in Europe has been addressed by a
number of vocational training programmes. In recent years there has been
a growing emphasis on adult education and training (Table 6.2).
Take-up of these programmes is uneven, as participation in the
Erasmus programme illustrates (Table 6.3). France, Spain, Germany and
Italy have the largest numbers of students going to study elsewhere, the
UK has less than half the number of those countries, while Sweden with a
population of nearly nine million has proportionally far fewer than
Belgium with just over ten million. Mason (2000, 26) argues that student
mobility between EU countries increases the chances of host country
employers recruiting foreign national engineers and scientists after they
have graduated from universities with which they (the employers) are
familiar. He does, however, find that student mobility is still marginal and
that mobility per se does not necessarily have beneficial effects. In 2000,
only 2.3 per cent of European students were pursuing their studies in
another European country and, while the mobility of researchers is higher
than that of the average of the population concerned, it is still lower than
it is in the US. Mason also reports that many European countries are char-
acterized by a high degree of labour immobility even within national
borders. Such difficulties are conceivably more likely to be overcome in



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the case of highly qualified occupations than in any other type of occupa-
tion, particularly if the cross-border movement takes the form of job
changes within particular multi-national enterprises. Therefore mobility in
the EU is so far not a major influence in developing a ‘hybrid labour
market’.
Compared to the US, the potential for integration of the interests of
universities and industries in Europe is limited by the quality of the
research or study environment and by terms of employment. European
universities offer researchers and students a less attractive environment
than in the US. The EC (2003a, 77) states that ‘In several countries, such
as Finland, Italy, Germany and Austria (and until recently France), mobil-
ity between universities and industry is frequently hampered, especially
for the academic partner. Most university professors and other employees
have the status of civil servants, and are neither encouraged nor allowed to
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Table 6.3 Erasmus student mobility numbers: 2000/1–2002/3
Home country 2000/1 2001/2 2002/3
Austria 3,026 3,026 3,312
Belgium 4,417 4,551 4,653
Bulgaria 398 622 612
Cyprus 0 72 91
Czech Republic 2,001 2,533 3,002
Denmark 1,750 1,752 1,847
Estonia 255 274 302
Finland 3,286 3,291 3,402
France 17,179 18,220 19,396
Germany 15,890 16,641 18,494
Greece 1,922 1,974 2,115
Hungary 1,996 1,736 1,830
Iceland 134 147 163
Ireland 1,648 1,708 1,627
Italy 13,237 13,951 15,217
Latvia 182 209 232
Liechtenstein 12 17 7
Lithuania 624 823 1,001
Luxembourg 28 30 33
Malta 92 129 72
Netherlands 4,162 4,244 4,241
Norway 1,007 970 1,010
Poland 3,691 4,323 5,419
Portugal 2,569 2,825 3,171
Romania 1,899 1,965 2,701
Slovakia 505 578 654
Slovenia 227 364 422
Spain 16,383 17,405 18,258
Sweden 2,726 2,633 2,656
United Kingdom 9,028 8,479 7,957
Total 110,274 115,492 123,897
work temporarily within industry’. Moreover, Mason finds that the labour
markets for qualified scientists and engineers in various EU countries are
linked in important ways to non-EU countries, casting doubt on the exist-
ence of a specifically ‘European’ labour market. He reports that evidence
shows that many Europeans migrate to the US.
For example, the UK has a low level of international mobility within
the EU. Consistently with the pattern of relatively low participation in
Erasmus programmes, Mason (2000) reports that the UK has been found
to be rather less committed to the process of ‘Europeanizing’ science and
engineering activities than many other EU countries. In particular, the
logic of the UK’s university finance regime tends to promote the recruit-
ment of non-EU foreign students (who pay full tuition fees) against
recruitment of EU students who are eligible for public subsidies. Further-
more, one of the many consequences of the greater pressure on British
national laboratories to generate short-term commercial income – at the
expense of involvement in basic and strategic research – has been a reduc-
tion in interactions with non-national qualified scientists and engineers.
On the other hand, Mason concludes that, in terms of British performance
in high-tech industries such as electronics, the results of cross-country
comparisons show that the UK’s relative lack of involvement in cross-
border student mobility and knowledge flows within Europe is more than
offset by the impact of non-EU foreign investment in the UK together
with the advantages to internal knowledge transfer which arise from high
levels of mobility between enterprises.
Moreover, in their study of electronics firms in France and the UK,
Mason et al. (2004) found that the greater proactivity of UK academics in
seeking out industrial funding was in part responsible for faster and
broader external network building with firms diversifying their knowledge-
sourcing activities. Mason et al. suggest that this may account for the
improved position of the UK’s electronics industry over France. They also
conclude (page 70):
in the British case some of the mechanisms contributing strongly to
high levels of labour mobility and university-enterprises research
interactions – such as the prevalence of temporary contracts for young
researchers in higher education and the financial pressures on univer-
sities in general – are associated with a relatively weak level of invest-
ment in basic and strategic research in the UK. In the long-term, this
could prove to be an Achilles heel contributing to deficiencies in
knowledge generation and the ability of UK-based establishments to
absorb relevant knowledge produced elsewhere.
The US in proportion attracts many more students from other countries at
advanced levels in engineering, mathematics and informatics, and is suc-
cessful in retraining more persons with doctorate qualifications: some 50
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per cent of Europeans who obtained their qualifications in the US stay
there for several years, and many of them remain permanently. Yet, in
spite of the fact that many European academics have studied in the US,
this has not in any major way brought the European system in line with
that of the US. Herbst (2004, 17) argues that European universities
‘cannot easily replicate the learning path that propelled the US research
university to prominence’.
The growth in the S&E labour force has been maintained at a rate well
above the rate of producing S&E degrees because a large number of
foreign-born S&E graduates have migrated to the US. Between 1990 and
2000 the proportion of foreign-born people with bachelor’s degrees in
S&E occupations rose from 11 to 17 per cent; the proportion of foreign-
born people with master’s degrees rose from 19 to 29 per cent; and the
proportion of foreign-born people with PhDs rose from 24 to 38 per cent.
This is one area where the US is performing less well than competitor
countries. Since the 1980s other countries have increased investment in
S&E education and the S&E workforce at higher rates than the US.
Between 1993 and 1997 the OECD countries increased their number of
S&E research jobs 23 per cent, more than twice the 11 per cent increase in
S&E research jobs in the US (www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsb0407/start.htm).
The US tops five countries which are host to more than 70 per cent of all
foreign students in OECD countries. The country attracts 29 per cent of
foreign students, followed by the UK (14 per cent) and Germany (12 per
cent). English-speaking countries account for over 50 per cent of the OECD
total (OECD 2001a). In 2004, a survey by the US Council of Graduate
Schools found that graduate schools saw a 28 per cent decline in applica-
tions from international students and an 18 per cent drop in admissions,
damaging many universities’ graduate programmes. The number of admit-
ted students from China dropped 34 per cent; from India, 19 per cent; and
from Korea, 12 per cent from 2003 to 2004. In engineering, which was
particularly badly hit, the number of admitted students dropped 24 per cent.
Programmes in the sciences reported application decreases averaging 20 per
cent. Explanations include changes to the visa application process after
‘9/11’, a perception that the US has grown less welcoming of foreigners and
increased competition from universities abroad (www.usatoday.com/news/
education/2004-09-07-grad-schools-foreigners_x.htm).
Accountability
Co-existing with the increasing emphasis of the universities as suppliers of
skills to the economy is a changing construction of accountability, with a
growing emphasis on the territorial role, albeit with geographically uneven
impacts. The example of policy debates conducted in the UK and the US
illustrates how responsiveness and accountability to industry has become a
central theme in policy making.
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The UK
Whereas university departments and individual academics have the
responsibility for course and lecture content, the advent of new-style of
degree courses, such as foundation degrees, brings with it a clear intent
that design must reflect the needs of employers and that this strategy
should be developed at the regional level. The 2003 White Paper on The
future of higher education proposed that employers should have input to
the design of two-year foundation degree courses. The LDA response to
the White Paper identifies a clear role for RDAs to help co-ordinate a
private sector response, particularly where competing interests might
inhibit such involvement, or to support HEIs themselves more directly.
Moreover, the intention is that there should be greater co-operation
between regions, with the suggestion that cross-regional co-operation in
the design of foundation degree courses would be particularly beneficial.
The political realization of the importance of training is illustrated by
the Framework for Regional Employment and Skills Action (FRESA)
(now replaced by Regional Skills Alliances) which the regional develop-
ments have been obliged to formulate with their partner organizations.
For example, the 2002 FRESA plan for the South East identifies a number
of objectives or priorities linked to improving the coherence of the rela-
tionship between HE or FE institutions and the business community. This
quotation from the FRESA document is typical of the kinds of responsive-
ness envisaged:
Colleges and universities should be granted more flexible funding to
respond efficiently and effectively to employer requirements and raise
the attainment of vocational and intermediate skills at level 3, key to
raising productivity. Funding formulae also needs to reflect the
increased demand for short ‘bite sized’ courses.
(www.seeonline.net/learning/ActionSouthEast/Publications)
While the RDAs have been given an important role in skills development,
the RDAs’ Skills Development Funds amounted only to £26 million
between the eight RDAs and remains small. Moreover, the potential co-
ordination of activity between universities and industry is limited because
Learning and Skills Councils are not responsible for training in the HE
sector or for addressing graduate-level training needs. Organization at the
regional scale, moreover, is not without problems. Within the UK, because
of the complexity of regions as defined by RDA boundaries, demand 
for HE skills might be at the local rather than the regional level (Potts
2002, 997).
A swingeing criticism of the UK system of education and confusion of
objectives, the simplication of role of education and the direct relationship
between the amount of education in a society and economic growth comes
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from Wolf (2002, 249). Such criticisms can be levelled also at the Bologna
process. Her argument is that expansion in higher education is ineffective
in economic terms compared to investment in core skills at primary and
secondary levels, and has little to do with social justice and quality of life.
She argues that ‘low level, uniform funding of a vast sector precludes first-
rate facilities in which to train first-rate students and deters such students
from entering university research and teaching’. Similar problems exist
throughout the system: it has been argued that the UK ‘government’s
skills strategy is qualification-led rather than skills-led’ (Willis quoted in
Tysome 2003a). Moreover, the downside of massification of HE in the UK
is that, although it is designed to feed professional, managerial, associate
professional, technical and some craft occupation labour markets, it has
the negative effect that the rest are seen as low-status and low-paid work
(Keep and Mayhew 2004).
The US
Recent debates have been around the extent to which the US govern-
ment should subsidize training to overcome the shortage of qualified
scientific and engineering workers, an issue relevant to all countries
because of its implications for how universities should be required to
tailor their teaching to meet the needs of industry – and hence be
accountable if those needs are not met. The issue has been the subject of
the 2003 National Science Board (NSB) report, The Science and Enginer-
ing Workforce: Realising America’s Potential, and a paper by Romer
(1999) as well as by economic strategy reviews by individual states such
as Connecticut.
Romer’s argument is that the supply response of American HE has not
only been inadequate, it has also been perverse, in the sense of withhold-
ing supply when demand is rising, as was demonstrated above (see Stodder
undated). It has erred by subsidizing the private-sector demand for scien-
tists and engineers without asking whether the educational system pro-
vides the supply response necessary for these subsidies to work. Romer
puts forward the view that university politics have constrained science and
engineering departments from adequately expanding their student enrol-
ments, pushing them instead to over-invest in ‘quality’ and scholarly
research – although he points out that, as in the UK, undergraduates in
natural sciences and engineering must be convinced that this kind of
degree can lead to better career outcomes than the ‘dead-end postdoctoral
positions that have become increasingly common in some fields’ (page 32).
He finds that the challenge for the universities is not to increase the total
number of PhDs but to increase the proportion of them that can put their
skills to work in private-sector R&D. Likewise Stephan (2001, 203) argues
that ‘science has a long tradition of producing graduates who have a con-
tempt for jobs in industry. This widespread attitude has contributed to
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poorly-functioning labour markets for newly educated scientists – espe-
cially in the life sciences, where post-docs are bountiful.’
Stodder (undated) looks at the evidence in relation to two of Romer’s
points. He finds that, in contrast to Romer’s assertions of universality, there
are sector and regional (state) differences in supply conditions. His study
related educational supply to educational demand through associated job
clusters within 47 states and Washington DC. He found that post-graduate
degrees in sciences are highly responsive to research spending – the supply
rises when research funding increases. On the other hand, associate degrees
in engineering are highly responsive to salary – much more responsive than
demand. It follows that the demand target to the appropriate incentive and
degree level will be met with an elastic (responsive) supply. His conclusion
is that for some scientific and engineering labour markets, educational
supply may be more salary-elastic than industry demand. In such cases sub-
sidizing demand at the state level rather than supply will provide more
employees at a reasonable cost in the shortest possible time. Directly subsi-
dizing supply, however, yields a longer-term increase in the stock of human
capital and reduction in wage differentials, with lags of up to a decade.
Stodder argues for directing demand towards the basic end of profes-
sional qualifications, to associate degrees and short-terms certificates, and
concurs with the Batelle Report (2001) that there is a need to expand busi-
ness input into the education process. He finds that this is the practice in
leading states such as California, Maryland, Illinois and Virginia, whereas
some richer states lag behind in the provision of associate degrees. Con-
necticut for example, with the highest income per capita in the US, pro-
vided no associate degrees in the sciences in 1996–7. Thus Stodder’s study
is a partial qualification of Romer’s study in that it shows that the market
insensitivity of US HE does not hold everywhere for the supply of S&E
workers. But it does confirm Romer’s thesis in that, for post-graduate
degrees in the basic sciences, supply is sensitive to research expenditures
rather than to salary increases and for bachelor’s degrees in engineering;
the educational supply does appear ‘perverse’, reacting to salary increases
with fewer not more degrees produced; the supply of engineers is most
sensitive to salary pressure in the associate degree programmes; and there
is likely to be a regional demand effect as programmes at associate and
certificate levels have already the shortest time-to-market.
If the trends identified in Indicators 2004 continue undettered, Stodder
argues that three things will happen. The number of jobs in the US
economy that require science and engineering training will grow; the
number of US citizens prepared for those jobs will, at best, be level; and
the availability of people from other countries who have science and
engineering training will decline, either because of limits to entry imposed
by US national security restrictions or because of intense global competi-
tion for people with these skills. The US has always depended on the
inventiveness of its people in order to compete in the world marketplace.
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Now, preparation of the S&E workforce, for example by universities, is a
vital arena for national competitiveness (see also NSB 2003).
Stephan (2001) finds that that a barrier to this objective is a lack of
information. She suggests that US universities should collect data on job
placements in industry and make it available to students. The US has no
nationwide database of occupations sorted by comparable level of skill –
the US sorting of Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) is merely by
industrial area, which hinders policy formation (Stodder undated). This
problem is being addressed state by state. For example, the state of Con-
necticut has established its own grouping of occupational clusters relating
to education supplies and occupational demands through the Southern
Technology Council (STC). The STC was faced with problems of collect-
ing data from institutions in its attempts to understand why so many young
talented people were leaving the Southern states and not being replaced
by migrants from elsewhere, and had to rely on sample data from the
National Science Foundation (see Tornatzky 2003 on this point).
Moreover, as in the UK, in the US the issue of the number of university
places is politically sensitive. Bundy (2004) reports that, in his Higher Edu-
cation Policy Institute lecture, Robert Reich described how state govern-
ments have cut higher education spending, while the Federal government
has slashed Pell grants to poor students, and how there is extensive social
stratification within the university system. While the US has engaged in
massification of the university system, students from the richest 25 per cent
of families are more than ten times more likely to attend college or univer-
sity than those from the poorest quartile.
Defence and biotechnology
The expansion in the number of research units in the life and agricultural
sciences has been matched by a growth in the number of students taking
courses in these subjects and a decline in subjects with defence applica-
tions such as physical sciences and engineering. The populations of stu-
dents in particular locations are therefore also changing depending on the
degree of specialization of institutions.
In the UK, the number of students in biological science has risen sharply
from 81,750 in 1996–7 – the earliest date for which data are available – to
149,520 in 2004–5 (a 54 per cent increase). Engineering, in contrast, rose by
only 3,000 students and physical sciences rose by only 4,000 to 78,685 in
2004–5, up from 74,496 in 1996–7 (5.4 per cent) (www.hesa.ac.uk). In the
US, the number of biological science undergraduate degrees nearly doubled
between 1985 and 1998, before dropping back to 62,089 in 2001 when they,
with agricultural sciences, accounted for 6.3 per cent of bachelor degrees
awarded (www.nsf.gov).
In the US, the geographical distribution of both life science students and
defence is highly uneven. Of the three states which feature in Chapter 8,
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California is ranked top in the number of doctorates in S&T, including those
in life sciences as well as in academic R&D. Kentucky is 33rd in both under-
graduate and doctoral degrees, 30th in academic research but well above the
national average in spending on life science research. New Jersey ranks
14th, 12th and 17th respectively and has a lower than the national percent-
age of academic R&D devoted to life sciences. With regard to state rankings
in research and development funded by the DoD, and by extension the
number of staff and students working on defence related research, Califor-
nia is ranked first, Kentucky 40th and New Jersey 11th (www.nsf.gov).
Territorial role
The potential for policy intervention to develop a territorial role for uni-
versities based on graduate recruitment and retention, training and CPD is
that regions will gain if university graduates stay locally and lose if they
leave and are not replaced by sufficient numbers of incoming graduates.
Patterns of each vary considerably by country, by region and by institu-
tion, depending on which areas offer the best jobs and career prospects.
To illustrate how they vary, examples are given from the UK, France,
Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the US.
The UK
Belt et al. (2000) found wide variations in the proportion of students who
stayed in the region to go to university and of graduates who stayed in the
region following graduation. This is illustrated in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4 Proportion of graduates remaining in region of study after completing
degree and proportion of these who originate from the region
Region Proportion of graduates Proportion of those 
remaining in the region remaining who originate 
after study (%) from the region (%)
Scotland 42.7 89.5
Greater London 41.2 62.9
Northern Ireland 37.3 99.5
Wales 35.7 68.3
Rest of South East 33.7 65.1
North East 33.2 68.8
North West 33.1 68.2
Yorkshire and Humberside 30.4 50.4
South West 29.7 60.4
East Midlands 29.2 52.2
West Midlands 28.5 62.6
East Anglia 22.2 47.7
Source: Belt et al. (2000).
Of the English regions, graduate retention of migrating students tends
to be highest in Greater London and the rest of the South East, reflecting
the superior job and career prospects in these regions. On the other hand,
East Anglia, which includes Cambridge, has the lowest proportion of stu-
dents staying in their home region to study, the lowest proportion staying
in the region after study and the lowest proportion of those remaining who
originate from the region. This situation is more extreme than in any other
English region, with 42.8 per cent more students going out of the region to
study than coming into it, and with only 17.8 per cent of students living in
the region also studying in the East of England (East of England Develop-
ment Agency (EEDA) 2002). EEDA’s response to Lambert argues that
the net loss needs to be reversed given the very high graduate skills short-
ages. In contrast, the North East has a low popularity as a destination for
graduates of other regions but a relatively high retention of graduates
from local institutions. The South East and East of England contribute to
the success of London by flows of graduates into employment (see
McCann and Shepherd 2001).
A weakness in the UK generally is insufficient training and graduate
recruitment by SMEs. Nationally, between 30 per cent and 40 per cent of
firms employ no graduates but this varies between areas (CURDS 2000).
Thus intervention is appropriate for better training of undergraduates, of
graduates and of employees in industry, enabling SMEs to retain gradu-
ates and make the best use of them, facilitating technology transfer
through mobility within the labour market and linking into the further
education sector to ensure a strong value chain of skills. Central to these
activities are (1) the identification of where HEIs jointly can offer training
and (2) an intelligence-gathering role about vacancies and availability of
personnel. At the same time, other problems in the UK are inter-agency
competition, an overemphasis on delivery at the regional rather than the
local scale, plus fragmentation of effort and vested interests not wanting to
lose their patch (Potts 2003).
Some examples of where universities have identified industrial demand
for vocational courses are given in Box 6.1 (Lawton Smith 2003c):
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• In the South East, the Oxford Brookes Motorsport degree is supported
by the major motorsport companies in the region.
• The University of Westminster has developed a number of degrees that
address the particular needs of industry, for example BA (Hons) in
fashion merchandising and management, and City University offers an
MSc in mathematical trading and finance.
• Collaboration between the five university careers services in the North
East have sought to raise awareness of graduate employment opportun-
ities to regional employers and of regional SME employment opportun-
ities to students.
• The Graduates North East (GRANE) website started in 2002 has been
France
Compared to countries such as the UK, the French system of higher edu-
cation is distinctive in that it is much more local and regional (OECD
1999, 134). High levels of students attend home universities and up to two-
thirds of graduates are retained in the region in which they studied. There
are, however, inter-regional variations reflecting the size and structure of
the university sector and the economic-industrial environment. For
example, the Ile-de-France (Paris region) attracts many students from
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the chief output of the RDA-funded Graduate Retention in the North
East programme. It provides links to the university careers services
websites and other websites but does not offer a single website for
employers and students through which to pass on information about job
and placement opportunities.
• Since 1995 Newcastle and Northumbria University careers services have
collaborated on graduate recruitment and have been fully sharing
vacancy information. Around 1,000 graduates per year have received
advice.
• Yorkshire Universities have established a forum of ten universities and
three HE colleges to work together to extend their contribution to the
region. One project is HLS for Success ESF Objective 3 Project. The
purpose of this project is to build capacity within HE institutions to
deliver a Virtual Business School (VBS) for the region.
• In the East of England, a number of HEIs have links with FE colleges
to encourage continuing education. Anglia Polytechnic University is the
leader in the field with 20 FE partner colleges.
• Oxford University’s Department for Continuing Professional Develop-
ment draws on Oxford University academics to deliver master’s level
courses and part-time PhDs aimed at the high-tech sector. The strategy
is to offer part-time modular courses in new technologies or areas
where R&D is in development, for example bioinformatics, where it is
not known what the skill set is.
• The University of Greenwich Biopharmskills project was established in
June 1999 with £474,900 funding for the development phase from
SEEDA and £225,000 matched funding from the university. It forms
part of SEEDA’s skills development programme to plug critical skills
shortages within specific sectors of the economy.
• In London, the Southern Key Skills Group comprises 11 universities
and ‘brings together regional higher education institutions’ key skills
coordinators to share experiences in policy development and imple-
mentation of key skills work and to provide support and disseminate
findings regarding key skills provision’. This is in line with government
policy (the UK’s 2003 White Paper The future of higher education) that
employers should have input to the design of two-year foundation
degree courses.
other regions and retains 80 per cent of its graduates, whilst regions such
as Languedoc-Rousillon generally lack the ability to both attract students
and to retain graduates.
In 1990 the ‘University 2000’ project was launched, a long-term plan for
the development of training nationwide. Grenoble has strong local pat-
terns of recruitment and so does Sophia Antipolis where the contribution
of universities to the scientific labour market has been of increasing
importance since the relocation of research institutes and doctoral pro-
grammes of the University of Nice. This increased training capability and
reduced reliance on an inflow of highly qualified workers facilitated the
development of local-university research linkages in which students play a
significant role (Lawton Smith and De Bernardy 2000, 104).
Denmark
In Denmark, Maskell and Tornqvist (2003, 136) report that both the Copen-
hagen region and the Scania region have been able to attract more graduates
than they export, thus maintaining a balance of academic trade. This is espe-
cially so for the Copenhagen region, which has benefited from a net immigra-
tion of graduates educated outside the region. This has benefited industry as
well as public administration and the legal profession. A major outflow has
taken place within natural science (school teachers and veterinarians). The
authors find, however, that, in the Oresund region, in general firms do
without university graduates: more than three-quarters of firms employ no
graduates, while the R&D-intensive industries employ proportionally more
than other types of firms. Moreover, they found a distinct sub-regional dif-
ference: in all sub-sectors of manufacturing studied, industry in Scania had a
higher proportion of graduates than the same sub-sectors in the Copenhagen
region. This result was ascribed to a different division of labour between the
manufacturing and the knowledge-services providers and the size of the local
market. They conclude that it is not the abundance of university graduates
employed in industry that can explain the relative success of the dominant
R&D extensive, low-tech parts of the manufacturing industry in the high-cost
environment in the Oresund region. They point out that knowledge intensity
is a much broader concept and firms might employ huge stocks of accumu-
lated knowledge without employing a single graduate. They conclude that
the economic role played by universities in one of the most prosperous and
advanced regions in the world is mainly indirect. It is achieved through influ-
ence exercised on public governance, on civic culture and on informal institu-
tions rather than on private sector firms directly.
Germany
Leifner et al. (2004) identified two changes to the German pattern of
student recruitment which are influencing where students chose to study.
Labour markets in Europe and the United States 159
First, the vast majority of students (82 per cent) go to within their home
region. The absence of income from student fees mean that there are
fewer opportunities for universities to raise money to cover costs and to
offer more expensive – but different – courses. Second, German universi-
ties are not selective; they have no influence on the motivation and know-
ledge-level of first-year students, although that is changing under
modifications to the Higher Education Acts in several states. Thus, as in
the UK, growing transparency about differences in quality and reputation
following the growth of university rankings may affect where students
choose to study.
Sweden
Following a different line of the relationship between universities and
their supply of graduates, that of institutional factors which influence the
levels of graduates in the local labour market, Lindholm Dahlstrand and
Jacobsson (2003, 80) examine the changes in the supply of capabilities
approximated by changes in the volumes and orientation of graduates and
MSc and PhD levels in Gothenburg. They found an indirect process
whereby local firms, in relying on the local labour market for engineers
and scientists, generate spin-offs. This market in turn is greatly influenced
by the responsiveness of Chalmers University. They argue that the extent
of the local availability of specialized labour has a direct bearing on the
size of industrial activities in fields demanding such specialized labour – in
this case electronic engineers in microwave technology. The knock-on
effect of this is that the responsiveness of Chalmers is therefore expected
to influence, via its influence on the labour markets, the ‘size’ of the train-
ing ground, and therefore the potential number of technology-based engi-
neers. They found, however, that, during the period when demand was
high, the responsiveness to growing electronics opportunities in electronics
and computer engineering was weak. As a consequence the volume of
technology-based engineering was limited and skewed towards the
region’s traditional strength in mechanical engineering. They explain the
poor responsiveness by reference to the centralized nature of Swedish
education, by which the Department of Education controlled the volume
and specialization of undergraduate education in great detail, and the
absorption by Ericsson Microwave of many of the available engineers,
which also had a negative effect on technology-based entrepreneurship.
The US
The case of San Diego illustrates further Stodder’s assertion about state
differences in supply conditions. San Diego has a very large population of
graduate student enrolments, particularly in scientific subjects, and of
post-doctoral doing research. This is an important resource for the
160 Labour markets in Europe and the United States
region’s growing population of high-tech firms, which in 1999 employed
11,000 people. Here it is continuing education rather than graduate educa-
tion that provides one of the main inputs into innovation (Walshok et al.
2002, 40). These authors cite an earlier study which shows that continuing
education enrolments are significant and can dwarf regular full-time
undergraduate and enrolments combined. Furthermore, on a per capita
basis, regions with thriving high-tech clusters have higher extension (CPD)
enrolments in science and technology programmes than regions without
them.
CPD/Extension programmes are becoming more part of individual
states’ economic development strategies. While much of the academic and
policy focus is on the university sector’s role in educating and training its
own cohorts of students, it is slowly becoming recognized that universities
have an increasingly important role in updating skills more generally. In
the modern world, skill requirements are changing so rapidly that tradi-
tional skills and traditional ways of training and re-training are becoming
outdated. Workers at all levels need to adjust to changes in technology
methods of production and to expand their range of skills, thus providing
continuous skills improvement. This is true in skills ranging from techni-
cians through to R&D managers to CEOs. And workforce training should
be so directed that ‘all workers progress steadily up the ladder to fill jobs
requiring higher skill sets than they currently possess’ (Lee and Walshok
2002, 1).
Lee and Walshok argue that in the case of San Diego in California, the
University of California at San Diego (UCSD) and Riverside have well-
developed self-supporting Extension and Continuing Education Pro-
grammes which represent a significant contribution to human resource
development in the state. In 2001 enrolments were running at 163,303 in
UCSD and 64,670 at Riverside. While the nature of the programmes
offered in each region reflected the industry mix, most of the students
were working adults in the prime working decades of their lives. The
authors conclude that the role of the University of California in workforce
education and training, especially in science and technology-related skills
and competencies, has been understated.
In a study which does not appear to have been replicated in Europe,
research by Quigley and Rubinfeld (1993 in McCann and Shepherd 2001,
136) found considerable variations in spend on universities depending on
whether graduates were more or less mobile. They found that there was
less spending when graduates were more likely than not to leave the state
following graduation. In such locations, the reduced ability to retain stu-
dents after graduation reduces the returns to public investment in higher
education, and state government have responded accordingly.
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Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the supply, training and mobility of human
capital as the three components of what is probably the most important
contribution of universities to innovation and economic development. It
has shown that the supply of S&E graduates is increasing, particularly in
biological sciences, engineering and computer sciences, notwithstanding
decline in some subjects such as physics and chemistry in the UK (Chapter
4). This is one area where Europe leads the US (Malecki 2005). Beyond
that, a number of substantial differences are apparent between Europe as
a whole and the US, and within Europe between different countries, just
as there are between the different states in the US. For the EU, the estab-
lishment of the EHEA, as well as the ERA, is intended to improve cohe-
sion and overcome fragmentation.
In addition to reform in the structure of undergraduate and graduate
education, training and programmes designed to improve the flow of
people, skills and knowledge to industry, with a growing but still under-
developed focus on vocation and life long learning compared to the US,
are central to EU and member state policy agendas. Examples from
particular countries illustrate national weaknesses and the challenge for
European policy. The US training model is becoming pervasive, but there
are problems with demand and leakage at post-doc as well as PhD stage.
The share of PhDs that industry absorbs varies from country to country
(Lanciano-Morandat and Nohara 2002a). The chapter has presented argu-
ments that in both the US and the UK there are significant cultural and
other barriers which limit the propensity of students to be recruited by
industry.
International student mobility has the benefit of increasing the likeli-
hood of industry recruiting foreign engineers. Mason (2000) is sceptical
about how far Europe has advanced in encouraging mobility between
member states, with the US a more attractive destination. Indeed the
attraction of foreign talent is crucial to the US university system and the
economy (Malecki 2005).
It is also shown that engagement of universities with the economy at
territorial level varies enormously. Stodder demonstrates vast differences
within the US in patterns of retention, patterns replicated in Europe,
reflecting both the impact of different structures of university systems (e.g.
Germany compared to the UK) and the location of demand from industry.
Finally the chapter has also shown that the normative agenda implicit in
most of the discussion is not without its downsides. Wolf (2002) and Keep
and Mayhew (2004) in the UK and Bundy (2004) in the US all point to the
confusion of objectives arising from placing so much emphasis on universi-
ties and training. The results are an increasing social stratification within
university systems and knock-on effects on segmentation within labour
markets, both of which lead to social polarization.
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7 Grenoble and Oxfordshire
Introduction
The purpose of this and the following chapter is to explore in some detail
what can be learned about the differences in relationships between univer-
sities and their territories by using case studies as examples. In this chapter
Oxfordshire (the UK) and Grenoble (France) are discussed, and Stanford,
Louisville and Princeton in the US in the next.
Oxford and Grenoble are twinned towns. Their twinning reflects their
similar rank in their respective national innovation systems, that of second
ranking after their capital cities as research poles of public sector research.
Grenoble specializes in physics, electronics, engineering, biotechnology
and medical sciences (Druilhe and Garnsey 2000) and Oxfordshire in
physics, chemistry, materials, biochemistry and medical research.
In comparing the potential for the territorial role, however, the units of
analyses are the Grenoble city region and the county of Oxfordshire. This
reflects pattern of population and of the research base in each. Grenoble’s
population is some 626,000 compared to 607,500 in Oxfordshire. Whereas
in Grenoble the majority of research facilities are located in and around
the city because it is surrounded by mountains, in Oxfordshire the
research base is more dispersed. In Oxfordshire, two of the universities
(Oxford and Oxford Brookes) are in the much smaller city which has a
population of some 134,600 people, while the major research laboratories
are to the south of the city and a third university (DCMT at Shrivenham,
part of Cranfield University) is to the south-west.
While the research bases and populations are similar, their locations are
very different, a factor which is significant in the overall pattern of eco-
nomic development. While Oxford is within easy reach of London, Greno-
ble is in France’s South East and its scientific fortunes are in part linked to
France’s decentralization strategies in the 1950s. Another difference is that
although both have strong manufacturing bases: in Oxfordshire until the
mid-1990s this has been low-tech – cars, blankets and food – while in
Grenoble manufacturing has long been high-tech (energy, electrical
engineering), dating back to the early twentieth century (see Dunford
1989). Neither is strongly oriented towards defence research, but in
Oxfordshire there is perhaps more than is generally recognized.
The chapter will show how, although the research bases of Oxfordshire
and Grenoble have some similarities, they are very different in the ways in
which they function in teaching and research and in their territorial roles.
The evidence to support this comes from a number of sources. These
include a CNRS-funded study (1999–2001) undertaken by the late Michel
de Bernardy and the current author. Interviews were conducted in six
research laboratories and universities in Grenoble and four in Oxford-
shire. For this book, the information has been updated with interviews
with senior academics and administrators in Oxfordshire’s universities and
laboratories and further desk research. For Oxfordshire, much of the dis-
cussion is focused on Oxford University, which has had the greatest, and
an increasing, impact on the local economy in recent years.
Grenoble
Grenoble is a major international centre of public and private sector
research. It has five major international laboratories and eight national
facilities employing some 18,200 people. The majority (about 13,700) work
on fundamental research, operating in a wide range of fields ranging from
atomic energy to telecoms and computing. It has four universities with a
combined student population of 59,200. Two of Grenoble’s universities,
UJF and INPG, have developed strong specializations in teaching and
research in science-based subjects including maths, computer science, elec-
tronics, physics and process engineering. INPG has nine engineering
schools. These strengths are reflected in the series of collaborative
arrangements with other local institutions, which are both locally estab-
lished and are part of national programmes. The institutions and their spe-
cializations are shown in Table 7.1.
Grenoble also has one of France’s largest concentrations of research in
the private sector. Firms include Xerox, Open System Foundation, Sun
Microsystems, ST Microelectronic, Hewlett-Packard and Schneider-
Electric. The number of inward investors is increasing dramatically. In
2000, some 212 companies were partly or wholly foreign-owned, compared
to 180 in 1999 and 145 in 1996. Of these some 68 are US companies,
accounting for 15,600 jobs, many of them in large research laboratories.
The active population of Grenoble-Isère is younger and better trained
than the national average. The relatively high level of qualification is due
to the large number of leading international firms operating here, the pres-
ence of one of France’s top universities and the overall attractiveness of
the location (www.grenoble-isere.com).
Although both Grenoble’s and Oxfordshire’s national laboratories
were established after the Second World War, those in Grenoble were
located in a city that already had a highly skilled workforce and an
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Table 7.1 University and Scientific Pole of Grenoble – ‘Pole Scientifique’
Laboratory Specialization
International laboratories
European Synchrotron Radiation Materials research, ranging from 
Facility biomolecules to nanomagnets, and
ancient Egyptian cosmetics to metallic
foams
IRAM (Institut de Radio-Astronomie Astronomy
Millimétrique)
GHMFL (Grenoble High Magnetic Physics
Field Laboratory)
EMBL, European Molecular Biology Molecular biology
Laboratory
ILL Institut Laüe Langevin Neutron science and technology
National laboratories
CEA-Grenoble Atomic energy
LETI (Laboratoire d’Electronique de Microelectronics
Technologie de l’Information) 
CEREM
CNRS (Centre National de la National scientific research funding 
Recherche Scientifique) body
CRSSA (Centre de Recherches du Medicine
Service de Santé des Armées)
INRIA l’Institut National de Recherche IT and automatics industry
en Informatique et en Automatique
CNET (National d’Etudes des Telecoms
Télécommunications)
INSERM National Institute of health and medical
research: a publicly-owned
establishment of research in scientific
and technological matters, 4 federative
units of research in Grenoble, including
CEA and UJF
IMAG Institut d’Informatique et A federation of research institute for 
Mathématiques Appliquées applications of mathematics, including
INPG and UJF
TIMA (Techniques of Informatics and Computer architecture, largest French 
Microelectronics) independent research laboratory in the
field of design and testing of circuits
and systems
Universities
INPG (Institut National Polytechnique 
Grenoble)




orientation to R&D. De Bernardy (1999) explains the development of
Grenoble as a scientific city as resulting from the actions of a local
scientific elite which was instrumental in attracting big scientific com-
plexes throughout the second half of the twentieth century. A major role
was played by Professor Louis Néel, director of the Centre d’Etudes
Nucléaires de Grenoble (CEA-G) from 1956 to 1970. In 1956 he created
and subsequently developed CEA-G, as part of the French Atomic
Energy Commission, and subsequently was responsible for decisions
which integrated networks between different elements within the
public/private research base. He and other leading scientists were able to
defeat other competitors by winning the location of large devices,
allowed under territorial planning rules. Arrivals included CEA-G
(1965) and CNET (1974), both of which relocated activities from Paris
under decentralization programmes under DATAR (Délégation à
l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Ré), established in 1963 to
co-ordinate regional policy. A more recent arrival is the European Syn-
chrotron Research Facility (ESRF) (1989). Commercialization of the
nuclear research programme began with the establishment of LETI in
1967. This was to be achieved primarily by developing new technological
processes in microelectronics that would be licensed by industry. The
period 1970–6 saw the privatization of all CEA activities through the
formation of CEA Industrie (Lawton Smith 2000). De Bernardy’s con-
clusion is that this series of activities and achievements, even when
helped by local politicians, never reached the point where it amounted to
a deliberate local policy.
Grenoble’s specialization in advanced semiconductor manufacturing
processes has resulted from the collaboration between LETI, other
government laboratories and major French firms. LETI is partnered with
CNET and SGS-Thomson in a regional consortium, the Grenoble Submi-
cron Silicon Initiative (GRESSI). The group was created in 1991 and
boasts an annual budget of $60 million and a staff of 200 researchers
(www.cordis.lu/paxis/src/lyon_grenoble.htm). GRESSI’s main programmes
are work on CMOS and nonvolatile memories, silicon-on-insulator (SOI)
technologies, and sub-0.1-µm research, including Coulomb blockade
devices.
Early in the new century, LETI and INPG established Minatec, a C400-
million innovation and education centre in micro and nanotechnology. A
total of C150 million was scheduled for investment in Minatec between
2002 and 2005 to fund the new infrastructure, in addition to the C250
million invested by CEA-Léti and INP Grenoble. Moreover, during the
last ten years the microelectronics industry has invested C4 billion in the
Grenoble-Isère area. Minatec will be giving new impetus to courses in
micro- and nanotechnology at INP Grenoble, which launched its first
microelectronics courses at the end of the 1970s.
In all, almost C35 million will be invested in training at Minatec, which
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will be taking more than 1,000 student engineers, masters, PhDs and
interns. New courses, focusing specifically on emerging technologies, are
already on offer, as part of initial and continuous training schemes. Several
projects are under study to focus more attention on nanophysics and
nanoscience, and respond to rapidly evolving demand in research and
industry. The initiative has had the decisive support of local authorities –
Isère Departmental Council, Rhône-Alpes Region and Grenoble Urban
Area Council and City Council (www.minatec.com/minatec_uk/).
Autonomy and accountability
While units have been set up to facilitate the patterns of technology trans-
fer both in the universities and in the national laboratories, there are con-
siderable tensions concerning the university–industry interface. Support
provided by the liaison unit at UJF (UJF-Industrie) ranges from providing
simple advice to the whole transfer process. A specific ‘assessment commit-
tee’ chooses projects that will be supported for six to 12 months with tech-
nical and economical expertise, protection of results, constitution of the
means for developing prototypes, search for industrial partners and mar-
keting training etc. As at Oxford University, a policy has been established
on how to share the financial rewards from the commercialization of IP,
and how to allocate and guide funds through rules in order to avoid waste
or illegal practices. But, unlike in the UK, universities in France are gener-
ally not prepared to extend the introduction of profit to individuals. Instead
external incomes are oriented to the laboratory. Hence the incentive for
academics to establish new firms is not as strong as in the UK. Moreover,
the study found that the downside is that there is a growing trend for firms
to demand to be exclusive partners for the outcome of research results
when a contract is agreed, thus threatening academic freedom.
In the 1999–2001 study, the Head of UJF-Industrie reflected on the
growth of university–industry interaction: ‘In Grenoble, after an important
period of growth of relationships between firms and university, a certain
stability is observed and that in itself raises some questions on what we are
about to do’. Depending on the interpretation, it can direct different pol-
icies but there are concerns about aspects of informal or non-professional
management of the relationship around the three issues:
• interface between the university as an entity and industry for the
purpose of technology and knowledge transfers (more institutional
aspects)
• interface between research academics and various facilitating services
(incubators, technical structure, start-up funds)
• interface between laboratories and their actors and the supervision at
the level of the university: the internal relationships and the ethical or
‘disciplinary’ aspects.
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Like the universities, the national laboratories in Grenoble have extended
the technology transfer function and developed a professional service in
order to manage those relationships that need a wide range of competen-
cies: IP, laws, management, ethics, adaptation or translation of researcher
language to SME and vice versa. This problem must be mutually
addressed and, even though each institute keeps its own facilities
(ASTEC, CEA Valorisation and various testing technical platforms at
CEA-G for example), a regional policy is being gradually developed to
foster technological development through inter-institutional collaboration.
The comment was made by the Head of UJF-Industrie that while these
arrangements make spin-out easier, this does not disguise the fact that
there is a vicious circle between sponsor’s funds and official public help
which often impose conditions that make projects impossible.
Defence and biotech
Grenoble does not have defence research establishments per se but some
of the research in the national laboratories, for example in microphontics,
micro- and nanotechnology, has defence applications. Life science
research in Grenoble, as in Oxfordshire, is expanding rapidly and with it a
number of strategies to facilitate the commercialization process. For
example, the Grenopole Rhone-Alpes, a functional genomics network
launched in the year 2000, links nearly 60 laboratories. Two further net-
works are being built up: Cancerpole is a network of cancer R&D exper-
tise and will receive C60 million from regional and national funding, and
Nanbio is a programme that will bring nanoscience into biology. All three
poles will use public/private partnerships to provide funding for priority
research projects. Grenopole also supports an exploratory genomics
centre split between Lyon and Grenoble to develop research and applica-
tion in bioinformatics (Goodman 2003).
Massification and training role
One of the key differences between the locations is the relative roles
played by universities and research laboratories in training graduate stu-
dents. Grenoble has 55,000 students, compared to Oxfordshire’s 35,000, a
main difference being that Oxfordshire’s nuclear laboratories have far
smaller student populations than their equivalents in Grenoble. In 2003
Grenoble’s universities had only 14 per cent of students on post-graduate
courses in the 14 doctorate schools in the city. The research laboratories
such as CEN-G and TIMA supervise the majority of students, and provide
close links between the laboratories and industry. For example, TIMA’s
post-graduates take a large part of the responsibility for contracts with
firms while they work on their thesis, a guarantee that specific research
will be developed with benefits to the firm via a patent, the employment of
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the post-graduate and other forms of transfer. Between 1984 and 1998, 100
theses were completed in TIMA. Of the students graduating, 37 found
their first job in Grenoble. Of these 23 were integrated into a research
team in Grenoble (12 within TIMA) and ten were recruited by SGS-
Thomson (Lawton Smith 2003a).
In comparison to Oxford, the universities, national laboratories, indus-
try and the communities of the city region in Grenoble are far more integ-
rated into a regional technological strategy. In particular, all of the
universities and schools in Grenoble have pooled their energies with the
objective of making Grenoble France’s leading centre for training in
micro- and nanotechnology. The two main players are INPG and the Uni-
versité Joseph Fourier (UJF). Some five-year courses are organized in
partnership. Their objective is to offer students courses ranging from two
to eight years after matriculation in micro- and nanotechnology (materials,
components, systems-on-chip (SoC), biotechnologies, etc.) as well as their
applications (telecommunications, multimedia, etc.), information techno-
logy and software. Table 7.2 shows courses in micro- and nanotechnology
on offer in Grenoble.
Entrepreneurial activities
That formal research co-operation with industry is well established is
demonstrated by the levels and variety of income from industry through
various means including licensing, secrecy agreements and contracts for
both UJF and INPG. Income more than doubled in the period 1992–9.
INPG alone had managed 556 contracts with firms since 1995 for Fr226
million, ranked fifth in a league table of the best engineering schools for
links and contracts with firms in 1998 (Review Industrie et Techniques 797).
The largest increase is in income from licensing. This grew from Fr1
million in 1995 to Fr13 million in 1999 in total before the shares between
universities (15 per cent), laboratories and individuals are broken down.
Grenoble-Isère is the top French department for patent registration in
electronics, electricity and instrumentation and for engineering science
publications rated by the Science Citation Index. In 1998 235 patent
requests were filed in Isère (i.e. a quarter of the total for the Rhône-Alpes
region) (www.grenoble-isere.com/index2_uk.html).
The two locations differ markedly in the entrepreneurial activities of
the national laboratories. Whereas Oxfordshire’s laboratories have pro-
duced only around ten firms (Lawton Smith and Ho 2005), many more
firms have emerged from their equivalents in Grenoble and where
entrepreneurial activities of the science base are underpinned by the local
state. By the late 1990s, this strategy had had some success: 29 new firms
had been recently created in the numeric imaging activities of which ten
were from universities, five from INRIA, six from CEA, one from ILL,
one from France Telecom and six from other firms within the region.
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Table 7.2 Undergraduate, graduate and professional courses in micro- and nano-
technology in Grenoble
Initial training: engineering Grenoble’s Graduate School of Electronics and 
degrees, and post-graduate: Radioelectricity (ENSERG), specializing in 
and PhD courses microelectronics and data processing
Grenoble’s Graduate School of Physics (ENSPG),
specializing in physics and biotechnology
The Telecommunications Department of INPG,
specializing in telecommunications
The Doctoral School of Electronics, Electrical
engineering, Automation, Telecommunications and
Signals (EEATS)
Continuous training Centre for Continuous Training in Microelectronics
and Microsystems
Initial training: engineering Grenoble’s Graduate School of Computer Science 
courses for micro and and Applied Mathematics (ENSIMAG): software 
nanotechnology and the engineering, computer systems, communications 
associated applications in and calculation systems
other schools belonging to Grenoble’s Graduate School of Electrochemistry 
the INP Grenoble group and Electrometallurgy (ENSEEG): science of
materials and surfaces, microsystems
Grenoble’s Graduate School of Electrical
Engineering (ENSIEG): signals and systems
Graduate School of Advanced Industrial Systems
(ESISAR) in Valence (Drôme): computing and
networks, embedded computing
INPG Doctoral College post-graduate and PhD
courses
Courses at UJF Institute of Technology (IUT1) courses starting two
years after matriculation
Institute of Science and Technology (ISTG), courses
starting three and five years after matriculation;
industrial computing and instrumentation (i), and
materials science and engineering (SciGMa) with a
joint micro- and nanotechnology option in the third
year (starting in 2003)
Training & Research Units (UFR) ranging from
four to eight years after matriculation
Doctoral College with post-graduate and PhD courses
Continuous Training • access to engineering degrees (ELAN 
Department at INP programme)
Grenoble • access to executive positions (Formatech and
MIDEP programmes)
• Technological Research Diploma (DRT),
Multimedia Project Leader Diploma (DHET), etc.
University Centre for Adult Education and
Training (CUEFA), Continuous Training and
Apprenticeship Department (SFCAA) at
Université Joseph Fourier.
Source: www.cordis.lu/paxis/src/lyon_grenoble.htm.
Reflecting the research base specialisms, the fields of production are
mainly oriented to microelectronics, computers and the internet. Since the
turn of the new century, the rate of spin-off has been sustained by a
change in national seed funds and venture capital.
LETI is the only French research centre with a spin-off policy. The lab-
oratory has been the origin of about 30 new companies since the early
1980s, with around ten between 2000 and 2004. In those 30 years more
than 1,500 jobs have been created. The most famous is the international
firm STMicroelectronics, world number four in semi-conductors (Cheney
1997). Other companies spun off from LETI include field emission display
(FED) pioneer Pixtech, integrated read-write head manufacturer Silmag,
and Soitec, a leader in the burgeoning silicon on insulator (SOI) market.
Protein’eXpert is a spin-off from Grenoble’s institute of Structural
Biology; it was founded in 2000 and by 2004 had 25 employees.
TIMA records five spin-off companies (http://time.imag.fr/valorization/
Spinoffs.asp). The earliest was established in 1997. The five companies are:
• MEMSCAP, 1997. The company started with seven engineers, mainly
composed from researchers from the Microsystems Group of TIMA
Laboratory (CAD of micro electro mechanical systems)
• AREXSYS, 1997. Merged with TNI-Valyosis in July 2001 (innovative
hardware/software co-design solution for embedded system and
system-on-chip (SOC) designs)
• iRoC, 2000 (technologies unique and global design solutions for inte-
grating Robustness on Chip)
• MND, 2003 (semiconductors)
• NanoSPRINT s.a.r.l., 2005 (innovative provider of virtual representa-
tion solutions for science and technology).
In the Rhône-Alpes region linkages between universities and national lab-
oratories and industry are being built by support provided for seed
funding, business advice and incubators, and for developing structured
poles such as the biotechnologies pole around Lyon as well as the micro-
and nanotechnologies. National schemes are the main source of funds for
early stage capital. For example, national seed funds are delivered through
local organizations including the national seed fund for electronics and
materials, EMERTEC; the national seed fund for informatics and I-
Source in Grenoble is hosted by INRIA.
With the exception of the biomedical sciences, Grenoble has had busi-
ness incubators for science-based industries associated with national labo-
ratories and universities for far longer than Oxfordshire. Since 1986 the
ASTEC incubator has generated some 80 firms located near CEN-G in
order to benefit from various facilities like heavy apparatus, measures and
prototyping capacities, expertise by direct relations. ASTEC is now linked
to GRAIN (Grenoble Alpes Incubation), the regional incubator located in
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Grenoble. GRAIN works with EMERTEC. As a common initiative at the
local level, GRAIN brings together the two previous incubators and has
greater resources. This increases the number of projects introduced in the
incubator. It supplies advice and aid to companies, providing market
research assistance and development of business plans and, through
investment opportunities, assisting their financial start. Nearly one-third of
all the projects selected by GRAIN concern bio-industry. More recently a
biotech incubator, Biopolis is being established and is due for completion
in 2006. It will provide specialist premises and business support (Goodman
2003).
The territorial role
The role played by the regional authorities in supporting research in the
attempt to bring coherence to the region’s infrastructure is far more
advanced than in Oxfordshire. Since 1999, the regional council has
doubled its financial support for research, contributing C43 million in
2003. The territorial role is enshrined in the activities of the Groupement
d’intérêt public (GIP). This grouping was created in 1992 by the universi-
ties, the communities, the research laboratories and major companies to
support scientific developments within the scientific community and the
sharing of resources and projects. Grenoble Universités was set up to
encourage dialogue between the universities as a means of supporting the
emergence of innovative solutions and to set up actions that would be in
the public interest (see www.grenoble-univ-rech.org/pole/).
As everywhere else, there are barriers to the successful realization of
strategies, for example, local SMEs do not necessarily have the absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) to collaborate with the institutions,
scientific research does not necessarily translate into economic develop-
ment. Other factors relate to the geographical location of Grenoble.
Saperstein and Rouach (2002) conclude that Grenoble faces a number of
challenges and problems in staying competitive and attracting multination-
als. Regional factors include infrastructure – there is no TGV from Lyon
and being surrounded by mountains isolates Grenoble. It faces competi-
tion from Lyon and Sophia Antipolis. Nationally, Brittany, Lorraine, Paris
and Sophia Antipolis are competitors for high-tech activity. Internation-
ally, Grenoble is not a major European city and is in competition with
Munich, Dublin, Barcelona and Stockholm.
Oxfordshire
Three features mark Oxfordshire’s scientific innovation system: a high
concentration of research, especially in biomedical sciences; success in the
application of research; and until recently a specialized largely non-
university- and non-local-authority-based innovation support system. The
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research base encompasses three universities (Oxford University, Oxford
Brookes and Cranfield DCMT at Shrivenham) and seven laboratories to
the south-west of the city in the Didcot area (United Kingdom Atomic
Energy Authority (UKAEA) Harwell and Culham, Joint European
Taurus, Central Council for Research Laboratories (CCLR), Rutherford
Appleton Laboratory (RAL), Medical Research Council (MRC), National
Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) and the Institute of Hydrology).
Collectively these institutions employ around 13,200 people (Table 7.3).
Oxfordshire’s first laboratory, Harwell (nuclear energy, fission), was
established in 1946 on an old airbase, located within reach of Oxford Uni-
versity. Other laboratories funded under a range of government depart-
ments were established in the next three decades. These include the
atomic energy fusion laboratory Culham in 1961, RAL in 1957 (education
and science) and the National Radiological Protection Board in 1970
(health and social security) (see Lawton Smith 1990). The latest big
science project is the Synchrotron X-ray laboratory which is being
developed at RAL.
Oxford University
Oxford is the one of the UK’s premier universities and was established in
1214. Oxford consists of a central university (including the central and
departmental libraries, and science laboratories) and 39 colleges and seven
permanent private halls (PPHs). All teaching staff and degree students
must belong to one of the colleges (or PPHs). These colleges are not only
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Table 7.3 Research laboratories and universities in Oxfordshire (2002)
Name of research Location Number of Sector
centre/university employees
Research laboratories
UKAEA Culham and 920 combined R&D
Harwell
RAL Chilton 1,700 R&D
Environment Wallingford and 324 combined Government/
Agency Oxon regulatory
NRPB Chilton 260 R&D
Universities
Oxford University Oxford 7,773 Academic
Oxford Brookes Oxford 2,278 Academic
University




houses of residence but have substantial responsibility for the teaching of
undergraduates and post-graduates. Some colleges accept only post-
graduate students and one college, All Souls, does not accept students at
all. Oxford’s collegiate system came into existence through the gradual
agglomeration of independent institutions in the city of Oxford (www.fact-
index.com/u/un/university_of_oxford.html).
By research income and human capital it is one of the UK’s top four
universities (the other three are Cambridge and two London colleges,
UCL and Imperial). It has more academic staff working in world-class
research departments (rated 5* or 5 in the RAE 2001) than any other UK
university. It had the highest research income of any UK university in
2002–3 (www.ox.ac.uk/research). External income has risen sharply in
recent years, rising by 28 per cent between 1998–9 and 2002–3 (Table 7.4).
Major funding came from the Wellcome Trust and cancer charities. The
university specializes in genomics – 50 per cent of university research
groups work on genomics. The university is increasingly part of interna-
tionally distributed innovation systems as overseas industry income is
increasing while UK industry income is declining. On the other hand, com-
mercialization activities, with the exception of spin-offs, are not advanced.
While the university’s licensing income has reached £10.2 million, on a
global scale, however, compared for example to Stanford University
(Chapter 8), Oxford still has a long way to go to catch up.
In 2000–1 Oxford University’s externally funded research amounted to
£142 million. Of this almost £100 million was directed towards research in
the life and medical sciences.
Like other UK universities, public funding for research has been declin-
ing as a proportion of university research income, particularly under the
successive Conservative governments (1979–97) to reach a low point in
1997. While research income from external sources pays for salaries and
travel and so on, it does not replace worn-out equipment. (In 2005, the UK
research councils have moved to provide full economic costing for
research.) Oxford has, however, benefited from programmes which have
been jointly funded by government and the private sector, including
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Table 7.4 Oxford University income from industrial sources FY 1998–9 to FY
2002–3 (£ million)
1998–9 1999–2000 2000–1 2001–2 2002–3
UK 11.8 12.5 13.6 11.7 11.4
Overseas 5.8 7.8 8.9 8.2 9.0
Total Industry 17.6 20.3 22.5 19.9 20.4
Total University 117.5 129.6 142.4 149.7 162.9
Research Income
Source: Oxford University Research Services Office.
charities such as the Wellcome Trust to address these problems: JIF (Joint
Infrastructure Funds) (1998–2001) and the on-going SRIF (Science
Research Investment Funds). (The Science Research Investment Fund
(SRIF) is a joint initiative by the Office of Science and Technology (OST)
and the Department for Education and Skills (DfES).) For example, the
Chemistry Department’s new building is funded through a £60 million JIF
bid, the biggest JIF grant. The drawback of these awards is that they are
not recurrent and provide only 75 per cent of total funding for each
project. These and short-term research grants of three years’ duration also
do not solve the general problem of maintenance.
One of Oxford University’s major strengths is its interdisciplinary and
interorganizational research across a wide range of technologies in physics,
chemistry, engineering, materials, IT and life sciences. In 2001, Oxford’s
Department of Engineering Science was awarded a Faraday Partnership in
Automotive and Aerospace Materials. Partners are Oxford Brookes and
Cranfield Universities, the Motor Industries Research Association,
the Oxford Trust (a local charitable trust), and the Heart of England
Business Link. Box 7.1 shows Oxford University’s interdisciplinary
research centres.
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Box 7.1 Interdisciplinary research at Oxford University.
• Faraday Partnership in Automotive and Aerospace Materials, a collab-
oration between universities and industry to develop new materials
required for future low-energy consumption, pollution-free transport
systems supported by the DTI and the Engineering and Physical Sci-
ences Council (EPSRC), aims to build effective networks between
academia and industry to provide a continuous exchange between
skilled scientists, engineers and technologists of research results and
advanced technologies.
• Oxford Internet Institute, set up in 2001 as the first truly multidiscipli-
nary internet institute based in a major university, aims to carry out
research and make policy recommendations about the effects of the
internet on society.
• MRC IRC for Cognitive Neuroscience promotes interaction between
research groups in aspects of basic and clinical neuroscience. Its main
interests concern the mechanisms by which the brain forms representa-
tions of the outside world, stores information as memories and pro-
grammes movements. The Centre encourages work in all areas of
cognitive neuroscience, across all relevant disciplines.
• Oxford Centre for Environmental Biotechnology (OCEB) was inaugu-
rated in 1997 as a collaboration between research workers in the
Department of Engineering Science, the Department of Plant Sciences,
and the NERC Institute for Virology and Environmental Microbiology
(IVEM). The objectives of OCEB are broadly to develop biological
One of the key differences between Oxfordshire and Grenoble and one
which limits the county’s territorial role is the potential for collaboration
with local MNCs. Oxfordshire has a small number of research laboratories
of foreign-owned companies. These include the European research labora-
tory of Sharp and Dow Elanco’s research laboratory. Genzyme, the US
biotech company set up its UK headquarters in Oxfordshire in 2000, but
has a service rather than research function. Yamanouchi, the Japanese
pharmaceutical company, relocated its R&D activities back to Japan in
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science and technology and the associated process engineering to reme-
diate environmental problems in soil, water and air.
• Quantum Information Processing Interdisciplinary Research Collabora-
tion (QIPIRC) received EPSRC funding of £9 million over the next five
years to further the understanding of the fundamental laws of quantum
physics.
• Oxford Centre for Gene Function (OCGF) will be a multidisciplinary
international centre of excellence for postgenomic science. Funded by a
£10 million JIF award and a subsequent grant of £1.7 million from the
Wolfson Foundation, it will involve substantive collaboration between
research teams from the departments of Physiology, Human Anatomy
and Genetics and Statistics. It will provide an integrated approach to
the study of gene function, which will facilitate the discovery and devel-
opment of novel targets for therapy. The state-of-the-art building of
about 3,000sqm, will combine leading experimental research groups
totalling around 70 scientists.
• IRC ‘From Medical Images and Signals to Clinical Information’ focuses
on the development of clinically efficient IT systems for clinicians and
researchers who, increasingly, have vast amounts of images and mea-
surements at their disposal which they need to analyse effectively in
order to diagnose and treat their patients in the best possible way.
• The IRC Bionanotechnology is a collaboration between six depart-
ments within the University of Oxford (Departments of Physics, Chem-
istry, Biochemistry, Engineering Science, Physiology and Materials),
together with the Universities of Glasgow and York, Cambridge, Not-
tingham and Southampton, and the National Institute for Medical
Research. The Centre aims to investigate naturally occurring biomolec-
ular nanosystems, from the level of single molecules up to molecular
machines, and to apply this knowledge to produce artificial electronic
and optical devices.
• Institute of Nanotechnology will offer state-of-the-art facilities,
opportunities for collaboration, cross-disciplinary transfer of ideas and
support for those involved in nanotechnology research and applications.
• Princeton/Oxford Partnership in Materials Science. Formal programme
of undergraduate student exchange, academic collaboration and sharing
of research facilities.
Source: Oxford University.
2002. Overall, in 2003 some 93 of Oxfordshire’s 1,400 high-tech firms
employing 36,700 people were foreign-owned, over half of them US-
owned. Employment in these firms represented almost one-fifth of all
high-tech jobs in the county (Chadwick et al. 2003). The majority of these
firms have been acquired by foreign companies rather than established in
the county. One explanation for the low level of influx of foreign com-
panies to the county is Oxfordshire’s strict planning rules (Lawton Smith
et al. 2003).
Accountability
The UK allows each university to set their own terms of trade by which
the commercialization of research is undertaken. From 1 October 2002,
Oxford University formally changed its statute to a position where the uni-
versity claims ownership of all intellectual property of staff, students and
visitors to the university. This new statute, in asserting the right to deter-
mine the distribution of income derived from any profits made from
patents, licences, other intellectual property and of course spin-off com-
panies, changed the basis of accountability of its staff and students to the
university, from one of relative freedom to determine the ways in which
research should be commercialized to one which is regulated by the uni-
versity. The rules are now that:
(1) The University claims ownership of all intellectual property speci-
fied in section 6 of this statute which is devised, made, or created:
(a) by persons employed by the University in the course of their
employment;
(b) by student members in the course of or incidentally to their studies;
(c) by other persons engaged in study or research in the University
who, as a condition of their being granted access to the University’s
premises or facilities, have agreed in writing that this Part shall apply
to them; and
(d) by persons engaged by the University under contracts for services
during the course of or incidentally to that engagement.
(2) The University’s rights under sub-section (1) above in relation to
any particular piece of intellectual property may be waived or modi-
fied by agreement in writing with the person concerned.
6. The intellectual property of which ownership is claimed under
section 5 (1) of this statute comprises:
(1) works generated by computer hardware or software owned or
operated by the University;
(2) films, videos, multimedia works, typographical arrangements, field
and laboratory notebooks, and other works created with the aid of
university facilities;
(3) patentable and non-patentable inventions;
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(4) registered and unregistered designs, plant varieties, and topogra-
phies;
(5) university-commissioned works not within (1), (2), (3), or (4);
(6) databases, computer software, firmware, courseware, and related
material not within (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), but only if they may rea-
sonably be considered to possess commercial potential; and
(7) know-how and information associated with the above.
7. Notwithstanding section 6 of this statute, the University will not
assert any claim to the ownership of copyright in:
(1) artistic works, books, articles, plays, lyrics, scores, or lectures, apart
from those specifically commissioned by the University;
(2) audio or visual aids to the giving of lectures; or
(3) computer-related works other than those specified in section 6 of
this statute.
8. For the purpose of sections 6 and 7 of this statute, ‘commissioned
works’ are works which the University has specifically employed or
requested the person concerned to produce, whether in return for
special payment or not, but, save as may be separately agreed between
the University Press and the person concerned, works commissioned
by the University Press in the course of its publishing business shall
not be regarded as ‘works commissioned by the University’.
9. Council may make regulations:
(1) defining the classes of persons or naming individuals to whom
section 5 (1) (c) of this statute shall apply;
(2) requiring student members and such other persons as may be spec-
ified in regulations to sign any documents necessary in order to give
effect to the claim made by the University in this Part and to waive
any rights in respect of the subject-matter of the claim which may be
conferred on them by Chapter IV of Part 1 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988; and
(3) generally for the purposes of this Part.
10. This Part shall apply to all intellectual property devised, made, or
created on or after 1 October 2000 and is subject to the provisions of
the Patents Act 1977.
(www.admin.ox.ac.uk/statutes/790-121.shtml#_Toc28143157)
Alongside these rules, the university has established a highly professional
technology transfer system, in the form of Isis Innovation, Oxford Univer-
sity’s wholly owned technology transfer company. In 2001 Oxford won an
award for being the UK’s most entrepreneurial university (see below).
Defence versus biotech paradigm
Oxford University like many other universities has defence-funded
research but the level of funding is dwarfed by that of income for bio-
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science research. In 2002–3 the university gained £117,553 from the
Defence Research Agency, Defence, Science Technology Ltd and the
MoD combined. It also had an award of £46,000 from the US Office of
Naval Research. In contrast, it received £7,281,705 in grants from the
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBRC).
Harwell undertook defence research in its early years but its remit
changed entirely to energy research.
Defence research is concentrated in Cranfield DCMT, which under-
takes specialized and generic research to be carried out on defence
technology and equipment.
The Centre for Photo-Analysis and Photo Manipulation of Materials
has been formed by Cranfield University in an initiative funded under
the remit of the Science Research Investment Fund (SRIF) from the
Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE). The Centre is
an inter-disciplinary venture involving four departments: Engineering
Systems Department (ESD), Department of Materials and Medical
Science (DMMS), Department of Environmental and Ordnance
Systems (DEOS) and Department of Aerospace, Power and Sensors
(DAPS). Its primary objective is to consolidate and strengthen the
research facilities at Shrivenham and to establish an international lead
in the area of novel photo-materials chemistry, photo-fabrication and
analysis and modelling.
The aims of the Centre are:
• to offer a service to local industries in the areas of process and struc-
tural health monitoring using low-cost and non-contact fibre optic
sensor systems
• to custom-design, synthesize and characterize organic, inorganic and
composite materials
• to enable technology transfer and exploitation of technologies
developed in the Centre
• to design and offer specialist career development and progression
courses in partnership with local industries
• to offer a consultancy service to local industries.
The Centre has a staff of 22 and a research portfolio totalling £1.5 million,
and collaborates with a number of industrial sectors including aerospace,
civil engineering, manufacturing, chemical and defence. Funding has also
been secured to make possible the purchase of state-of-the-art equipment
such as excimer lasers for micro-machining materials, a suite of thermal
and spectral characterization facilities, environmental scanning electron
microscope, dynamic contact angle, nano-indenter and quasi-static and
fatigue test machines. In addition to servicing the research needs of the
Centre, the facility will also be made available to local industries and
schools for training and consultancy.
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Oxford University is one of the major UK centres for life sciences
research, and one which is characterized by interdisciplinary research and
by initiatives to commercialize that research. Biomedical research (from
research councils, charities and industry) accounts for the largest share of
external income. In 2002–3, major grants came from the charities such as
the Wellcome Trust (£37 million) (over a fifth of all external research
funding) and the British Heart Foundation (£4.1 million) and the drugs
companies such as Merck (£4 million) and Bayer (£1.68 million). The uni-
versity has at least 14 interdisciplinary centres in the biomedical field and
runs programmes in genetics, immunology and epidemiology with 700
graduate students. Specialization is increasing in genetics and genomics. In
June 2004, the university was awarded £500,000 for research into stem
cells (Blueprint 2004).
Moreover, strong links between the research base and hospitals, such as
the John Radcliffe, ensure easy access for the clinical studies that are
necessary for putting research into action. Oxford’s hospitals have a long
record of providing excellent ‘testing grounds’ by hosting commercial
trials as well as NHS trials. Building on this relationship, in 2002 Oxford
was awarded £750,000 over five years to establish a Genetics Knowledge
Park (GKP) funded by the Departments of Health and of Trade and
Industry, one of the initial six Genetics Knowledge Parks. It is a partner-
ship between Oxford University and the Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals NHS
Trust. The aim of the GKPs is to translate advances in genetics research
into clinical practice. As well as the research and application remits, the
parks are intended ‘to cause the transfer of technology and skills between
research groups, the NHS and private sector’ (www.dh.gov.uk/Publications
AndStatistics/PressReleases/PressReleasesNotices/fs/en?CONTENT_ID=
4013031&chk=7neKRv). Isis Innovation has staff dedicated to supporting
the biomedical sector and manages a bio innovation fund (Oxford Univer-
sity BioForm).
Massification
Oxford’s universities and government laboratories in the county are part
of the explanation why Oxfordshire has proportionately the second most
highly qualified labour market in England and Wales: over a quarter (27
per cent) of Oxfordshire’s residents are qualified to degree level (NVQ
level 4). Its student S&E labour market has a different orientation to that
of Grenoble. It is more focused on the universities than on Oxfordshire’s
research laboratories, which have far smaller student populations than
their equivalents in Grenoble. Table 7.5 shows the student populations in
the major institutions.
The student body at Oxford University is increasingly international,
particularly at post-graduate level. The University recruits over 1,000
foreign undergraduate students per year (1,029 in 2002–3). The largest
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cohorts come from Germany (141), North America (151), Asia (168) and
Far East Asia (200). The overseas post-graduate body is three times as
large (3,085 in 2002–3). Some 771 students come from Europe and 2,314
from outside the EU. North America dominates, accounting for over one-
third of non-EU students with 901 in residence plus a further 239 addi-
tional students. The emphasis on graduate studies at Oxford has been
increasing, with the university setting up seven new colleges dedicated to
post-graduate studies in the last 30 years. Post-graduates currently account
for more than one-quarter of the student body.
The move towards an increasingly graduate focus has been accelerated
because the university finds that it is no longer cost-effective to teach
undergraduates. Schooling costs Oxford more per student than the current
fees and government subsidies cover, and even with the government’s pro-
posed additional top-up fee of £3,000 from 2006 (from the 2004 figure of
current flat-rate tuition fee of £1,125), there would still be a deficit per
student. In 2004, it was estimated that Oxford’s undergraduate teaching is
in the red by £24 million (Nülle 2004). Davis (2004) cites David Palfrey-
man, bursar of New College and Director of the Oxford Centre for Higher
Education Policy Studies (Oxcheps), who argues that Oxford will need to
charge undergraduate fees of up to £10,500 a year from families of the
higher income brackets to maintain its international status; the true cost of
teaching an Oxford undergraduate for a year was £18,600, which the Uni-
versity currently subsidizes by 47 per cent. The effect is that there is a
freeze on undergraduate numbers but an increase in the number of post-
graduates, particularly from overseas. The university’s major target
market for recruitment for post-graduates is the US and it is therefore in
competition for the best students with Harvard, Stanford, Yale and Prince-
ton (personal communication Dr Jeremy Whiteley, March 2004). It has
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Table 7.5 Student populations in Oxfordshire: 2002–3
Undergraduates Post-graduates Student totals
Oxford University 11,069 5,626 17,0971
Oxford Brookes 12,510 5,702 18,212
DCMT – Cranfield 00,300 0,700 01,000
University
Rutherford Appleton 00,20 CASE awards 00,20
laboratory
UKAEA Culham – 00,16 00,16
Totals 17,690 36,345
Sources: Oxford University Annual Report 2002/3 and author’s survey of institutions. NB:
only those with graduate students are included. For example, the NRPB does not have a
formal graduate programme.
Note
1 includes 375 additional students.
been suggested in the education press that if Oxford wants to rival the
major US universities, its 36 independent colleges should follow the
example of Yale and Harvard and establish a single in-house ‘investment
club’ – which would make it better placed to go private or offset the
impact of top-up fees with more scholarships for poor students (see
Tysome 2004, 8).
A high proportion of Oxford University’s students stay locally on grad-
uation, whereas those from Oxford Brookes University are more likely to
leave. HESA data shows that one-third of both Oxford University (32.62
per cent) and Oxford Brookes University (34.6 per cent) students stay in
the county after their first degree. These figures reflect the much greater
propensity for Oxford University graduates to stay on for further degrees
as they include those students who stay on to post-graduate studies: one-
quarter of all Oxford undergraduates go on to further study. The availabil-
ity of jobs in London exerts a strong pull on Oxford University’s
graduates: over a quarter (26.3 per cent) are recruited to London. One-
fifth go overseas. Fewer Brookes students moved to London (16.2 per
cent) and only a very small proportion (less than 4 per cent) go abroad.
The university is also in a global market for best academics. For
example, it competes to attract the top bioscience people, of whom there
are estimated to be only 250–300 in the world. A barrier to recruitment is
that academics (dons) at Oxford are paid about one-third as much per
teaching hour as in the US, are bereft of teaching assistants and have only
two support staff at their disposal, compared to five per professor in the
US. Moreover, the beginning salary for Oxford’s dons is typically £14,100
(Nülle 2004). Oxford, however, has begun to respond. In order to
compete, the university is much more flexible in rewarding staff than ten
years ago, being able to pay higher salaries. Until the beginning of the
1990s there was a single professorial salary. The university is now able to
offer distinction awards to keep people and recruit the best people. More-
over, the university is constantly aware of the need to fulfil infrastructural
requirements underpinning recognition to keep staff happy (personal com-
munication, Dr Jeremy Whiteley 2004).
The training role of the university has gradually expanded but is
nowhere near as extensive as in US universities for example. Initiatives are
small-scale. For example, in 1995, the Physics Department introduced
OUTINGS (Oxford University Training in Industry Graduate Scheme),
initially funded by the department and now receiving DTI funding. This
scheme organizes placements for science post-graduates with local high-
tech companies, ensuring that they gain business experience and network-
ing opportunities with potential employers. The university so far has 
not done what Oxford Brookes University has done and created under-
graduate degrees that have the support of industry. Oxford Brookes offers
a Motorsport degree supported by the motorsport industry, reflecting
Oxfordshire’s ‘pole position’ in Motorsport Valley (Henry and Pinch
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2000). Recently, however, the two universities have begun a collaboration
that seeks to address the county’s technician shortage through a pro-
gramme based at Oxford University’s Begbroke Science Park.
Industrial in-service training is available in the dedicated programmes
run by Oxford University’s Department of Continuing Professional Devel-
opment, a component of the Department of Continuing Education.
Courses are held in engineering, computation, biomedical sciences,
information technology, mathematics, law and the applied social sciences.
Specially tailored courses are available for companies and professional
groups. Oxford Brookes offers a ‘Business for bioscience’ web-based
course – hence not a locally based programme. CPD is not yet, however,
mainstream to either Oxford’s universities or to the regional development
agencies. The former head of Oxford University’s Department of Continu-
ing Professional Development, Dr Mark Gray, said this of policy short-
comings:
On the policy side, I should note that our representations to DfES, to
SEEDA and others in the last few years have all tended in one direc-
tion, namely noting that the lack of direct support (other than under
special initiatives such as HEIF and HEROBAC, and from the
research councils in target sectors) for skills development in high skill
and high technology areas is seriously affecting the ability of the
region to develop, retain, retrain and motivate key science and engin-
eering professional staff. My own view is that the region’s professional
scientific and technology staff are well served in a few areas, but not
served with enough volume or variety across the whole GOSE region.
Our concern here is that as science-based businesses play an increas-
ingly important role in the region, and as science moves faster and
toward greater integration of life, physical and computational and
mathematical sciences, the region could be left with excellent basic
skills provision for the unemployed and the low skill occupations but
less than adequate provision for the underemployed and, more seri-
ously yet, the employed experts the region needs to retain a science
lead. The argument against funding the work (a Treasury one) is that
such provision ought to be near market and that there would be a
welfare loss from public provision. That would be true if universities
were tasked – and were expecting themselves – to compete with
private training providers. Instead our role is to anticipate the devel-
opment of new science based businesses and the evolution of existing
sectors and to develop innovative new course structures for them –
that in my view necessitates public goods provision and public, pump
priming, funding. While the CPD Centre is an excellent example of
how a university can do this without ongoing funding – and do so
largely without loss – that is not proof that this provision should be
regarded as near market enough to end public funding. If I could
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change one thing it would be to have the region take the development of
high level skills provision as seriously as it takes (through SEEDA and
the LSCs) the development of basic skills and level 1 and 2 attainment
levels.
(Miles and Lawton Smith 2004)
Perhaps the most marked difference between Oxfordshire and Grenoble is
in the number of graduate students supervised by the national laborato-
ries, reflecting the very different position occupied by these organizations
in France in the national innovation system. While UKAEA Culham
supervises a small number of graduate students, the number of graduates
supervised at Harwell fell sharply in the 1990s when the laboratory was
split and the largest component was privatized and moved into the com-
mercial sector. A more important link to the economy was the training
provided under the apprenticeship programmes run by the UKAEA at
Harwell. These ended in 1993 with the closure of the nuclear reactors.
Until then, Harwell was a source of skilled people for other local organi-
zations such as RAL, Esso Research, National Power etc. and for Oxford-
shire companies such as Oxford Instruments (Lawton Smith 2003a).
Culham and RAL still train apprentices, who are often recruited by, for
example, the motorsport companies. A recent development is RAL’s plan
to establish a technician training academy in collaboration with other
major employers in the county. For that to happen it will require funding
from the local Learning and Skills Council.
The entrepreneurial role
Oxford University is the UK’s ‘most entrepreneurial university’ as judged
in a competition by Brainspark 2001 (see www.xacp.com/news_detail.
asp?news_id=82). Indications of Oxford University’s increasingly entre-
preneurial role are the growing numbers of patents, licences (though these
are small compared to some of the top US universities) and spin-off com-
panies. Data from Oxford University Research Services Office reveals that
over the period 2000–3 the grand total of income from 34 licences
amounted to £10,230,059. Examples of licences include a licence to BTG
FactorIX protein and a licensing agreement with research sponsor Searle
Phamaceuticals in the year 2002–3 for £500,000, which took the total
income from licences to £1,399,384 in that year.
Since the 1980s, the university and its colleges have launched a series of
initiatives to increase entrepreneurial activity. They include Isis Innova-
tion, the university’s wholly owned technology transfer company estab-
lished in 1988, the Oxford Science Park (1990), Entrepreneurship
Programmes at The Saïd Business School, Venturefest and Oxford
Consulting.
In March 2001, Oxford launched Oxford University Consulting, a
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wholly owned subsidiary that markets academic expertise. Contracts are
already under negotiation with companies ranging from global enterprises
to locally based start-ups. Academics are allowed to consult for 30 days
per year.
Venturefest was created to bring together new innovators, entre-
preneurs, managers and their potential sponsors. It gives scientists the
opportunity to find out how to promote their ideas commercially. It has
helped promote Oxford as a global centre for business innovation and
development, which is underpinned by Oxford University’s reputation as a
world-class seat of learning. The event was developed in association with
Oxford University’s Saïd Business School and the Departments of Engin-
eering, Chemistry, and Medicine. Dr Peter Johnson, University Lecturer
in Business Development (then Visiting Fellow of Balliol College), origin-
ated Venturefest in 1999, and the event was first held in St Catherine’s
College in 1999. The intention to broaden the engagement with the local
business community and research communities is reflected in the fact that
the venues for 2001 and 2002 were Culham and RAL, and in 2004 and
2005 were on land owned by Unipart.
The Saïd Business School was established in 1996 and has since
developed a number of initiatives to foster entrepreneurship. These
include its teaching programmes and Oxford Science Enterprise Centre
(OxSec). OxSec was established in 2001, part funded by the Office of
Science and Technology and the University of Oxford, to encourage entre-
preneurship amongst the science and technology communities in Oxford.
It aims to encourage entrepreneurship by giving university members the
vision and skills to deal with the reality of business. The most recent is
Entrepreneurship Saïd established in 2005 to integrate the teaching,
research and practice of entrepreneurship in Oxford University
(www.science-enterprise.ox.ac.uk/html/Default.asp).
Isis Innovation
Isis Innovation did not become the driving force for commercialization of
the university’s research activities until 1997 with the appointment of Dr
Tim Cook, a successful entrepreneur and business angel in his own right.
Under his leadership, Isis Innovation has expanded and now has the
largest number of commercialization staff of UK universities (Minshall
and Wicksteed 2005) and has been very successful in attracting govern-
ment as well as private funding for spin-off activities, being awarded funds
from all of the major government programmes designed to increase the
rate of university spin-offs. The success of Isis Innovation in managing the
spin-offs process and patenting and licensing activities is indicated by
Table 7.6. Box 7.2 gives the names of companies formed through Isis
Innovation and some of the major firms which originated from Oxford
University before Dr Cook’s arrival and the refocusing of Isis Innovation.
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The data shows that Oxford University generates three times as many as
the UK average of two university spin-offs a year. Between 1998 and 2003,
33 firms formed through Isis Innovation had a combined market capital-
ization of over £308 million. In 2002, Isis estimated that the total market
capitalization of spin-offs formed since 1988, including such firms as Pow-
derJect and Oxford Asymmetry/Evotec OAI, had a combined value of 
£2 billion. By 2004, 37 spin-offs had been established through Isis Innova-
tion, with a total job creation of some 5,000. Moreover, the survival rate is
very high; very few of the spin-offs supported by Isis Innovation have
failed. The table also shows the investment in spin-off companies and
licensing activities.
Isis Innovation has been highly successful in attracting outside funding
to support its enterpreneurship activities. Since 1997 Isis Innovation has
raised £4 million from Universities Challenge Fund. Under this scheme,
the University’s £1 million was matched by £3 million from the Treasury,
the Wellcome Trust and the Gatsby Foundation. In 1999 Oxford Univer-
sity established the Isis College Fund, making £10.7 million available to
Oxford spin-offs in their second round of financing. In 2000 Isis Innovation
set up the Isis Innovation Angels Network. By October 2000, 18 angels
had signed up with £19 million in funds and 36 new applications. Isis has
also won £300,000 from DTI Biotechnology Challenge Fund to establish
BioForm, a dedicated unit for creation and growth of biotech firms.
Since 1997, the majority of companies formed through Isis Innovation
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Table 7.6 Oxford University spin-offs
Year ended March 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 5 years
University investment £500,000 £1 million £1 million £1 million £1 million
Staff 9 17 21 23 34
Projects 243 319 415 476 627
Patents filed 51 55 63 82 65 316
Licences/options 18 21 36 42 71 188
New companies 3 6 8 8 7 33
Investment in spin-out companies
Business Angel Start Up Investment £25 million
Venture Capital Follow on Investment £153 million
Total Capitalisation of Spin-outs £308 million
Current University Equity in Spin-outs £10.8 million
Oxford University Challenge Seed Fund
Investment (Proof of Concept/Seed capital) £4 million
Business Angels Co-investment £21.4 million
Number of Projects 68
Licences 4
UCSF Equity holding in 21 companies
Source: www.isi-innovation.com/spinout/index.html
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Box 7.2 Companies formed through Isis Innovation.
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The Oxford Bee Company
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Opsys Ltd (now Cambridge Display
Technology) (1997)
Oxagen Ltd (1997)
Oxford Biomedica Ltd (1996)
Oxford Gene Technology Ltd (1995)
PowderJect Pharmaceuticals Plc (now
Chiron Corporation) (1993)
Oxford Asymmetry Int Plc (now Evotec
OAI) (1992)
Oxford Molecular (now Accelrys Ltd)
(1989)
Oxford Glycosciences Plc (1988)
Oxford Lasers Ltd (1977)
Oxford Instruments Plc (1959)
have three characteristics in common: they are companies, they have
Oxford University IP and are backed with non-public sector cash.
However, using other definitions, including counting those formed by
graduates of the university, many more companies have their origins in
Oxford University. Examples include Littlemore Scientific Engineering
founded in 1954 by Professor Edward Hall, Research Machines (comput-
ers) formed by Oxford graduate Mike Fischer and Cambridge graduate
Mike O’Regan, in 1973, Sophos (anti-virus software) in 1985 and Powder-
Ject in 1993 (vaccines, needless injection system) (acquired by Chiron in
2003). The most famous – and most successful in terms of employment – is
Oxford Instruments, formed by Dr Martin Wood in 1959, then a Senior
Research Officer in the Clarendon Laboratory. The company now
employs around 2,000 people worldwide (Lawton Smith et al. 2003).
Some departments are more entrepreneurial than others. The Depart-
ment of Chemistry, for example, has contributed over £40 million in cash
to the University as a result of its spin-out activities. In addition it holds
substantial equity in eight recent spin-outs. This return comes from the
successes of Oxford Molecular and Oxford Asymmetry International, both
of which had successful initial public offerings, floating on the London
Stock Exchange, and later sold. In addition a novel partnership with
IP2IPO Ltd (formerly Beeson Gregory) produced £20 million towards
financing a new £60 million Chemistry Research Laboratory.
The IP2IPO partnership was described by the Financial Times as ‘the
way universities should be financed in the future’. Under this arrangement,
in return for an upfront sum IP2IPO receives half of the university equity
in Chemistry spin-outs and technology licences until 2015. The typical
equity split in spin-outs is: founders 30 per cent; management 20 per cent;
the university 25 per cent; and the academics 25 per cent. Since 2000, six
new companies have been created: Inhibox; Pharminox; Zyentia; Glyco-
form; REOX; and Vastox. Close ties between the department, Isis and
IP2IPO are maintained through the chairman of the department, Profes-
sor Graham Richards, who is a director of Isis Innovation and of IP2IPO
Ltd (www.chem.ox.ac.uk/commercialisation.html).
A study by the current author (Lawton Smith and Glasson 2005) has
identified 114 science and engineering based spin-offs from Oxfordshire’s
universities and public laboratories. Of these 12 are PLCs, the rest are
limited companies. They collectively employ at a conservative estimate
9,000 people, about 3.5 per cent of the county’s workforce, with a turnover
of over £1 billion. Non-Oxford University spin-offs include Psion
(UKAEA Culham) and Exitech (RAL).
Science parks
Oxford’s first science park, the Oxford Science Park, opened in 1991 and is
a joint venture between Magdalen College and the Prudential Assurance
Company. It is home to over 50 companies, operating in computer hard-
ware and software, bioscience and electronics, and Phase II of the Park’s
development is under way. The Oxford University Begbroke Science Park
was opened in July 2000. The Park houses the industrial arm of the
Department of Materials, and a number of companies have already estab-
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lished Technology Centres on site, funded by (amongst others) the
Toppan Printing Company of Japan, Luxfer and Infineum. This science
park hosts the University’s Faraday Centre. The Begbroke Directorate,
Oxford University Begbroke Science Park is sponsored by the Higher
Education Innovative Fund (HEIF) set up by the Higher Education
Funding Council for England (HEFCE). Its objective is to try to improve
the interface between academic research and academic activities and busi-
ness and commerce. It is the prototype of what the government would like
to see in the way of third-leg funding. Initial funding has been extended
under HEIF2 and HEIF3 programmes.
The Directorate specializes in high-tech engineering. It has established
four institutes in high-tech aerospace automotive, environmental technolo-
gies and ICT. It currently comprises some 12 people. Of these, the Direc-
torate employs three types of Enterprise Fellows whose task it is to engage
in the process of improving the interface between the university and busi-
ness and commerce. Industrial Research Fellows have a remit to spin out
companies; Business Development Enterprise Fellows work with ISIS
Innovation and help with the Industrial Research Fellows. The Direc-
torate has a strong commitment to training and works closely with the
CPD department. One of the two Knowledge Transfer Enterprise Fellows
works directly for the Department of Continuing Education.
The territorial role
The institutional innovation support system in Oxfordshire until recently
was primarily non-university-based and led by The Oxford Trust, a local
charitable trust. The non-university activities form part of an intercon-
nected set of initiatives to support high-tech industry in Oxfordshire, of
which academic enterprise forms a part. They include the Oxfordshire
Investment Opportunity Network (OION) and a number of incubators
and science parks (see Waters and Lawton Smith 2002). Although locally
led, most of the dedicated biotech initiatives are at least in part funded by
central government. These include the Oxfordshire BiotechNet (estab-
lished under the DTI’s Biotechnology Mentoring and Incubation Chal-
lenge). Initially a network, it has established the Oxford BioBusiness
Centre, Littlemore Park (on land owned by Yamanouchi Pharmaceuti-
cals). Later the Oxford Bioscience Network (now based in Oxford
Brookes University) was formed. The most recent, and the only one
without central government funds, is The Oxford Trust’s Biosciences
Network, an initiative led by The Oxford Trust. Its steering group and spe-
cialist sub-groups are designed to bring local interests (academia, the
government labs, industry and local government) together with a view to
identifying the needs of the sector and identifying how they can be met.
Even with the last, the local-research-to-innovation system is fragmented.
While entrepreneurs, including academic entrepreneurs, might meet other
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local actors, there is no formal setting by which representatives from the
universities, government laboratories and local authorities can meet with
entrepreneurs to discuss local strategies. There is still no coherent
overview of how the sector should be supported and by which organi-
zations. This is clearly not the case in other locations, for example Boston
(Cooke 2002).
Oxford University’s territorial role became explicit in 1999 when
Oxford University was awarded more than £1 million over four years from
its bid to the Higher Education Funding Council for England’s
HEROBAC initiative. This funding enabled the university to set up a new
post, the Regional Liaison Officer, to act as a ‘one-stop service’, forging
stronger links with regional agencies and promoting the services which it
can offer to meet business needs. The appointment underlines the univer-
sity’s commitment to play a more prominent part in local economic devel-
opment (Oxford University Gazette 1999). An indication of how this
works is that, in addition to being heavily involved in the management of
Venturefest, the Head of the Regional Liaison Unit and Dr Tim Cook are
both members of the Oxfordshire Economic Partnership’s management
board and are extensively involved in local networks (see Lawton Smith et
al. 2005).
At the regional level, the RDA, SEEDA, is a partner in the Faraday
Centre and, like others, its Economic Strategy articulates that it will
encourage universities and industry to work together (seeda.org.uk). At
this stage, it is difficult to see where in fact the RDA is making a dif-
ference. Moreover, in 2005, it made a decision to cease supporting the
BioBusiness Incubator.
Conclusions
These two case studies illustrate how profound differences in national
innovation systems and local/regional patterns of engagement lead to dis-
tinctive roles and functions of the universities and research laboratories
within distributed innovation systems. Oxfordshire’s and Grenoble’s
research bases have a similar number of scientists and engineers. Both
have diverse specializations and comprise engagement at the highest levels
within distributed innovation processes with an emphasis in both at the
blue-sky end of the spectrum in the universities and government laborato-
ries, but in Grenoble a greater emphasis on applied research. Biomedical
research is of growing importance in both locations but defence activity is
also a contributor to the profile of the research base. An increasing trend
in both is the establishment of interdisciplinary research centres, particu-
larly in biotechnology, but also in engineering sciences. In both places
then, there is evidence of a plurality of engagement within an increasing
range of actors in innovation processes.
The economic link, however, is much more direct in Grenoble – its
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research laboratories, and much more recently its universities, have been
linked to firms in its hinterland through collaboration, courses and stu-
dents. The city region has a long history of integrated innovation processes
though regional consortia involving research and training. The territorial
role is grounded in the nucleus of activity built by Professor Neel. The
commercialization of research in Grenoble’s research laboratories has
been achieved through four main factors: (1) central government strat-
egies with regard to the technology transfer function of laboratories such
as LETI and INRIA; (2) a history of incubation activities dating back to
the 1980s which include the involvement of SMEs; (3) the presence of
national and international MNCs which have located in Grenoble to col-
laborate with the laboratories; and (4) since the early 1990s, a close rela-
tionship between the science base and the regional and local authorities.
For the universities, the legal framework and incentives for entrepreneur-
ial activity were not in place until the late 1990s. They, like the laborato-
ries, particularly UJF and INPG, are actively involved in developing the
networks of training which are the bedrock of technology-based economic
development activity.
The Oxfordshire case illustrates how the degree of autonomy allowed to
individual universities affects their overall strategy towards positioning
within international research and research commercialization systems. For
Oxford, the ability to respond to global challenges depends on prestige and
ability to attract resources as well as internal cultures. Oxford’s response to
new agendas is to reposition itself towards competing in the global elite,
moving towards research and away from its traditional undergraduate focus.
The case also illustrates how the national system, as in France, is crucial
in the decisions made by individual organizations to adopt a territorially
active role. Oxford University’s territorial role would not have developed
without national funding incentive structures. But also important was the
person whom the university appointed to head Isis Innovation. In Dr
Cook they appointed a man who has driven the commercialization strat-
egy forward and who has been a prime mover in local networks that
combine both the university and the business and government communit-
ies (see Lawton Smith 2003b). At the same time Oxford University’s
income from commercialization activities, other than spin-offs, is very
small-scale compared to the major US research universities. Unlike in
Grenoble, in Oxfordshire the research laboratories until recently have not
been involved in stimulating local economic development and now only in
a limited range of activities including science and technology parks,
hosting Venturefest and training technicians. Far less attention is paid in
Oxfordshire to how the universities’ central function of teaching might be
harnessed to further human capital development at the local level.
The greater autonomy of UK universities compared with those in
France is reflected in Oxford University’s rate of spin-off formation. In
Grenoble institutional entrepreneurship is the dominant form of spin-off,
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largely from the research laboratories. University academics have only
recently been ‘encouraged’ to be entrepreneurial. Moreover, the greater
restrictions on researchers have led to a brain drain rather than to scien-
tists staying local and enjoying dual incomes (university salaries and entre-
preneur income). On the other hand, in both, state investment in the
biosciences is having a notable impact on the growth in the number of
firms in that sector.
National policies on the function of national laboratories have a major
and differing impact on patterns of engagement with the local economy,
for example in the case of the atomic energy laboratories. In France, the
policy has been one of renewal of research in national and international
scientific activities, keeping core strengths together, while at the same time
there has been a strategy of spinning out new firms. As a consequence,
many more firms have originated in the research laboratories in Grenoble
than in Oxfordshire. The sudden change in UK government policy in the
early 1990s, which brought about the removal of the research function of
the Harwell laboratory, considerably reduced the size of the science base
and that of the training element – the supervision of doctoral students.
Moreover, Oxfordshire’s laboratories, unlike those in Grenoble, have had
no remit to work with local SMEs and therefore have not in this way
increased local innovation capacity. Nor, in the absence of a concentration
of large foreign high-tech firms, is there the likelihood of linkage arising
from geographical coincidence through either collaboration or recruitment
of the post-graduate cohort as in Grenoble. On the other hand, there is an
increasing availability of property on business and sciences parks on the
sites of the Harwell and Culham laboratories. While this may act as a
means of encouraging firms to stay in the county, it does not in itself add
to the skill base – a crucially important component of any innovation
system. Finally, and most important, the major difference between Greno-
ble and Oxfordshire is the scale of operations in the former that involve
collaboration between the universities, research laboratories and industry
– and the regional and city authorities. Hence the territorial role is part of
the system of governance.
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8 Stanford, Louisville and
Princeton
Introduction
The three case study universities in this chapter – Stanford on the west
coast, Louisville in one of the Southern states (Kentucky) and Princeton
on the east coast – occupy very different positions within the US national
and state/regional systems of innovation. Stanford and Princeton are both
private universities but come from very different traditions. Stanford is
often described as the driving force for Silicon Valley’s evolution, while
Princeton, an ‘Ivy League university’, although famous for its undergradu-
ate teaching and research, has come very late to its territorial role.
Louisville is a relatively unknown university in a state that is famous for
the Kentucky Derby and the ‘Louisville Lip’ (Mohammed Ali) but which
is interesting in this context because of the ‘Bucks for Brains’ programme
designed to stimulate economic growth through its universities. Each of
the three illustrates responses to changing political agendas in which the
territorial role is increasingly prioritized at state, but not necessarily at the
national, level. The chapter proceeds by identifying student and research
profiles of the three universities and then takes each case study in turn
beginning with the west coast and moving east.
The universities, student populations and sources of income
The student bodies differ considerably by size, ratio of undergraduates to
graduates and in recruitment patterns. These three combined represent
considerable differences in the way each university functions within distrib-
uted innovation systems and with their territories. Louisville has the largest
student population and Princeton much the smallest, with around a third of
Louisville’s students. Reflecting its research orientation, Stanford has more
graduate students than undergraduates, the reverse of the ratio at the two
other universities. Princeton has a higher ratio of graduate students to
undergraduates than Louisville (Table 8.1). Princeton and Stanford have a
far stronger orientation to research than Louisville, hence the potential for
research engagement with industry.
This orientation is further demonstrated by the pattern of income. Stan-
ford and Louisville represent the extremes of research income, research
standing, endowment income and degrees of accountability to their respec-
tive states. Stanford is one of the top ten research universities in the US,
ranked eighth in the list of the top 100 academic institutions in R&D expen-
ditures in 2001. Princeton was 80th, reflecting its small size, and Louisville
was not in the list at all (NSF 2002). Stanford is ranked second (behind
Harvard) in a recent world ranking of the top 500 universities (see Chapter
1). While Stanford and Princeton are major players in international and
national innovation systems, Louisville is much more embedded in a
regional innovation system, receiving a higher percentage of state funding
for research than either of the other two (7.2 per cent). Stanford receives 1
per cent and Princeton 2 per cent. Overall, the University of Louisville
receives 38 per cent state appropriation, 18 per cent tuition fees, 9 per cent
money from endowments. The rest is related to grants, contracts, medical
school, and clinical dollars. Sources of income are shown in Table 8.2.
One of the major differences between European universities and those
in the US is in the endowments that are used for research. Stanford has
endowment of $8.6 billion, which yielded $28,275,787 of non-athletic
endowment income in 2003–4. Louisville’s total endowment rose from
$183 million in 1995 to $492 million in 2002–3. In comparison, Oxford Uni-
versity’s 36 colleges have combined assets of £1.6 billion ($2.2 billion) St
John’s College, the richest, has assets of £202 million ($282.8 million) and
The university has endowments of £424 million ($593.6 million).
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Table 8.1 Student numbers, Stanford, Louisville and Princeton Universities: 2002–3
Undergraduates Post-graduates Total
Stanford 6,654 7,800 14,454
Princeton 4,635 1,997 6,632




Table 8.2 Stanford, Louisville and Princeton Universities’ income sources: 2002–3
($ million)
All sources Federal State/local Industry Academic Other
institutions
Stanford 483 384.00 5.0 35.0 31 27
Princeton 149 79.00 3.0 8.0 42 17
Louisville 115 53.67 8.3 5.7 14 –
Source: NSF and University of Louisville website.
Stanford University
Silicon Valley is located on California’s San Francisco peninsula and radi-
ates outward from Stanford University. It is bounded by San Francisco
Bay on the east, the Santa Cruz mountains on the west and the Coast
Range to the south east (Tajnai 1996). At the start of the twentieth
century, California’s Santa Clara County was an agricultural economy.
Stanford University was founded on 8,800 acres of land donated in the
early 1890s by Leland and Jane Stanford, who specified that it could not be
sold. The standard story of Stanford is that it played a major territorial
role in developing Silicon Valley, and that Frederick Terman, who was the
first chair of electrical engineering, then Dean of engineering and who
started a series of initiatives at Stanford University which Etzkowitz
(2003) sees as exemplifying the stage-wise institutional evolution of acade-
mic enterprise, was a major driving force. Recent re-evaluations have sug-
gested a complex picture that dates back to the early part of the twentieth
century (see Lenoir et al. 2002) and suggested that Terman’s role was
replicated across the US (Moore and Davis 2001). (Gordon E. Moore is
one of Silicon Valley’s founding fathers. He was one of the ‘Traitorous
Eight’ who left Shockley Semiconductor to start Fairchild Semiconductor
in 1958. He was also co-founder of Intel.)
Distributed innovation systems
To begin this case study, two quotes from Lenoir et al. (2002) summarize
their view of the interdependent relationship between Stanford Univer-
sity, the Federal government and industry, showing not only how different
actors interact within distributed innovation systems but also how their
roles change over time.
We view Stanford as perhaps the paradigm case of a university deeply
integrated into networks of mutually beneficial, symbiotic exchange
with industry, forming what might be characterized as a university-
regional innovation complex. The flows of influence and dependence
have been both ways: Stanford has contributed to the emergence of
Silicon Valley through the flow of people, ideas, and technology. On
the other hand Stanford has also been profoundly shaped by Silicon
Valley. Through connections with industry Stanford research pro-
grams have been pushed toward new frontiers. Silicon Valley has con-
tributed to Stanford by providing funds for research, by posing
research questions that push the boundaries of fields such as materials
science, microprocessor architectures, and database design, and by the
movement of technology, technical know-how, and people from
industry to the University.
Even preliminary discussions made it clear that Stanford has played
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different roles at different times in the rise of Silicon Valley and that
Stanford has developed different types of relations with the Valley’s
high-tech sectors. In some industries, such as microwave component
and system manufacturing or biotechnology, the University played a
major role in educating key scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs
who made major innovations such as the klystron and nuclear mag-
netic resonance instrumentation. In other industries, such as semicon-
ductors, Stanford initially played a more modest role, acting more as
the recipient than as the initiator of incentives for new lines of
research.
The origins of Silicon Valley go back to the early part of the twentieth
century. Sturgeon (2000) argues that a Stanford graduate, Cyril Ellwell,
who founded the Poulsen Wireless Telephone and Telegraph Company in
1909, had more influence on the origins of Silicon Valley than Frederick
Terman. In his account, Silicon Valley grew out of the area’s amateur
radio community in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Partly
because of its strong maritime orientation, starting in the 1900s and 1910s,
the Bay Area was one of the largest centres for amateur radio in the US.
The local hobbyist community produced technologists and entrepreneurs
who set up vacuum tube and radio system corporations – such as Heintz
and Kaufman, Eitel-McCullough (Eimac) and Litton Engineering. In the
postwar period, the electronics manufacturing complex on the Peninsula
was shaped by subsequent groups of entrepreneurs and technologists in
semiconductors and computing. These groups, who predated Terman,
came from the east and had, at first, little to do with the University. In
time, this industry recruited Stanford graduates who ‘installed and main-
tained technology imported from the eastern United States and supple-
mented it with their own inventions and products’ (Etzkowitz 2003).
Moore and Davis (2001, 2) are equally less certain of the key role of the
University in innovation and economic development, attributing the
central element in the Valley’s trajectory to ‘the founding of a previously
unknown type of regional, dynamic, high technology economy’. They
argue that its success lies in a progression of effort, discovery and learning.
In particular they argue that the university’s scientists learning to be man-
agers and the evolution of the technologist manager have been critical in
this process.
Sandelin (2002), on the other hand, finds institutional factors to be
important. He argues that the relationships such as those developed by the
Office of Technology Licensing and other proactive efforts are linked to
the success of technology transfer and formation of university-linked start-
up companies. He supports this claim by providing evidence of consider-
able and diverse funding for corporate Stanford, for activities relating to
income for training, industry-funded research and, above all, from gifts to
the university. In the fiscal year 1999–2000, revenue to Stanford totalled
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$172 million. The breakdown shows that Stanford does not receive huge
amounts of industry income directly for sponsored research – only 
$42.1 million came in industry-sponsored research – but industry does pay
for training on a large scale. Some $11.3 million came from company sub-
scriptions to the Stanford Center for Professional Development and 
$17.7 million from Industry Affiliate Programs. The largest amounts come
from gifts. While $64 million came in donations and gifts through Stan-
ford’s Office of Development, total donations in that year exceeded $300
milllion, with a higher proportion from wealthy individuals.
Quality versus quantity
U.S. News and World Report (2004) ranked Stanford second to MIT only
in overall quality in US universities. The Report’s college rankings place
four Stanford engineering departments/programmes in the top two: aero-
nautics & astronautics (ranked top), computer science and mechanical
engineering (both ranked second), and the environmental engineering
programme within the civil and environmental engineering department
(ranked top) (see soe.stanford.edu/about/facts.html). This quality is
arguably a legacy of Terman’s philosophy, that quality of research is based
on extremely talented people, and the institutionalization of that philo-
sophy under the leadership of the university’s president J. E. Wallace Ster-
ling from 1955 to 1965 ‘led to Stanford experiencing unprecedented
growth in national academic prominence and prestige’ (Lenoir et al. 2002).
Lenoir et al. (2002) describe in detail the ‘Terman model’ of ‘steeple
building’ – that is building academic ‘steeples of excellence’ by bringing on
and utilizing the talent of others while retaining a high degree of
independence from industry sponsors. Although government grants and
contracts were used to finance the growth of faculty research, Terman
pursued what he termed ‘salary splitting’. The strategy was to pay for half
of the salary of a new faculty member from grants and contracts. Research
associates and other personnel working on sponsored projects would be
entirely covered from contract funds. In addition, building expansions and
equipment would be funded on contract. His primary goal was to build the
premier research programme in electronics (or other potential ‘steeples of
excellence’). This was to be accomplished by getting the very best talent in
the field and building a graduate programme around them – which was as
important as any other component of the programme. Terman’s approach
was that, instead of receiving research funds to pursue specific problems
defined by a sponsor, he wanted both government and industry to invest
funds in the research directions defined by the core faculty of the lab.
Even with industry funding, Terman rejected funds for specific applied
industry problems in favour of funds to pursue a general research direc-
tion of interest to a company. A company funding the research would have
privileged access but not exclusive rights to the research results.
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Defence and biotechnology
Defence research was crucial in Stanford’s expansion in the Terman era.
Terman used defence money to leverage the growth, first of electrical
engineering, then at the School of Engineering when he became dean, and
then used broader Federal funds in very similar ways to leverage the
growth of other parts of the University after he became provost (see
Rosenweig 1998 in Lowen 1998). In the 1950s and 1960s the Engineering
School accounted for the largest sector of government grants and con-
tracts. Within the Engineering School, electrical engineering was the
major recipient of government funding, around 90 per cent in the mid-
1960s, falling gradually to around 70 per cent in the 1980s in the post-
Vietnam period, when roughly 80 per cent of the operating budget for
electrical engineering was covered from grants and contracts. The percent-
age of the operating budget covered from grants and contracts to the
Hansen Labs and the Electronics Lab was between 90 and 98 per cent in
this period. After the Cold War, funding for the research programme was
replaced by industry, including local industry (Lécuyer 2002). Moore and
Davis (2001), however, do not find the Stanford story exceptional. They
argue that while it is true that some electronics firms did grow out of this
defence-related university research and the San Francisco Bay Area did
find itself home to a growing electronics industry, the clustering of science-
based firms around universities was common throughout the country.
Likewise other universities set up industrial parks and Terman’s own
efforts were replicated in other places around the country.
From the 1980s, the Engineering School experienced an intensification
of its relations with industry and more specifically with Silicon Valley – in
a variety of ways. The main impetus for this reorientation was industrial
grants and contracts, which represented a few percents of the school’s
research budget in the late 1970s and grew roughly to 10 per cent of its
total research funding at the end of the 1990s. Much of this funding was
funnelled through new organizational mechanisms such as consortia.
These consortia, which pooled funding from a number of industrial firms,
supported several research groups. Examples of these consortia include
the Center for Integrated Systems, the Stanford Institute for Manufactur-
ing Automation, the Center for Telecommunications and the Center for
Photonics. Later medical sciences and biotechemistry research became the
fastest-growing areas and appeared to have followed the Terman model
(Lenoir and Ueyama 2002). They find that whereas faculty research might
have pursued any number of new areas, rather than pursuing, for example,
work on drosophila or other organisms, Stanford biochemists and mole-
cular biologists focused on problems related to human genetics and
molecular medicine. Their preliminary interviews have pointed to discus-
sions in numerous faculty meetings at the end of the 1970s where program-
matic decisions of this sort were discussed – and not without dissent.
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Moreover, concerns about orienting the work of the department toward
technology transfer are also reported to have been hotly debated in these
meetings.
Lenoir and Ueyama (2002) argue that a crucial element in transforming
the medical school was the founding of the biochemistry and genetics
departments. The departments of radiology, biochemistry, and genetics all
fit the Terman model in the style of their growth. As prime recipients of
government funding, particularly from the NIH and NSF, these depart-
ments were the first medical school departments to finance their growth
and operating budgets almost entirely from government grants. They also
evolved important relations with industry and made extensive use of the
Honors Cooperative Program in building teaching components of their
programmes directly linked to the emerging biotech industry.
The shift from defence to life science research as a source of research
funding and commericalization activities has been dramatic. Rosenberg
and Colyvas (2002) find that the Academic Medical Center (AMC) is now
the dominant contributor, within the Stanford University research
community, to technological innovation. The reason for this focus is
straightforward. They point out that whereas in 1970 one-eighth of the
patents issued to universities were for biomedical inventions, by 1990 the
percentage had doubled. Currently, over 60 per cent of all university
licences are based upon biomedical invention and the dominant source of
patent royalties.
Accountability
Even within Stanford, misgivings exist about the economic and territorial
role that universities are expected to assume. For example, Donald
Kennedy, President Emeritus of Stanford and a professor of biological sci-
ences, was quoted in 1994 at a conference at Stanford University: ‘The uni-
versities have been cast in a very utilitarian role in recent years . . . It’s
widely believed by universities and their regents that if only they did the
right thing, they could be the next Silicon Valley, I think that’s heavily
overstated and there’s going to be deep disappointment in universities
when it doesn’t happen’.
Moreover, Tornatzky et al. (2002, 160) find that Stanford’s relationships
with industry in the past were not well managed and that problems over
accountability and responsibility were rife. They cite a 1995 faculty study
of industry relationships in medical sciences. This reported ‘a growing mis-
trust . . . [based on] perceived differences in motives and mission that are
not based on fact’. It said that Stanford was perceived as one of the worst
American universities to deal with, especially on the topic of
ownership/patent status of intellectual property. Subsequently, the Office
of Technology Licenses (OTL) was given responsibility for managing
industry-sponsored research, which improved organizational efficiency. He
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does, however, find that the position on intellectual property rights at
Stanford increases flexibility missing in other universities.
The policy on IP at Stanford – as generally in the US – is for the univer-
sity to claim ownership:
As a general proposition, the University’s patent policy requires that
all potentially patentable inventions conceived or reduced to practice
in whole or in part by members of the faculty or staff (including
student employees) of the University in the course of their University
responsibilities or with more than incidental use of University
resources be disclosed on a timely basis to the University. Title to such
inventions is assigned to the University, regardless of the source of
funding, if any. Inventors may place their inventions in the public
domain if they believe that would be in the best interest of technology
transfer and if doing so is not in violation of the terms of any agree-
ments that supported or related to the work (http://www.stanford.edu/
dept/DoR/rph/5-1.html).
Massification of education and the teaching role
As already indicated, an important feature of Stanford’s link to its expan-
sion through its engagement with Silicon Valley is the postwar expansion
of lucrative graduate education programmes both in technical education
and more recently in business and management. Lécuyer (2002) argues
that professional education is arguably Stanford’s most significant contri-
bution to Silicon Valley from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s. More
recently the Stanford Graduate School of Business has played a significant
role in the evolution of Silicon Valley (Rowen and Sheehan 2002).
Lécuyer (2002) argues that Stanford’s professional education pro-
grammes found their origin in the educational demands of the local tube,
instrumentation and communication industries during the Korean War. In
the early 1950s, Hewlett-Packard, Sylvania and other electronics corpora-
tions on the Peninsula put considerable pressure on the university to set
up evening programmes in electronics for their rapidly growing workforce.
At first, Terman resisted these demands on the ground that evening
courses would provide an education of dubious quality and be detrimental
to the school’s prestige. But, as the pressure grew intense, he allowed engi-
neers working at local firms to take regular classes at the university on a
part-time basis. This proved to be a mistake. The University experienced a
large influx of industrial students. These students far outnumbered regular
students in most electronics courses. They proved also to be costly, as
tuition did not cover the cost of their education.
To solve these problems and at the same time serve the needs of local
firms, in 1954 Terman set up the Honors Cooperative Program, a graduate
course of study intended to train the most talented research and develop-
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ment engineers in industry. Under this programme, co-operating firms
nominated employees for admission to the university. While Stanford
theoretically had the final say on their selection, in practice the university
seems to have followed the firms’ recommendations. Students obtained a
master’s degree in two years (they could also work for a PhD degree). The
programme was particularly remunerative for the university. Industrial
students paid double the normal tuition. In addition to the regular tuition,
firms paid a matching fee of a similar amount to the university. In order to
ensure a steady income stream, Stanford instituted a quota system
whereby each firm had to commit itself for a specific number of units over
a period of five years. These steady revenues helped the School of Engin-
eering create twenty faculty positions between 1954 and 1974. Hewlett-
Packard, the Stanford Research Institute and the local branches of
Sylvania and the General Electric Corporation (GE) were the first firms to
participate in the programme. Within a few years, the programme
attracted a substantial number of electronics and aerospace firms in Silicon
Valley. By the early 1970s, more than 30 firms sponsored honours co-oper-
ative students, in order to provide training and to address recruitment
problems by attracting top students with the offer of free places. Lécuyer
(2002) finds that by 1974 the programme had enrolled approximately 2,000
students a year from local industrial firms and had granted graduate
degrees to some 1,500 engineers in local industry.
Yet Moore and Davis (2001, 11) find that the Honors Cooperative
Program was secondary in importance to the opportunities that semicon-
ductors represented and that ‘the size of the opportunity and the learning
about firm-building and market building that took place in the semicon-
ductor industry would have overcome a less welcoming environment’.
Although they find that Stanford’s main role in the industry was to
produce students of outstanding quality, they argue that, ‘In a country
with such mobile labour markets as the US, the local presence of a univer-
sity seems hardly to have been a necessity’. In sum their conclusion is that
the best way to think of the primary role of the university in this and other
regional high-technology economies is ‘as an economic institution respon-
sive to the manpower and intellectual needs of the marketplace’ (page 12).
They argue that Stanford has been exemplary in responding to the needs
of the industrial community, and that the synergistic relationship increased
in the 1990s so that large numbers of advanced degree scientists and engi-
neers work directly in the Valley.
The Stanford Graduate School of Business was established in 1925 at
the instigation of Herbert Hoover, later President of the US. Hoover had
decried the lack of management education on the west coast and, in an
entrepreneurial act for the times, proposed starting a business school at
Stanford. He enlisted the aid of his business friends to raise the money and
open the School (www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/about_us.html). In the
postwar period it developed a reputation as an analytical powerhouse but
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posed an obstacle for its ability to address the highly entrepreneurial types
of Silicon Valley firms (Rowen and Sheehan 2002). They report that this
changed after the mid-1980s. In 1985 there were two or three such courses
while in 2000–1 there were 17, comprising around one-third of second-year
course-hours. The GSB has not been alone in the university in offering
courses on entrepreneurship; other schools such as Engineering, Medical
and Law offer courses. The Center for Entrepreneurial Studies was estab-
lished in 1996 with the mission of supporting research, curriculum devel-
opment and student programmes on entrepreneurship and venture capital
and the entrepreneurial activities of alumni and students.
The entrepreneurial role
Rather than the entrepreneurial role at Stanford being recent, in the 1930s
the university took steps to formalize a system by which the intellectual
property generated in the university and in firms related to the university
was held by the university as a common commercial resource. A number
of significant electronic devices, with theoretical as well as practical
implications for the study of electrons and radar systems, were invented in
the physics and electrical engineering departments just before the Second
World War. Etzkowitz (2003) points out that, ‘rather than the patent posi-
tions being split among competing firms and used to exclude access, the
university served as a repository of economically commercially useful
knowledge that was made available to all firms in the region’.
Defence research played a major role in the expansion of entrepreneur-
ial activity in the postwar period. In 1945 the microwave lab began as a
division of the Physics Department. The new centre built upon Stanford’s
prewar work in electronics and much funding came from Federal research
funds. At this time Terman initiated a three-pronged financial strategy
that included accessing federal funds for defence-related research, making
contracts with industry in exchange for access to research results, and the
development of university land. Federally funded research centres were
also expanded with industrial support. Stanford entered into an agreement
with the GE to build an extension of the microwave lab. In return, GE
received first rights to the Stanford patents from the linear accelerator, the
right to call upon Stanford researchers for assistance in accelerator design,
and office space at the university so that its representatives could closely
monitor developments.
Sharpe (1991) identified that it took the Korean War in the early 1950s
to transform this academic empire into big business. In light of the
national emergency, the military services reviewed their university con-
tracts and decided to complement selected programmes with applied (and
classified) contracts. Stanford, already high on the list for its contributions
to travelling wave tubes (TWT) and high-power klystron studies, received
$300,000 (subsequently increased to $450,000) a year for translating its
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basic research into practical devices and systems (Etzkowitz 2003). In
seeking to further capitalize on Stanford expertise, GE and Sylvania, as
well as other companies, set up microwave tube divisions near campus and
often hired Stanford faculty and graduates to staff them. Former students
became heads of these divisions, while others went into business for them-
selves. By 1960 one-third of the nation’s $40 million annual TWT business
(virtually all of it for defence) was located near to the university.
It was not until 1955 that semiconductors became a major sector in
what was to become the Silicon Valley area, and it was in this field that
entrepreneneurship grew rapidly. The start of the solid state era is attri-
buted to Terman, who wrote a letter to transistor inventor William Shock-
ley at Bell Laboratories to invite him to participate in ‘independent
research and development activity in transistors’ near Stanford. In this
letter, Terman told Shockley about the university’s objectives and of all
the benefits of being located nearby. William Shockley, who would share
the Nobel Prize in 1956 for the invention of the transistor, recruited
Robert Noyce, Gordon Moore, Jean Hoerni and others to set up Shockley
Semiconductor in Palo Alto. In 1957 eight of Shockley’s recruits left to
form Fairchild Semiconductor (www.stanford.edu/dept/OOD/CORPREL/
maximize.html).
The Stanford Industrial Park, the US’s and the world’s first university-
owned science park, founded in 1951, is an indicator of the entrepreneurial
activity connected to Stanford University. It was made possible by the ori-
ginal bequest of land. The idea of the park developed when Varian Asso-
ciates, which had its origins in the university, made a proposal to the
university to build its facility on university land in order to be close to
faculty and facilities in the university. Terman enthusiastically supported
this development. Subsequently the university developed an 800-acre park
later entitled the Stanford Research Park (Tornatzky et al. 2002). By 1962,
the park had 25 companies on site (Saxenian 1994), and there were 140
companies employing 23,000 staff in electronics, software, biotechnology
and other research fields in 2003 (www.stanford.edu/home/stanford/facts/
lands.html).
The existence of the park, which illustrates a demand for sites for entre-
preneurs, and the evidence on the number of university spin-offs, suggests
that a culture of enterprise had been established in the university by the
1970s. From 1971 to 1993 over 300 full-time surviving companies had been
founded by members of the university community (Leone et al. 1993 in
Tajnai 1996). In the last several decades, over 1,200 full-time companies
have been founded by members of the Stanford University community
including Hewlett-Packard, Cisco Systems and Yahoo! – three top Silicon
Valley companies founded or co-founded by those with a current or
former affiliation with Stanford University, as an alumnus or alumna
or faculty or staff. In FY 2001, the largest companies on the list were
responsible for generating 42 per cent ($106.3 billion) of the total revenue
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of the Silicon Valley 150 – an annual list of the largest Silicon Valley firms.
And as a group, the Stanford-affiliated companies experienced a loss ($9
billion) that represented 10 per cent of the aggregate loss of the Silicon
Valley 150 companies (www.stanford.edu/group/wellspring/). It is import-
ant to note that, on an individual basis, there were many firms on the list
that reported income rather than loss for 2001. The Stanford-founded
companies on the list had a total market capitalization of $332.5 billion, or
36 per cent of the total market capitalization of the Silicon Valley 150
firms. Table 8.3 contains a ranking of the top companies founded or co-
founded by Stanford affiliates, in descending order of revenue.
Rowen and Sheehan (2002), however, are cautious about this data and
have a number of reservations. They find that the number of start-ups
from Stanford is impossible to calculate accurately. Three main problems
exist. The first is the definition of Silicon Valley – given that the univer-
sity’s research and teaching activities are not geographically bounded.
Second, defining a ‘Stanford’ start-up or product is problematic given that
most companies and ideas for products have multiple sources. The third is
causation. For example, does the high level of entrepreneurship exhibited
by GSB graduates during the 1990s reflect changes in the School, changes
in the character of the students or increased opportunities in the Valley?
The authors conclude that some combination of these has been involved.
They found that, of the founders listed as graduates of Stanford on the
Wellspring of Innovation website, 379 hold an MBA from Stanford; many
of these also hold bachelor’s degrees and/or JDs or MDs from Stanford.
Nevertheless, they noted that GSB graduates who started a company
within four years after graduating comprise the majority of the site’s listing
for alumni from that School.
Territorial role
In the Stanford model the university does not give preference or actively
seek local licences (Tornatzky et al. 2002, 162). He argues that in practice,
however, strong ties between Stanford faculty and students and local busi-
nesses meant that ‘a strong regional market exists for new inventions’.
Moreover, the pattern is for start-ups to remain in the state, reinforcing
those strong ties. He also reported that Stanford was found to be an exem-
plar of a university which actively participated in local economic develop-
ment (see Chapter 5).
The Stanford University Office of Technology Licensing (OTL),
however, has a societal role as well as just that of commercialization.
Sandelin (2002, 39–53) reviews its history. He finds that its mission from
the beginning has been to promote the transfer of Stanford technology for
society’s use and benefit while generating unrestricted income to support
research and education. Thus, the primary focus of OTL has not been to
maximize income generation but to facilitate putting into use for society’s
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benefit the innovations developed at Stanford. Thus, the OTL accepts and
invests in inventions that may have small income potential but neverthe-
less will bring incremental value to the public. For example, while the
OTL accepts and pursues over one-third of the invention disclosures it
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Table 8.3 Ranking of the top companies founded or co-founded by Stanford affili-
ates
Company Revenues 2001 Net income 2001 Market cap on 
($ million) ($ million) 28 March 2002 
($ million)
Hewlett-Packard 44,211.0 751.0 34,855.0
Cisco Systems 18,290.0 2,294.0 123,953.1
Sun Microsystems 14,059.0 563.0 28,651.1
Agilent 7,257.0 241.0 16,216.5
SGI 1,684.5 405.0 836.4
Electronic Arts 1,562.2 36.3 8,765.7
Atmel 1,472.3 418.3 4,735.2
Cadence Design 1,430.4 141.3 5,664.5
Intuit 1,372.4 48.1 8,158.8
Nvidia 1,371.4 177.1 6,413.3
Adobe Systems 1,168.6 185.7 9,531.8
Maxim Integrated 1,111.4 211.6 18,152.6
Symantec 1,011.3 60.4 5,861.8
BEA Systems 975.9 35.7 5,503.3
Network Appliance 819.3 4.3 6,804.0
Cypress Semiconductor 819.2 407.4 2,809.2
Varian Medical Systems 787.3 71.7 2,755.8
Rational Software 751.4 57.7 3,077.2
Varian 751.2 46.1 1,268.6
eBay 748.8 90.4 15,829.0
Yahoo 717.4 92.8 10,989.2
Read-Rite 659.8 18.9 369.7
Aspect Communications 449.4 151.8 205.1
Extreme Networks 444.5 128.1 1,191.8
Silicon Storage 294.0 29.0 964.0
Ariba 293.9 2,494.3 1,194.6
Mattson Technology 230.1 336.7 264.5
Affymetrix 224.9 33.1 1,679.0
Incyte Genomics 219.3 183.2 790.2
ONI Systems 195.7 188.3 873.4
Dionex 184.3 29.4 521.2
Actel 145.6 4.7 496.6
E.piphany 125.7 2,609.4 538.2
SonicWall 112.0 20.9 861.9
Zoran 107.7 36.1 778.5
Rambus 107.3 24.4 781.3
Net.com 101.9 48.6 113.9
Totals 106,272.1 9,104.0 332,456.1
Source: www.stanford.edu/group/wellspring/economic.html.
receives, the for-profit Research Corporation Technologies (a licensing
agent for a large number of universities) accepts less than 5 per cent.
The OTL also engages in a number of activities that are not income-
generating, such as serving on committees, assisting in policy formulation
and reviews and providing advice and consultation on intellectual property
questions from members of the Stanford community. When the OTL was
established in FY 1969–70, it was agreed that 15 per cent of gross revenue
would be allocated to offset costs of operation. Using this measure of
financial breakeven, the cumulative 15 per cent amounts did not exceed
total costs until FY 1988–9, or 19 years from the formation of the OTL. By
FY 2000–1, the cumulative total had reached over $45 million. This surplus
has been used to cover patent cost write-offs to fund the OTL Research
Incentive Fund, to fund invention enhancement via the Birdseed and Gap
Funds and for other uses as determined by the Dean of Research. In FY
1981–2, the software distribution centre (SDC) was formed. It served as a
place where faculty could arrange for the distribution of software they had
created and which others were requesting. This software was offered ‘at
cost’ to non-profit organizations, and for a modest fully paid royalty to for-
profit organizations. It also encouraged the submission of invention disclo-
sures for software programs that had potential for licensing to third
parties, such third parties then to develop commercial versions (with
useful documentation) for sale to end customers and with royalty pay-
ments to the OTL based on product sales. It should be noted that this
effort resulted in a number of software licences (with copyright and some-
times affiliated trademark protection, but no patents) which have total
royalties in excess of $1 million.
The benefits to Stanford resulting from the formation and operation of
the OTL have been many. By the end of FY 2000–1, the OTL had
received total revenues of $496 million and had total expenses of 
$29 million. Revenue from the DNA invention accounted for $255 million,
and this was shared equally with the University of California as their
faculty member, Herbert Boyer, was a co-inventor with Stanford’s Stanley
Cohen. Genetech, the world’s first biotech company, was founded in 1976
to exploit this technology. Since its establishment, OTL has distributed
over $300 million to inventors and to support research and education at
the university. Royalty growth in the early years was, compared to later
years, relatively modest – from $55,000 in the first year to $655,000 in FY
1980. During this period, there were no significant earned royalties from
product sales. Typical was the FM sound synthesis invention licensed to
Yamaha in 1974, where product introduction, and thus earned royalties,
did not start until 1984. Eventually this invention produced over $22
million in royalties, but most of this amount came in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.
A very few inventions produced most of the royalties, and, with the
exception of the Yamaha licence, the vast majority of royalty income came
206 Stanford, Louisville and Princeton
from medical-related inventions. Medical industries tend to have products
with relatively large gross margins that can afford an earned royalty and
still produce acceptable profits. These industries also do not have the
patent proliferation that exists in some other industries (e.g. consumer
electronics or computer products) where many patents may have to be
licensed to market a product. While income from the RDNA licences
comprised the largest share of royalties, non-RDNA royalties also grew
during the decade FY 1991–2001 (from $8.4 million to $38.6 million).
An incident at Harvard University in the early 1980s resulted in a
policy that Stanford would not take equity in a start-up company where
Stanford people had any involvement. The incident was the formation of
a biotech company by some Harvard people virtually within the univer-
sity, apparently using university resources for the benefit of the start-up
company. This caused Stanford’s President to call a conference of univer-
sity presidents at the Pajaro Dunes Conference Center, the result of
which was a strong statement that universities should not be providing
resources for start-up companies or acquiring equity that might create
conflict-of-interest situations. This policy remained in effect at Stanford
until 1992, and resulted in almost no equity from the licensing of start-up
companies.
Since 1992, the policy has shifted, to where in 2001 the OTL was
encouraged to take equity when licensing start-up companies. Of about 75
start-up companies providing equity to the OTL, 36 were in the period
2001–3. This may reflect the change in policy in 1998. Prior to 1998, all
proceeds from the sale of equity went to a graduate student fellowship
fund. None went to the OTL or to the inventors, whose goodwill and
support is so crucial to the success of the OTL. For the OTL, this created a
very difficult dilemma when negotiating a licence to a start-up and balanc-
ing taking cash versus taking equity as the licence issue fee. Clearly it was
in the best interest of the inventors to take cash over equity and there was
even the possibility of legal action by inventors if a significant amount of
income was at stake – because, if they chose to take equity instead of cash,
both the OTL 15 per cent and the inventor’s one-third share would disap-
pear. The policy changed in 2001. From that year, the OTL has been
encouraged to take equity when licensing start-up companies. Now OTL
and the inventors receive the proceeds from equity as if it was cash. The
change produced immediate results. Of some 75 start-up companies pro-
viding equity to the OTL, 36 were in the period 2001–3.
Louisville, Kentucky
Louisville and the Kentucky ‘Bucks for Brains’ programme
The case of Kentucky provides an example of a state harnessing its univer-
sities’ research and teaching activities as a key element in its economic
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strategy. Its strategy is driven by political will, and hype and hope (Glasner
2004) abound. There are interesting parallels with the strategy adopted by
Georgia, another Southern state, with a strategy preceding that of Ken-
tucky (see Tornatzky et al. 2002, Shapira 2005b). (The Georgia Research
Alliance has helped endow 37 eminent scholars at one of Georgia’s uni-
versities. The emphasis is on hiring individuals with an industrial back-
ground and often with an entrepreneurial orientation (Tornatzky et al.
2002, 22).)
The University of Louisville can date its history to 1798 with the estab-
lishment of an early medical school but it is 50 years old in modern guise.
It began as a private university, part city-funded, until 1972, when there
were financial problems, as a result of which it became part of the state
system. From 1997, the university, along with Kentucky’s other universi-
ties, became part of the state’s new regional development strategy.
There are two stories about the Louisville economy. The first is that it is
an economy in crisis. The second is that it is the most entrepreneurial loca-
tion in the US and that Kentucky’s universities will be the driving force for
its new economic prosperity. The ‘Bucks for Brains’ programme is funding
research but it is not clear how this will translate into economic develop-
ment given the unpromising context. Louisville was ranked 45th out of 49
metropolitan areas (populations of over one million) in Florida’s creativity
index (see Florida 2002).
First the bad news. In 2003 the City of Louisville and Jefferson county
consolidated to form the 16th largest city in America with nearly 700,000
people. Louisville is the economic driver of the state. Over a quarter of
the state population lived in Jefferson county. It is an economy based on
manufacturing, distribution and healthcare. Trucks are made in
Louisville in two Ford plants which employ 9,800 people. Georgetown
has Toyota. Other major manufacturers include GE, also employing
9,800 people – making dishwashers and refrigerators although manufac-
turing has been moved overseas. In the 1980s the company employed
25,000 people. UPS, which has its main hub in Louisville, employs over
20,000 people, and Norton Healthcare employs 7,500. Greater Louisville
Inc. (GLI), a consortium of business players, not a government agency,
has responsibility for economic development – attracting inward devel-
opment and local growth (www.greaterlouisville.com/economic/indust/
default.htm).
A review for the Brookings Institution by Katz (2002) bears many simil-
arities to that undertaken of Georgia (Tornatzky et al. 2002, Shapira
2005b). Katz concluded that
• the new Regional City’s workforce is relatively limited in size and
skill, which hampers the region’s ability to mature its economy
• it lost more young adults than the US on average and neighbouring
counties
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• metropolitan Louisville ranks near the bottom on national high school
and college attainment
• the Regional City workforce lacks the education necessary to compete
in today’s ‘knowledge economy’
• university R&D expenditure in the Louisville metropolitan area
remains low
• metropolitan Louisville ranks low among peers and others in overall
high-tech presence
• the Regional City of Louisville’s population is decentralizing
• the Regional City is also home to a large concentration of poor
workers who cluster near the old City of Louisville
• the Regional City is struggling to build a workforce to support and
expand the economy
• the Regional City has a relative weakness in ‘knowledge’ industries
with the potential for high-quality growth
• decentralization has spread the Regional City’s population and
resources into the suburbs
• the Regional City is growing in socially, racially, and economically
divided ways.
Katz recommended that the strategy should be to:
• mobilize an ‘amenities strategy’ to attract and retain a talented work-
force
• involve colleges and universities in long-term development strategy.
Next the good news. In 2003, Cognetics Inc ranked Louisville 9th among
entrepreneurial hotspots, the best places in America to start and grow a
company. Entrepreneur, Inc and Business 2.0 have also drawn attention to
the attractions of Louisville. These include a 500 per cent increase in the
metropolitan area’s venture capital pool, an intensive programme by the
local chamber of commerce to support small business growth, and
the city’s establishment of a high-tech corridor (eMain US) adjacent to the
medical centre. In 2003 the Governor appointed Dr Bill Brundage as the
state’s first ‘New Economy Commissioner’ to ‘bring higher education,
government and economic development together’ (www.greaterlouisville.
com/content/ed/business/rankings.pdf and www.louisville.edu/hsc/factsheets.
pdf). Into this context came the ‘Bucks for Brains’ programme (Box 8.1).
The economic arguments are twofold and are based on a linear innova-
tion process philosophy. First, the state’s investment of $350 million will
be worth $700 million when fully matched by private donors. The Univer-
sity of Louisville by 2005 had received $80 million. Second, research bene-
fits translate into economic benefits. For example each $1 million in
Federal funding for research generates $2.2 million for state and local
economies. Discoveries made through research translate directly into busi-
ness development opportunities. A further argument is based on the
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eminence paradigm, that students gain from working with internationally
recognized faculty.
As a consequence of the political economic objectives of the pro-
gramme and the need to be involved in the decision-making process, the
University of Louisville has established a Government Relations Depart-
ment to ‘Expand the university’s presence in the offices of Kentucky’s
congressional presence and to help continue the unprecedented success of
the university’s challenge for Excellence’. Yet all is not well with the
‘Bucks for Brains’ programme. In 2004 there was not a funding round as
the state dealt with a budget shortfall and not all the money from the last
round was spent (personal communication, Alan Attaway, Professor of
Accounting).
Biotechnology
Life sciences and the College of Business are major components of the links
to the local economy. In the FY 1995, University of Louisville’s expenditure
on scientific research totalled $22.8 million. By 2000, expenditures had risen
to $64.1 million – an increase of more than 180 per cent. In 2003, the total,
which includes both external and internal funds allocated for research, was
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Box 8.1 ‘Bucks for Brains’ programme.
In 1997 the Kentucky legislature approved a bold plan to reform the state’s
system of higher education. The goal was to develop a ‘seamless, integrated
system of postsecondary education strategically planned and adequately
funded to enhance economic development and quality of life’.
To that end, the state created the Research Challenge Trust Fund, a stra-
tegic investment in university research designed to create new jobs, new
dollars and new opportunities for Kentucky citizens. Commonly known as
‘Bucks for Brains’, the programme uses state funds to attract and match
private donations, effectively doubling the investment to support research in
defined areas key to the state.
In 1998 Kentucky legislators invested $110 million in general fund appro-
priations to support ‘Bucks for Brains’ at the state’s research and regional
universities. They reinforced that commitment with an additional 
$120 million in 2000 and another $120 million in 2003.
This funding has allowed the University of Louisville to bring many
prominent scholars to its campus to work alongside the school’s already out-
standing current faculty. In return, these pre-eminent faculty are creating
economic opportunities, enhancing the education of students and drawing
international attention to the university with significant breakthroughs,
including numerous medical discoveries that will lead to a better quality of
life for people everywhere.
Source: www.one-ky.com/bucksforbrains.html
$88.52 million, a further 38 per cent increase. The majority of the new
funding for research was in life sciences. The medical school has over 1,100
professional places. The researchers attracted by the endowed chairs under
the ‘Bucks for Brains’ programmes have brought in, and are expected to
bring in, substantial amounts of Federal research dollars. In 2003, the Uni-
versity of Louisville grew at the fastest rate of any institution in the country
for grant money supplied by the National Institutes of Health.
Although this is a major tobacco state, little of the tobacco settlement
money has gone into the universities. Most of that money is going to pro-
jects in the state that will help tobacco farmers in some way. The state is
trying to use natural products as springboards for economic development,
for example through the state-funded Kentucky Natural Products Founda-
tion which decides which companies will support. A condition of the
award is that firms stay within Louisville. The state plan is to be a leader in
that area. Two companies have been formed from the medical school, one
of which uses tobacco in its research.
Indeed, the biotech industry is a major focus here, as in many universi-
ties throughout the US as well as in the UK. Louisville is starting from a
very low base point and realistically cannot expect to generate large
numbers of jobs. Cortright and Mayer (2002, 11) listed Louisville as having
‘No significant Biotech Research or Commercialisation’, reflected in Ken-
tucky being an EPSCoR state. Yet the medical school and the life science
departments are at the centre of the drive towards economic development.
The Louisville Medical Centre, a partnership of three non-profit teaching
hospitals plus the University of Louisville, formed the Louisville Medical
Center Development Corporation, which at the time of writing is in the
process of building a state-of-the art biomedical research park and techno-
logy centre. The hospital system is a major player in the Louisville innova-
tion process. The Jewish hospital’s corporate philosophy is that it is in its
best interests to have strong medical research and has invested a lot of
dollars in the university in the field of artificial hearts and hand trans-
plants. It has been a major investor in the ‘Bucks for Brains’ programme.
A formalization of the commercialization of the outcomes of the research-
to-innovation process is Metacyte, a consortium of business, the hospitals
and the state of Kentucky (Box 8.2). Its objective is to foster local enterprise
and to attract firms from other locations. Some $16 million has been spent on
buildings in the medical area and $5 million by the state to build Metacyte.
Land is still being acquired for a biotech park around the hospitals.
Four companies are listed as member companies on the Metacyte web
page, not all of them spin-offs from Louisville’s universities. For example
NIRS was founded in Kansas and has an R&D office in Louisville. In 2004
the College of Business merged its technology incubator ‘Ideas to Action’
into Metacyte to increase efficiency. This partnership seems to be working
well.
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The entrepreneurial role
Like other universities, Louisville has measures to support entrepreneurial
activity. The University Office of Technology Transfer employs a patent
attorney, a licensing/start-up attorney with a BBA in finance, a contract
attorney, a PhD with an MBA and a BS, who are responsible for soliciting
disclosures, managing the patent process by outside attorneys and negoti-
ating licences for University IP. The university has 13 university licences
with equity provisions, three other licence agreements and three option
agreements with companies.
Like most US universities, Louisville claims ownership of the IP of its
staff and students. From 1998, the general rule is that, with certain excep-
tions, the University of Louisville Research Foundation, Inc. (ULRF),
‘will hold all Legal Rights to all Intellectual Property conceived, first used
or reduced to practice, discovered, or created, by any employee of the
University, during his/her employment by the University’. Unlike at
Oxford University, however, students who independently create IP arising
out of their participation in programmes of study at the university, not
resulting from their employment by the university, will retain the legal
rights. Intellectual property created by students through the use of special-
ized resources or in connection with their employment by the university is
owned by the ULRF.
In spite of the more entrepreneurial approach adopted by the univer-
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Box 8.2 Metacyte.
MetaCyte Business Lab LLC is the venture development subsidiary of
Louisville Medical Center Development Corporation. MetaCyte Business
Lab was incorporated by Jewish Hospital HealthCare Services, Inc., Norton
Healthcare, Inc., UofL Health Care and the University of Louisville.
Located in the developing Louisville Life Science Research Park – within
walking distance of the Louisville Medical Center – MetaCyte Business Lab
is supported by the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s Office for the New
Economy and is a partner organization of The Innovation Group. In addi-
tion, Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government supports the economic
development efforts of MetaCyte Business Lab – the cornerstone of
Louisville’s and the Commonwealth’s efforts to grow the life science and
healthcare technology industry.
MetaCyte Business Lab identifies promising life science research and
healthcare technology by prospecting within state universities, healthcare
institutions, industry and the community, then drives that promising life
science research and healthcare technology to market – and the clinic – by
creating and assisting in the development of high-growth start-up com-
panies.
Source: www.metacyte.biz
sity, the number of spin-offs, like that of patents and licences, has
remained small. Within the university there is some scepticism about the
university’s strategy. Alan Attaway (Professor of Accounting, personal
communication) for example said:
Several in the community, including me, have been urging those in
GLI and the Metro government that we cannot ignore our existing
business base in pursuit of technology or biotech start-ups. Not that
those efforts are not important but technology companies have a
spotty track record with creating significant numbers of new jobs. We
can launch 20 tech businesses – ten will fold in two years or less –
because whatever they have figured out someone else has figured that
out too and is doing it better; and 8 – if their ideas are any good those
ideas will be bought out by bigger players. Very few technology com-
panies are now waiting to do an IPO but are selling to the bigger
players. This does not create new jobs. I’m not saying that the entre-
preneurial efforts are not important – they are – but we need to be
mindful of the type of ventures we are supporting. The name of the
game is to back those who might create a significant number of new
higher paying jobs in the area.
Massification of higher education and the training role
A much more extensive role within the economy is that of teaching and
professional training. When the university became part of the state educa-
tion system in 1970, the student body expanded and went from 6,000 stu-
dents to 23,000. This is very much a ‘local’ university. Instate students
comprise 83 per cent, and Jefferson county 55 per cent of all students.
Out-of-state students are 17 per cent of enrolments and foreign students
account for only 6 per cent of the population. The university’s ranking for
its doctoral programmes has risen so that, by 2003, the Carnegie Founda-
tion placed the University of Louisville in the top tier of universities
ranking it as ‘Doctoral/research universities – extensive’.
In the early 1980s, the College of Business decided to make entrepre-
neurship its niche. In order to have a national name, the university has to
find a niche. It has been recognized as being in the top 25 programmes for
entrepreneurship in the last seven or eight years. The business school,
which has a large proportion of graduate students, has a number of
programmes designed to foster entrepreneurship. These include the Integ-
rated MBA programme IMBA, which helps business start-ups from
groups within the IMBA programmes. The Business School is involved by
helping researchers write business plans. The goal is to have two start-ups
per year out of that programme. In the early 2000s, 80 per cent of teams
were working in dotcoms, creating business plans – web-based business
programmes. This has dropped to zero. Now the focus is on biotech. Some
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ten companies have been formed in the past five or six years out of gradu-
ated classes who have launched a business of some kind. The most success-
ful is a company called Genscape which has developed technology to
monitor electricity flows – from generating plants to heating plants. When
the national grid went down in 2002, this company was brought in as a
consultant. One of the founders was from the first graduating class in the
IMBA and another was from a later class. The company has been sold to a
Californian group.
Whether the university takes an equity stake depends on the company
and whether it is advantageous for a start-up to offer equity as part of a
licensing deal. There are a lot of models. Two companies seem to be
headed for success: one, started by faculty in the College of Arts and
Science, Education and Medicine, is Neuronetrix. This company is devel-
oping a device that is put on a newborn baby and measures brain wave
activity indicative of dyslexia at a week old. One of the IMBA teams
worked with the company to develop the business plan. Another company,
Othodata, has followed almost the same path. This company focuses on
spine surgery and has developed a rod that has microchips so that healing
can be monitored from the outside, eliminating unnecessary surgery. In
this case, most of the science was done before the scientists came to the
university on the ‘Bucks for Brains’ programme. The university does not
have a stake in the transferred IP but will do in any improvements.
The College of Business has developed a partnership with UPS but
much less with Ford or GE. UPS pays the university tuition fees, books,
and a stipend to students who work for UPS doing shifts (midnight to
4am, 4am to 8am). Alan Attaway (personal communication) recognizes
that the college has a strategy of how to work with the old as well as the
new economy and that not all efforts should go into fast growth sectors
and the rest be ignored. The bulk of jobs in most places are SMEs; many
have been there for years and provide a good base of employment. MBA
teams are working with companies in the West End of the city where there
is lots of unemployment and high crime rates. ‘Jobs are the answer’ may
have an effect of reducing the crime rate if people are employed. This,
however, is beyond the university’s capacity to enthuse businesses. This is
a role for the state. There is no funding for the university to liaise with
local industry in the College of Business. It is all done by using student
teams – free labour. The challenge is to get more organization, but this
needs a full-time person – but there is no money yet. Little training is pro-
vided for companies – this is not popular. Many bigger companies have
their own universities – e.g. Motorola, GE, Ford. The college is now trying
a new initiative for executive training, which started in January 2005.
In the late 1980s to early 1990s, the College of Business ran very suc-
cessful continuing education programmes while most of the university’s
attempts were losing money. The College took over Continuing Education
for the whole university. Problems with the management of that facility
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led to the programme being closed and a distance-learning programme
was offered instead. Currently the programme is being redeveloped under
a new head. The college has also developed a programme on logistics and
supply chain management, at graduate level. Most of the students work at
UPS and other places in the town. This is not a degree programme but
may develop as such.
The territorial role
According to Alan Attaway, Jim Ramsey, the current University Presid-
ent, came from state government but is an academic. His philosophy is
that the university should be more involved in economic development and
will be pushing this. Universities should be involved at different levels –
law school, medical and dental schools. There may not be active links in
the arts and sciences but they could get involved in the schools system.
There is not enough money to make everything happen. ‘At the same
time, there are some people in the university who think that this is not
what the university should be doing’.
Two bases for engagement with the local area are the School of Public
Administration and the Urban Studies Institute, which has a partnership
with the county working in environmental issues, sustainable environ-
mental studies (see www.louisville.edu/opb/planning/stradirc.pdf). The
university also houses the state data centre. In Alan Attaway’s assessment,
‘at the present time many of the local networks have not blossomed due to
a lack of funding for such initiatives. The state’s budget crisis leaves little
money for such programmes’.
Princeton, New Jersey
Princeton is a small town with a population of only 14,000 people as of the
2000 census. The town lies in the west central portion of New Jersey about
midway between Trenton and New Brunswick and about 50 miles from
both New York and Philadelphia. Princeton University obtained its
charter in 1746. It was known as the College of New Jersey until 1896 and
it was British North America’s fourth college. Princeton University retains
traditional Vannevar Bush values of research and a commitment to under-
graduate teaching, although a more recent engagement with economic
development has focused on its contribution to national economic, cultural
and social and political life. This is illustrated by Princeton’s mission
statement:
Princeton University strives to be both one of the leading research
universities and the most outstanding undergraduate college in the
world. As a research university, it seeks to achieve the highest levels
of distinction in the discovery and transmission of knowledge and
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understanding, and in the education of graduate students. At the same
time, Princeton aims to be distinctive among research universities in
its commitment to undergraduate teaching. It seeks to provide its stu-
dents with academic, extracurricular and other resources – in a resi-
dential community committed to diversity in its student body, faculty
and staff – that will permit them to attain the highest possible level of
achievement in undergraduate education and prepare them for posi-
tions of leadership and lives of service in many fields of human
endeavor. Through the scholarship, research and teaching of its
faculty, and the many contributions to society of its alumni, Princeton
seeks to fulfill its informal motto: ‘Princeton in the Nation’s Service
and in the Service of All Nations.’
www.princeton.edu/Siteware/aboutprinceton.shtml
Distributed innovation process
The changing profile of Princeton research – from a rarefied academic
atmosphere with informal links to the neighbouring Institute for
Advanced Studies to a university which now embraces collaborative activ-
ity with industry – is illustrated by the rapidly changing profile of research
income. Since its inception in 1988, the University’s Center for Photonic
and Optoelectronic Materials (POEM) has marked a major change in uni-
versity–industry relationships. POEM has demonstrated that the quality of
its PhD students is as good or is better than any other PhD students. In
2003 the Princeton Institute for the Science and Technology of Materials
(PRISM) was formed through the merger of the Princeton Materials Insti-
tute (PMI) and POEM. The goal of PRISM is ‘to become the world leader
in an area of materials science that is emerging as an important source of
scientific discoveries and commercial opportunities’ (www.princeton.edu/
~seasweb/eqnews/winter03-04/feature4.html). In 1989 Princeton received
only $11 million in external research income. The establishment of POEM
changed the culture of collaboration, brought in external income and has
given rise to academic entrepreneurship. The philosophy is that there
should be a strong independent faculty – ‘it is incumbent on industry to
keep up’ (personal communication, Joseph Montemarano, Director for
Industrial Liaison (POEM)).
Since its formation, POEM has developed research and development
partnerships with approximately 200 New-Jersey-based companies
(including 40 start-ups) and entrepreneurs in a wide array of fields, ranging
from aviation and environmental monitoring to medicine and telecommu-
nications. POEM’s focus is on companies with fewer than 50 employees.
For example, Sensors Unlimited was recently acquired for $900 million,
and Epitaxx was acquired for $450 million – both of these companies suc-
ceeding in large part because of POEM’s assistance and technology.
Organic electronics, biological imaging and bio-nano informatics are
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representative areas of forward-looking, interdisciplinary research led by
POEM in partnership with industry and government. Also, POEM has
launched an aggressive outreach effort to the venture and investment
communities to make them aware of the valuable technology created by
POEM and more broadly at Princeton University. POEM graduates work
for start-ups and small companies for three to five years and many go on to
start new companies. By 2005 around a dozen spin-offs had some student
involvement.
POEM attracted some $12–14 million external dollars and became the
second largest research unit on campus. Of this, 60 per cent was Federal
grant, 15 per cent state, 25 per cent industry – half from large companies
and half from small. One of the challenges for the university was to
replace income from telecommunications industry, mainly AT&T. POEM
was critical to the university’s ability to attract the brightest and best
faculty and students in opto-electronics. A university must have ‘a combi-
nation of theoretical, applied, and entrepreneurial talent’. The quality of
students has not been affected by industrially orientated research, accord-
ing to Joseph Montemarano. POEM has demonstrated that the quality of
PhD students is as good as or better than any other PhD students.
Alongside the more applied research, the university’s national research
role is reinforced with major Federal grants. In July 2004, the US Depart-
ment of Energy announced that the US project office for ITER, a major
international fusion experiment, will be located at the Princeton Plasma
Physics Laboratory. Ever since fusion research began at Princeton Univer-
sity in 1951, PPPL, located on Princeton University’s James Forrestal
Campus, has been charged with developing the scientific understanding
and key innovations that will lead to an attractive fusion energy source.
PPPL, in partnership with DOE’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory, will be
responsible for overseeing the US ITER Project Office and providing it
with the requisite staffing and facilities.
Defence and biotech
New Jersey, like Kentucky, is not one of the leading biotech or defence
expenditure states. Life sciences are not one of Princeton’s strengths. In
2002, New Jersey ranked 24th among all 50 states in NIH funding and
received ten NIH grandest awards and contracts totalling $136.6 million.
Yet the state is home to 19 of the 25 largest pharmaceutical and medical
technology companies in the world, including Aventis Pharmaceuticals,
Bristol-Myers Squibb (pharmaceutical research, oncology, immunology
and inflammation drug discovery), Johnson & Johnson, Merck and Co.
and Roche Pharmaceuticals. The big pharma companies in New Jersey
focus mainly on manufacturing, but 17,300 people, one-quarter of their
69,200 employees, are engaged in R&D. An additional 120 or so biotech
companies are clustered around a 48-mile research corridor stretching
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from Newark through New Brunswick to Princeton (Agres 2004). This is
an example where the presence of a major research university and the co-
location of pharmaceutical and biotech companies is coincidental.
Massification and the training role
Unlike at Oxford, at Princeton the undergraduate teaching focus and
strong loyalty to the Alma Mater has remained, as is shown by the very
high level of income from gifts. Princeton has begun to look outwards and
has begun a number of initiatives, which, although not focused on applied
research, may sensitize students to prevailing external agendas. The
Oxford/Princeton Partnership, established in 2001, is one such initiative. It
supports faculty research collaborations (including graduate student par-
ticipation) and undergraduate student exchanges between Oxford Univer-
sity and Princeton University. Since the Partnership’s inception, fifteen
joint research projects have been approved for fixed-term internal seed
funding. The university supports the Program in Continuing Education. In
this programme, individuals become officially registered students, pay full
tuition for each course they take, and receive a transcript and credit that
may be used toward a degree at another institution of higher learning.
The entrepreneurial university
The entrepreneurial role, like the territorial role discussed below, is relat-
ively recent. The Princeton University website lists only six spin-off com-
panies, most of which started in the early 1990s. The majority of these are
related to the photonics research area, and one is a bioscience company.
For example, Global Photonic Energy Corporation development stage
company was incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania on 7 February 1994 by American Biomimetics Corporation (‘Bio-
mimetics’), a privately held new materials, science and technology venture
company. It is based on ‘organic thin film’ technologies (the ‘Energy Tech-
nologies’) being developed by researchers at the University of Southern
California and Princeton University. Cellular Genomics Inc. is a drug dis-
covery and development company.
The recent more entrepreneurial stance of the university is illustrated
by the work of PRISM. This initiative is designed to build on existing
research expertise, to develop commercial applications and to strengthen
ties with the regional economy. This interdisciplinary institute already has
more than 65 faculty and 200 post-graduates. The new Institute will focus
on research and education that combines expertise in ‘hard’ materials such
as conventional semiconductors and ceramics with knowledge of ‘soft’
materials such as polymers and biological molecules. The objectives of the
centre and kinds of cultural shifts that have been made within the univer-
sity are illustrated by this quotation from the launch publicity:
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The interdisciplinary aspect of PRISM research is complemented by a
direct focus on industrial collaboration, particularly with companies
in New Jersey. The Institute will promote an entrepreneurial style of
research through support of far-reaching new ideas or ‘seed’ projects,
involving researchers from different academic perspectives and exter-
nal collaborations with industry and national laboratories. To cement
its links with industry, PRISM will offer an enhanced technology
infrastructure making it easy for companies to work with institute
researchers, including an active affiliates program and ready access to
the Institute’s four state-of-the-art research facilities: the
Nano/microfabrication Lab, the Ultrafast Laser Lab, the Imaging and
Analysis Facility, and the Materials Computation Lab. For use by
faculty, students and visitors, these facilities are designed to encour-
age the flow of people and ideas to Princeton’s campus and central
New Jersey.
The territorial role
Even as recently as the late 1980s, the state of New Jersey was not a
partner of Princeton. The then University President William Bowen was
reported as saying that Princeton was an accident of history and was not
identified with the region. It was a national research institution (personal
communication, Joseph Montemorano). Now there is a much stronger
focus on local and regional economy and the university is seen as a force
for growth. The rhetoric is all about partnership, and as in the case of Uni-
versity of Louisville, leverage of Federal funding. From being a different
kind of university to Rutgers – a state university which has a role for eco-
nomic development in its charter – this private university has found the
territorial role to be beneficial in that it has brought in research income
and has had a beneficial impact in the state. New Jersey, although it does
not put tobacco settlement money into university research – that has gone
in a bond to offset state deficit – has established the New Jersey Commis-
sion on Science and Technology (NJCST).
Wojciechowski (2004) reports that the NJCST has made a major impact
on the economy through funding research, helping the state start and attract
new companies and consolidation of activities at others – for example,
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Magnetic Resonance Imaging R&D activities at its
Lawrenceville site. PRISM is already home to four NJCST-supported pro-
grammes in organic electronics, large-area flexible displays and electronics,
molecular and biomolecular imaging, and embedded system-on-a-chip
design. Each has a number of industrial partners. Princeton researchers
have become world leaders in the area of ‘organic’ and ‘flexible’ electronics,
where conventional crystalline semiconductor devices are replaced with
materials that are potentially cheaper, printable, and energy efficient. This
work has led to several productive collaborations with companies that
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licensed discoveries from Princeton and now work closely with faculty
members and graduate students.
Further, at Princeton alone, the infrastructure made possible by NJCST
R&D programmes in emerging areas has led to Federal and industrial
research funds over ten times the initial state investment, and led to the
establishment of Princeton as a driver of Central New Jersey’s ‘Route 1
Research Corridor’, a regional link which did not exist before the Com-
mission’s programmes took effect. Support from the Commission has
enabled Princeton researchers to provide significant benefit to New Jersey
companies: assisting more than 250 companies (including more than 50
start-ups), thereby creating new jobs and yielding in a single year (2002)
over $500 million in capital gains from private investment in the com-
panies partnered with Princeton – generating New Jersey income tax pay-
ments in excess of $15 million. Cumulatively, NJCST-supported activities
at Princeton have resulted in more than $25 million in income and payroll
taxes (surpassing total direct state grants and bond money provided), and
leveraged more than $50 million in Federal grants and over $25 million in
industry resources. Moreover, Princeton University has long played an
important role in attracting prestigious international corporations to
central New Jersey, particularly to the university-developed Forrestal
Center properties in Plainsboro and South Brunswick.
The impact of these initiatives is to increase the attractiveness of the
local economy to business. According to the Moody’s Investor Service
Municipal Credit Research report, the university’s positive effect on the
local economy and the stability of its presence is the dominant factor in
the Triple A bond rating for Princeton Township and the Princeton
Regional School District, and the Double A bond rating for Princeton
Borough (www.princeton.edu/pr/facts/profile/04/32.htm).
Conclusions
The case studies show that each of the universities is positioned differ-
ently within international and national innovation systems, a variety of
mechanisms by which universities engage in innovation and economic
development, and that there can be more than one version of history.
Stanford has a very long history of contributing to economic develop-
ment in Silicon Valley in the context of the heritage of earlier techno-
logical revolution, which laid the basis for an environment in which the
electronics industry could flourish. This transformation was aided by the
ownership of vast tracts of land which gave the freedom for the univer-
sity to capitalize on those assets through both the science park and the
income from rent, and crucially by Federal defence expenditure. One
version has it that Frederick Terman was the right man in the right place
at the right time to capitalize on both assets. His vision was to maximize
the returns on the very best talent he could attract to the university and
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set the terms of trade with government and industry at a time when the
university was able to do so because of its expertise that was so useful in
the Second World War and the Cold War. Once established, those terms
laid the foundation for the future, building high-quality research and
linked to graduate and professional education programmes through
which entrepreneurship flourished. Told this way, the Silicon
Valley/Stanford story illustrates Florida’s (1999) point that what industry
wants most from universities is ‘talent not technology’. Another version
is that similar developments were occurring through co-evolution of atti-
tudes and practices in industry and in premier universities on the east
coast, particularly at MIT.
The University of Louisville is located in a much less promising setting.
The state has been suffering from the effects of de-industrialization in its
traditional manufacturing industries, and its service industries are not
natural collaborators with universities. It is a state with an already heavily
polarized economy. Moreover, although Louisville has expertise in its hos-
pitals, the University of Louisville has not had a history of research exper-
tise in life sciences that the state sees as the sector most likely to produce
jobs. Although the ‘Bucks for Brains’ programme has brought consider-
able funds into the university, the agenda is entirely one of economic
development and does not appear to have the graduate programmes as
central for sustaining links with industry and as a source of revenue. Issues
of human resources, which take the longest to change here as elsewhere,
are hence the most neglected part of technology-based development (Tor-
natzky et al. 2002). Rather, the terms of trade are that this money is for
leverage of other income. On the other hand, the city is judged to be a
fertile ground for entrepreneurship but it is not clear at this stage where
the two connect. As the example of Georgia shows, states can make con-
siderable gains in technology industries over a short period of time, but for
a state to be transformed can take decades.
Princeton University, one of the world’s most eminent universities, on
the other hand, has the research base on which to build a regional eco-
nomic strategy. A long history of top-quality research has provided the
university with the leverage to dictate the terms on which it engages in
economic development.
Hence the territorial role of each university and its associated
accountability are different. Stanford University, through whichever
version of history, has long been associated with the growth of Silicon
Valley. As a private university, it has no formal requirement to form part
of a regional economic governance system but is part of the social, eco-
nomic and cultural fabric of the region. The University of Louisville, a
state university on the other hand, like Princeton has recently been
recruited into the regional governance system through a state-wide initi-
ative. It and its staff have the most difficult task in delivering economic
development as expectations are so high, and the opportunities for its
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graduates to contribute to raising the skill base of the region in the short
term are limited. For Princeton, the academic as well as the commercial
advantages of engagement with the region have been successfully trans-
lated into new models of research and research application which are
reinforcing its premier status.
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9 Conclusions
Introduction
This book has taken as its theme how, in the early twenty-first century,
universities in Europe and the US are increasingly driven by political
normative agendas that have innovation and economic development at
their heart. It has shown that, although universities have long been
involved in innovation and economic development, what is recent is their
role as territorial actors. The rhetoric of the discourse around the eco-
nomic agenda is revealing, not all of it having favourable connotations.
Academic observers have used such epithets to describe universities’
current place in innovation and economic development as ‘mechanistic’
and ‘instrumentalist’ position, as ‘academic capitalism’, as ‘factories’. The
book explores the changes within higher education and is critical of the
normative agenda behind the growing convergence in orientation between
institutions and industry. It highlights how pressure both from the state
and from industry has produced new paradigms of accountability that now
include responsibilities for regional development. It argues that one of the
weaknesses of the current policy agenda is the focus on the elite or
research universities, misattributing directions of causality and unrealistic
expectations. Only recently has there been more debate on the long-term
adverse consequences of some aspects of the current agenda, particularly
the sustainability of high-quality research in the context of an increasing
reliance on industry funding for research.
Systemic changes in the relationship between universities and the
economy are investigated through the framework of eight paradigms.
These eight interconnected trends or paradigms represent the complexity
of contemporary relationships which characterize universities’ involve-
ment in economic development. They are defined as:
• innovation processes being increasingly distributed between actors 
in public and private sectors, resulting in a greater integration of
activity
• a series of systemic changes within national innovation systems dating
back to at least the early part of the twentieth century
• the disproportionate impact of the eminence of particular individuals
and universities
• systemic changes in the orientation of university systems: the still
important role played by defence research in the construction of uni-
versity systems and the rapid rise in biotech-orientated research
• new accountabilities to industry and society
• a rapid expansion in student numbers from the late 1990s onwards
• the legitimation and priorization of entrepreneurial activities
• most recently, an explicit territorial role.
Distributed innovation systems
The increasing emphasis on economic development being determined by
knowledge production and utilization, and the university as a source of the
former and instrumental in providing the framework for the latter, forms
the basis for the prevailing policy agenda. Both are underpinned by
funding programmes at international, national and regional level designed
to increase the distribution power of innovation systems (David and Foray
1995) by encouraging universities to be more commercial and for firms to
increase their capacity to absorb university research.
Evidence shows, however, that universities are not the major input to
industrial innovation and are commonly ranked as ninth or tenth in
importance, some way behind clients and customers – which are univer-
sally found, along with internal resources, to be the major sources of
innovation. Studies also show that degrees of engagement between univer-
sities and industry are context-dependent, with marked national, sectoral
and institutional country differences. These are strongly influenced by the
traditional cultural and institutional modes of behaviour (see Senker
2005). This holds even at the continental level, with the EU as a whole
some way behind the effectiveness of the US national system of innova-
tion. Evidence shows that the biotechnology, life science and pharmaceuti-
cal sector disproportionately accounts for the volume of linkages and is
more internationalized than industries such as chemistry and engineering,
which hence have different appropriability conditions (Brusoni and Geuna
forthcoming). On the other hand, studies also show that university–
industry engagement is not confined to high-tech sectors and that firms in
medium- and low-tech industries, which form the majority of businesses,
often work closely with universities, albeit by different routes (see Smith
1997).
Moreover, methods and targets chosen to identify the scale and scope
of the link between university research, innovation and economic perform-
ance vary and the practice of measurement is undertaken for different
reasons to show different outcomes. Any data set also at best shows a
partial picture when it is total links that matter (Lee and Walshok 2003).
Not all contacts are measured, of course: as Betts and Lee (2005) point
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out, the focus on innovations directly linked to universities, such as
patents, seriously undercounts the impact of individual university scientists
and engineers through informal contacts and being recruited into industry.
For example, faculty consulting is not tracked by formal university means.
Moreover, comparisons of performance between countries are compli-
cated by differences in national and regional innovation systems and the
difficulties in demonstrating both direct and indirect impacts. Moreover,
the current emphasis on short-term evaluation severely overlooks the
impact of research on innovation and economic development over longer
periods.
The current policy agenda on increasing the efficiency of the innovation
process through cluster policies focuses on innovation as a social as well as
a technological process. While it would not be disputed that there are per-
sonal interactions in which tacit knowledge is transmitted between person-
nel in universities and industry as Chapter 2 shows, there is much debate
about the significance of local innovation networks, compared to more
geographically extensive interactions, in the efficiency of the innovation
process (see Malmberg and Power 2004, for example). The focus on the
territorial role overlooks the fact that what matter most to firms are the
benefits to that particular location such as residential attractiveness rather
than their being flagship companies in a broader economic development
agenda.
Moreover, proximity effects change over time. In some industries but
not others, localized linkages are most prevalent at early stages in an
industry’s growth and decline over time. Not all areas can benefit equally
from a university’s presence because of the lack of match between the
profile of a university’s teaching and its research. Other caveats are that
urbanization are more important than localization economies. Evidence to
support localization effects, hence the justification for policies which
attempt to foster local university–industry links on the basis of innovation
efficiency, is at best mixed.
The case studies from Europe and the US illustrate how universities
vary in their degree of integration within geographically extensive and
localized innovation systems and how this variation is related to inter-
dependent systemic technological, political and institutional changes. For
example, Stanford is the most integrated into industrial innovation systems
and Louisville the least. The Grenoble model of collaboration between
universities, research laboratories, business and central and local state is
one which is replicated in the US and is being adopted by the UK.
National innovation systems
Countries differ in the level of allocation of resources allocated for
research in universities and national laboratories, for supporting strategic
technologies, and also in the distributive aspects of the national innovation
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system such as the ownership of intellectual property in universities and
other public research institutions and in the establishment of TTOs in
order to facilitate the exploitation of public sector knowledge (Senker
2005). Chapters 4 and 5 also show that systemic change is faster in some
countries than in others (see Bozeman 2000).
The comparison between Europe and the US forms a central theme of
the book to illustrate how these different elements in national innovation
systems have actual and potential consequences for the trajectories of
research-to-innovation systems. The US has traditionally been the model
for Europe. The Europeanization of the higher education system in both
teaching and research is intended to challenge US hegemony by improving
efficiency by increasing harmonization and strengthening the research
base. Under the Lisbon Agenda the aim is to raise the average share of
EU GDP invested in R&D from 2 to 3 per cent by 2010. Within the EU a
huge variety in structure and compliance existed amongst the EU15, now
further complicated by the expansion to EU25. Yet in mid-2005, EU
finance ministers were proposing severe cuts to the Framework 6 pro-
gramme (Lipsett 2005).
The European paradox, that the quality of Europe’s science is not
matched by the universities’ ability to respond to industry’s needs, is fre-
quently blamed on the universities. The counter-argument is that it is
industry’s under-investment, for example in the UK, that is the most
significant barrier to a greater degree of integration, a key conclusion from
the UK’s Lambert Report, and supported by David (2005) and Senker
(2005). Policy makers in the UK and Europe look to the US for models for
improving the quality of research-to-innovation systems, observing more
flexibility, greater investment in research and the impact of legislative
change in the US system. In respect of the last, some analysts, however,
argue that it is unrealistic to try to replicate systemic changes such as the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 which appears to have had a major impact on the
entrepreneurial activities of universities. David (2005) is one of a number
of authors who argue that its impact has been misunderstood (Chapter 5)
and cannot be separated from the conditions in the US at the time of the
Act.
Moreover, the book shows that the US hegemony is not constant. Some
analysts indeed suggest that the US has moved from a position of domi-
nance to one of first among equals in line with a more widely distributed
pattern of science and technological capabilities (Malecki 2005). While the
US maintains its lead over other nations in R&D performance, the US
share of research output, but not relative to publications, continues to
decline. In some sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, the US maintains
leadership because of much higher degree of knowledge integration
between universities and other research institutes and industry than in the
EU (Brusoni and Geuna forthcoming).
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Eminence
Recent league tables which rank the top research institutions on such cri-
teria as publications cited, patents, spending on research endowment
income and knowledge integration show that the US universities outper-
form those in the rest of world, with the two exceptions of Oxford and
Cambridge.
Eminence, however, while associated with academic excellence and
indicated by such measures as the number of Nobel Prizes, Fields medals
won and so on, now has a utilitarian value. The added-value and income
accruing to top universities through three kinds of ‘Matthew effects’ have
both direct and indirect leverage effects both on the way national and
increasingly internationally distributed innovation systems operate and on
the production of localized effects. In the former, these are being rein-
forced by national government efforts to create elite institutions – for
example Germany in emulating the US (Chapter 4) – and through the
establishment of international elites of universities – the global elite 8 and
the Universitas 21 (U21) which was launched in Australia in 2001. In the
latter, Chapter 2 illustrated the disproportionate impact that many, but not
all, leading universities have on their local economies and the techno-
logical profiles of their regions.
Yet the position of universities in relation to commercialization activ-
ities is not constant. In the US for example, Federal programmes such as
EPSCoR and state investments in research such as those in Georgia 
and in Kentucky aimed at using universities to drive economic develop-
ment have had some impact. For example, Powers (2003) finds that in
the US if private and Land Grant universities ever had an advantage
over public universities in commercialization, that has disappeared in
recent years.
Defence and biotech
This paradigm proposes an equivalence between defence and biotechnol-
ogy in the orientation of university systems. As Chapter 3 documented and
other chapters discussed, the share of research in universities dedicated to
biotech and life sciences is increasing while defence is declining. In the
1980s, much academic research focused on the role played by defence in
stimulating the growth of high-tech industries in locations such as Silicon
Valley and Route 128 in the US and the M4 corridor in the UK (albeit
without major university involvement). That emphasis has largely, and in
my opinion erroneously, disappeared. Defence funding for universities
and public research laboratories in countries such as the US, the UK and
France, although it has declined since the ending of the Cold War, still
comprises a significant component of national R&D systems. It has a
major influence on the direction of university research, has limited civil
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applications and potentially crowds out other areas of more ‘useful’
research and operates largely without publicity (Langley 2005).
By the early twenty-first century, biomedical science comprises the
largest share of R&D in US and UK universities. Like defence research, it is
concentrated in a small number of centres in the US and Europe, and like
defence research it is being further concentrated with the building of
regional ‘megacentres’ – centres of public and private sector research in
which public authorities are actively engaged in their development. Even so,
as a target for economic development and job generation, the university–
biotech commercialization route through spin-offs, patents and licences is,
with a few high-profile exceptions, extremely limited. Even in the US, it is
only a few blockbuster patents and licences that make up the bulk of income
derived from commercialization. Yet biotech is an industry where regions
are competing with each other for the attraction of major corporate research
establishment and new firms (Betts and Lee 2005). The relationship
between universities, innovation and economic development is therefore
complex. The cases of defence and potentially biotech illustrate both the
geographical impact of major expenditure programmes on economic activity
and failures of commercialization of university research (Senker 2005). All
in all, there are over-optimistic expectations of biomedical science and the
biotech sector on innovation and economic development in Europe under
current conditions (see DTI 2005; Nightingale and Martin 2004).
Accountability
How a system allocates resources is interdependent with systems of
accountability. The governance of public universities occurs at three policy
levels: government, university administration and the individual faculty.
What is important is where power is exerted on and in each of these three
levels in the respective national innovation systems. And, in spite of the
limited returns, the supposed commercial potential of university research
is being matched by an increase in measures designed to evaluate and
benchmark the outputs of universities, public laboratories and pro-
grammes designed to improve flows of knowledge between these bodies
and industry (see for example OECD 2002a). Yet at the institutional level,
many immeasurable variables account for differences in university
performance including institutional culture and incentive systems, policies
which legitimate this kind of entrepreneurial activity (Powers 2003).
In the US and in Germany as well as in the UK, a consequence of the
combined drives towards the excellence and industrial support for
research may well be a polarized system, in some cases along old and in
others along new lines. In meeting political agendas, the book shows that
universities in Europe and the US are faced with tensions between acade-
mic values of open science and meeting short-term industry objectives.
Studies, however, find evidence to support claims both for adverse effects
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on the commitment to free inquiry and for no adverse effects on the long-
term direction of academic research.
While the book has argued that the territorial role brings with it new sets
of accountabilities, what is not resolved at the regional or local level is the
tension raising from the fact that states, regions or localities do not have
responsibilities for conflicts of interests between, on the one hand, universi-
ties’ commercial activities and, on the other, their societal responsibilities of
education, custodians of culture heritage, recorders of history and agents of
debate on philosophical, scientific, literary debates and so on. Instead mul-
tiple accountabilities and stakeholders exist in which those responsible for
regional or local territorial development now have a say on what universities
should be doing to stimulate economic development. Yet the ethical
implications of what that means for the direction of university research in
general and in military and biotechnical activity have not yet been widely
debated locally. It is not in the remit of states or regions to be concerned
with such issues; rather they remain national and EU responsibilities.
Massification
The contribution of universities to innovation and economic development
through the teaching role is one of the most neglected relationships in acad-
emic analysis. It has, however, now assumed major political significance.
Europe’s Bologna agreement, for example, is for a common framework
designed to improve economic performance through human capital forma-
tion from undergraduate to professional development and to increase the
mobility of staff and students. It is mobility in the form of foreign recruit-
ment of staff and students that has been key to the continued renewal of
research activities in the US (Chapter 6), although concerns have been
raised about the over-reliance on foreign-born talent (Malecki 2005).
The quality, quantity and mobility of the workforce are connected to
levels of investment in science and technology at the national (and EU)
level. Although the number of scientists and engineers is increasing, a lack
of opportunities for young researchers found in Germany, the UK and the
US is hindering the sustainability of the research base and hence potential
longer-term links with industry. The UK, for example, is still redressing
the problems of the legacy of the under-funding from Conservative gov-
ernments. The university system suffers from poor pay for academic staff,
limited opportunities for graduates students within academia and few
incentives to stay on to undertake a PhD. Combined, these factors restrict
the intake to the next generations both of senior researchers and of people
who will participate in industry-related activities such as industry-funded
studentships and who can be recruited by industry. Chapter 5 shows that
similar problems are currently being experienced in the US. Evidence
from the US suggests also that there are cultural barriers to be overcome
in encouraging students to seek careers in industry.
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As the examples of Grenoble and Stanford show, in order to improve
levels of university–industry linkage, teaching and research should take a
greater account of how graduate and professional education programmes
can work to the benefit of both. What is missing in Oxford and Louisville,
but found in Grenoble, Stanford and Princeton, is the emphasis on gradu-
ate education as a research and industry resource and on CPD. Senker
(2005) concludes that entrepreneurial programmes and courses in gradu-
ate science programmes would raise the interest of scientists to work with
or for industry and help build links between the two communities. More-
over, CPD/industry courses can be important sources of income as the
examples of Stanford and UCSD illustrate.
Yet there is another viewpoint: that it is at primary and secondary
school level rather than at university level that education has the greatest
impact on the economy (Wolf 2002). Moreover such an emphasis on voca-
tional skills has little to do with social justice and quality of life, a senti-
ment supported by Bundy (2004) writing about the polarization of the
educational system in the US. Both point to a confusion of objectives
arising from placing so much emphasis on universities on training.
Entrepreneurial universities
This book shows the progression of the steps taken by many universities
to appropriate the gains of commercially valuable research activities
and the different models that exist (see also Powers and McDougall
2003). Stanford was one of the first entrepreneurial universities in the
US. In the UK, Cambridge University was one of the first to be identi-
fied with academic enterprise (in the mid-1980s), as was Chalmers, a
private university in Sweden, and by the early twentieth century, the
University of Twente was a leading model of the Netherlands’ entrepre-
neurial universities. Although the vast majority of universities in
Europe and the US have instituted measures to respond to growing
political expectations, not all can be entrepreneurial in the same ways.
Evidence from several countries finds that many TTOs are not effective
mediators between the university and industry and there is a need for
institutional innovation which complements its HEIs with novel organi-
zations that are better suited to commercializing the results of research
(Senker 2005; David 2005), and evidence from the US and Europe
shows that most universities do not make a profit from the activities of
their technology transfer offices or through intellectual property rights
(Geuna and Nesta 2003).
Yet efforts to establish science parks, TTOs and spin-offs and to
produce patents and licences are ubiquitous but are as much for political
as for economic reasons. For example, Powers (2003) argues of the US
that, as long as economic development remains a central concern for state
and Federal policy makers, then continuing to support Land Grant univer-
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sities in their pursuit of core purposes seems wise, even though, on finan-
cial grounds, policy should suggest otherwise.
The territorial role
Universities and other colleges are becoming more closely involved with
their territories. In so doing, they are emerging as key actors in gover-
nance systems, becoming the focal point for the formulation and delivery
of policies on innovation, entrepreneurship and cluster development, and
human capital formation and development. This is the paradigm of the
university which Etzkowitz (2003) describes as the ‘regional innovation
organizer’. Higher education then not only provides potentially a core
element of the knowledge base of cities and regions, but universities and
colleges also have the potential through their teaching and research mis-
sions to play a leading role in joining up the separate strands of urban
development policy and linking the global to the local (Goddard 2004).
While the case studies have shown that universities have been actively
involved in local economic development, the evidence on effectiveness is
mixed. Boosterish agendas tend to overlook the unintended outcome of
polarization within economies, for example in Atlanta, in which economic
benefits of stimulating economic development through innovation are
largely confined to the core.
More detailed academic analysis of the contributions of other kinds of
universities across a wide range of contexts has begun to inform that
debate. Rather than the discussion being confined to the purely economic,
the engagement of universities in the cultural life of cities and of their
broader governance role in addressing problems of regeneration and sus-
tainability are becoming more common (see Glasson 2003). Yet in many
countries there is a lack of strategic thinking about economic development
capacity at the regional or local level to assess what contribution the
various universities can play (Powers 2003). As Betts and Lee (2005) point
out, while universities can and do play an important role in stimulating
regional innovation, they cannot do this without a multi-faceted entrepre-
neurial structure being in place locally. Best practices might also include a
greater willingness to break down the traditional barriers within hierarchi-
cal tertiary educational systems that are found in many countries. They see
it as misguided to consider universities in isolation from other processes in
the economy. They find that the literature tends to ‘overplay the role of
universities and underplay the role of the private sector in generating
innovative technology clusters’.
To conclude, in reviewing Gibbons et al. (1994), Edqvist (2003, 220)
concludes that the book gives science a too-important role in society, and
that it should be seen not as the goose which lays the golden eggs but
rather as an ordinary hen laying breakfast eggs. This analogy could equally
apply to universities in innovation and economic development.
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